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We are pleased to present this new volume in the publication series of the 
Academy of Fine Arts Vienna. The series, published in cooperation with our 
highly committed partner Sternberg Press, is devoted to central themes of con­
temporary thought about art practices and art theories. The volumes in the 
 series comprise collected contributions on subjects that form the focus of dis­
course in terms of art theory, cultural studies, art history, and research at the 
Academy of Fine Arts Vienna, and represent the quintessence of international 
study and discussion taking place in the respective fields. Each volume is pub­
lished in the form of an anthology, edited by staff members of the Academy of 
Fine Arts Vienna. Authors of high international repute are invited to write con­
tributions dealing with the respective areas of emphasis. Research activities such 
as international conferences, lecture series, institute­specific research focuses, 
or research projects serve as points of departure for the individual volumes.
With Putting Rehearsals to the Test: Practices of Rehearsal in Fine Arts, Film, 
Theater, Theory, and Politics we are launching volume nineteen of the series. 
The book presents the results of a research process that has been conducted 
at the Academy of Fine Arts Vienna in close cooperation between two depart­
ments/studios: Modern and Postmodern Art Theory Professor Sabeth  Buchmann, 
and Constanze Ruhm, head of Digital Media Studio, have been dealing with 
the topic of “rehearsal” in many different formats, from many different approaches 
and with great dedication. Curator Ilse Lafer, who is coeditor of this volume, 
has also been instrumental in conceiving the exhibition that has been prepared 
in parallel to the publication of this volume, and which took place at VOX­ 
Centre de l’image contemporaine, Galerie Leonard & Bina Ellen—Université 
 Concordia, and SBC Galerie d’art contemporain, Montreal, from September to 
mid December, 2016.
This volume spans a broad arch from fine arts to theater, from politics to theory 
to film. And it presents artworks contributed by Silke Otto­Knapp, former head 
of the Figurative Painting studio at the Academy of Fine Arts Vienna and now 
professor at UCLA, which in a pronounced way points toward one of the central 
hypothesis of this book: that the practices of rehearsal not only prove to be 
 productive fields of scholarly inquiry, they are imminent to the practices of art 
and thus art practices in themselves.
We thank the editors of this volume, Sabeth Buchmann, Constanze Ruhm, and 
Ilse Lafer, for bringing together this wide range of expertise, and for their 
 continued work on the rehearsal. Their commitment to this book project was 
tremendous. We thank—as always—all the partners contributing to the book, 
 especially Sternberg Press.
The Rectorate of the Academy of Fine Arts Vienna
Eva Blimlinger, Andrea B. Braidt, Karin Riegler
On the Publication Series
Putting Rehearsals to the Test: Introduction
Sabeth Buchmann, Ilse Lafer, and Constanze Ruhm 10
What Your Spontaneity Is Worth to Us: Improvisation  
between Art and Economics
Kai van Eikels 22




Contingency and Plan: Working in Theater
Annemarie Matzke 58
A Heavy Compression to Bring Out the Moments of Crisis 
Eva Könnemann in Conversation 
with Stefanie Diekmann and Ekkehard Knörer 72
The Rehearsal in Film: From the Focus on Results 
to a Space of Experience 
Rainer Bellenbaum 82
The Rehearsal as Metaphor for Metamorphosis: The Pictorial  
Dramaturgy in Velázquez’s The Spinners, or The Fable of Arachne 
Christine Lang 96
The Play’s the Thing: On the Politics of Rehearsal
José M. Bueso 108
Contents 
Editors: Sabeth Buchmann, Ilse Lafer, Constanze Ruhm
Editorial Coordinator: Martina Huber
Proofreader: Niamh Dunphy 
Design: Victor Kassis, Surface, Frankfurt am Main/Berlin 
Cover image: Silke Otto­Knapp, from the series “The Common Reader,” 2015. 
Etching, ink on paper. Courtesy of the artist. 
Printing: Holzhausen Druck GmbH, Wolkersdorf
Binding: Buchbinderei Papyrus, Vienna
ISBN 978-3-95679-211-3
© 2016 Akademie der bildenden Künste Wien, Sternberg Press 











Re-rehearsing the Test Drive 




Richard Ibghy and Marilou Lemmens 138
Upheaval in the Despot’s Wake: Rehearsal and Drawing in 




The Rehearsal as Form: An Essay on Yvonne Rainer’s Lives  
of Performers
Jenny Nachtigall and Dorothea Walzer 182
In Abeyance: It Is Perhaps Now Time to Leave, Once More,  
the Clinic …
Vincent Bonin 196
Our Attempt/Notre Tentative 
Achim Lengerer 212
Castingagentur: Casting as Agency
Constanze Ruhm 224
Alive Supreme: On Rehearsal as Film 
Stephan Geene  234
Sabeth Buchmann, Ilse Lafer, and Constanze Ruhm 11
Despite the popularity of the format of rehearsal in film, theater, music, and 
fine art, it has been scarcely considered as a theoretical topic in contempo­
rary art discourses. It is against this background that this publication—as part 
of an ongoing research­based project that branches out into film screenings 
and lecture programs1 as well as, most recently, the format of an exhibition—
investigates the role as well as the function of the notion of “rehearsal,” un­
derstood as a methodology, a modus operandi, a medium, a site of represen­
tation and reflection for artistic production processes, and as an instrument 
of critique of institutional power relations.
The impossibility of distinguishing between rehearsal and performance—a 
specific feature of the so­called post­dramatic theatre2—appears as an anal ogy 
to certain practices existing in an area of conflict between so­called individual/
fine arts and collective/performing arts: these practices oftentimes lean toward 
narrativizing as well as staging artistic events going beyond a  rigid category 
of “artwork.” As Annemarie Matzke has shown in her instructive book Arbeit 
am Theater: Eine Diskursgeschichte der Probe3 and in her essay “Contingency 
and Plan,” published in this reader, formats of rehearsals seek to debunk the 
embeddedness of art into the social division of labor: “In other words, the way 
rehearsals are conducted in the theater says something about the society in 
which this theater is made.”4
Since this is true for other genres and media as well, the topos of rehearsal 
also inscribes itself into seemingly static formats such as drawing and paint­
ing—as Christine Lang points out in the case of Diego Velázquez’s The  
Spinners, or The Fable of Arachne (1655–60), and as Silke Otto­Knapp shows 
in her etching series “The Common Reader” (2015). It achieves this by turning 
the canvas, the paper, and/or the printing plate into the (performative) medi­
um, where the artistic labor process merges with the activity and/or work as 
the subject of representation.
Regarding this condition, artists, activists, and theorists working with and on 
strategies of rehearsal focus on moments of contingency within (pre­)existing 
systems and schemes in order to debunk their mutual function of establish­
ing and transforming social divisions of labor that correspond with the reci­
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1 “Putting Rehearsals to the Test” was the 
title of a series of seven evenings, 
including screenings, performances, 
discussions, and lectures at the mumok, 
Vienna, with a concluding conference 
hosted by the Academy of Fine Arts 
Vienna. The series took place between 
March and June 2013.
2 See Hans-Thies Lehmann, Das 
Postdramatische Theater (Frankfurt am 
Main: Verlag der Autoren, 1999).
3 Annemarie Matzke, Arbeit am Theater: 
Eine Diskursgeschichte der Probe 
(Bielefeld: transcript, 2012).
4 Annemarie Matzke, “Contingency and 
Plan,” in this volume, 58–70.
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investigates how processes of rehearsal are understood as an “attempt” or 
experiment” reveal processes of professionalization of the actors and actresses 
as well as the institutionalization of the theater as a genre to be distinguished 
from the entertainment industry. Conceiving rehearsal as a practice sus­
pended precisely between (pre­)determined and experimental role­playing, 
as part of rule­bending “work performances,” the entanglements of system/
scheme and contingency/randomness appear as a pendulum between the 
conventional and the searching creation of new knowledge.5
Assuming that systems and networks are interrelated modular forms of labor 
and knowledge, the relation between “role” and “rule” continues within an 
 investigation of the intersection and the interaction of the open form of re­
hearsal, while at the same time working with and against given conventions. 
By defining the methodology of rehearsal as a system­related format, we can 
observe the nexus of performative arts and fine arts. The processes of rehears­
ing and staging emerging from classical forms of theatrical production aim 
at perfection and virtuosity—in contemporary art discourse they reappear 
as a counter­model of a practice within which the final product frequently 
is the result of a fragile, fragmentary, incomplete, and experimental setting 
that reconstitutes and performs itself always anew by way of repetition and 
difference. 
It is exactly this aspect that leads us to the notion of post­dramatic theater, 
conceived by German theater theorist Hans­Thies Lehmann in his eponymous 
1999 book that summarizes a number of tendencies and stylistic traits occur­
ring in avant­garde theater since the end of the 1960s. The theater Lehmann 
calls post­dramatic is not primarily focused on the dramaturgic development 
of the narrative itself, but develops a performative aesthetic in which the text 
is set in a specific relation to the material situation of performance and stage. 
The moment of rehearsal in post­dramatic theater appears as a form of under­
lying instruction, a score, or a text that is not “interpreted” hermeneutically 
anymore, like in traditional theater, but is open to reinterpretation, thus also 
to variation, repetition, augmentation, non­finality/unfinishedness, and so on. 
Citing Giorgio Agamben, Richard Ibghy and Marilou Lemmens state that this 
is the core of practices in fine arts too, where the goal of a production is “joy­
ously forgotten” and is considered “to show itself as such, as a means without 
an end”6—or as Achim Lengerer’s text “Our Attempt/Notre  Tentative,” about 
the social worker and writer Fernand Deligny, who lived together with autistic 
children, lets us sense writing as an experiment dealing with undetermined, 
sonic forms of communication.
At this point, a link could be established between this specific notion of post­
dramatic theater and certain genealogies of classical Conceptual art, which 
are based on both linguistic procedures and on performative practices. This 
very nexus becomes a tool to figure out reasons behind the shift away from 
static aesthetic norms toward an interest in variable and alterable rules to im­
provise and/or rehearse new conjunctions between artistic practices, linguis­
tic structures, and daily procedures. This shift that can be seen by works in 
the context of Fluxus (e.g., Yoko Ono, Grapefruit: A Book of Instructions and 
Drawings,  published in 1964), and of the Judson Dance Theater (e.g., Robert 
Morris’s  Continous Project Altered Daily from 1969). Exemplary films such 
as Shirley Clarke’s The Connection (1961), John Cassavetes’s Opening Night 
(1977), or Chantal Akerman’s Les années 80 (1983) demonstrate the compre­
hensive meaning of improvisation and rehearsal as a tool for questioning the 
foundations, routines, restrictions, and limitations of institutionalized genres. 
This becomes obvious in experimental film as well as in recent Hollywood 
mainstream productions, such as Alejandro González Iñárritu’s film Birdman, 
Olivier  Assayas’s Clouds of Sils Maria, or Antoine Barraud’s Le dos rouge (all 
released in 2014). In all these films, rehearsal constitutes not only the frame­
work for, but becomes the actual production: the “work” and its documen­
tation or staging overlap. It is precisely this “in­the­making” that is the subject 
of  Stefanie Diekmann and Ekkehard Knörer’s conversation with filmmaker 
Eva Könnemann, as well as Rainer Bellenbaum’s challenge of the stage under­
stood as an “empty space” beyond social and aesthetic inscriptions, and 
Stephan Geene’s analysis of rehearsal as an “attempt to get a grip on the 
 ontological implications of the fact of film”7—as Geene puts it in the title of 
his contribution: rehearsal as film.
While tackling the question of what exactly the specific—even though not 
 always conscious or even, at times, masked—significance of rehearsal is, this 
publication seeks to reveal either internalized and/or new conjunctions between 
art, labor, and life; conjunctions that provide deeper insights into the shifting 
and overlapping of material and immaterial, alienated and de­alienated, produc­
tive and unproductive, heteronomous and autonomous types of labor. As such, 
they evoke concepts of self­as­work­performance between  refusal and self­
optimization/collaboration. These overlapping concepts go along with 
changing interactions between production processes and aesthetic judgments, 
as well as between mechanisms of subjectivation, medialization, and institu­
tionalization.8 And even though with neo­ and post­avant­garde productions, 
the credo of the transfer from art into a practice of life seems long dead and 
5 Ibid., 20–21.
6 Giorgio Agamben, quoted in Richard 
Ibghy and Marilou Lemmens, “Rehearsal 
without the Performance,” in this volume, 
138–80.
7 See Stephan Geene, “Alive Supreme: On 
Rehearsal as Film,” in this volume, 234–43.
8 See Matzke, Arbeit am Theater; and 
Sabeth Buchmann, “Shared Production  
(–Values),” in this volume, 32–45.
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buried,9 one can nevertheless state that those transformations manifested in 
and by practices of rehearsal touch on dominant attempts to animate labor: 
to negotiate given social divisions of labor and the imperative of (self­)im­
provement—in neoliberal terms of “lifelong learning.”10 Considering the im­
perative of staging “real life,” life itself appears as a never­ending rehearsal, 
as the staging of its very conditions: subjects being suspended between pro­
ductivity, exhaustion, and precarity, who accomplish their work with joy and 
curiosity. As Kai van Eikels points out in his essay “What Your Spontaneity Is 
Worth to Us: Improvisation between Art and Economics,” the self­command–
based “improvisational formation” is constitutive for the “work performance 
in twenty­first­century companies.”11 
Our thesis is that rehearsal appears predominantly during periods of artistic­
aesthetic and sociocultural transformations; that is, during times when tradi­
tional norms and standards are being considered as dogmatic and hence  
obsolete, and new concepts, procedures, and rules are imposing themselves 
in their place. 
It is precisely this historical condition and social circumstance that can be 
observed in Yvonne Rainer’s Lives of Performers (1972), as Rainer—who until 
then was known as a choreographer and dancer closely associated with the 
Judson Dance Theatre—decided during a period of artistic, political, institu­
tional, and personal crisis to make a film;12 her first one. In Lives of Performers, 
it is quite striking to observe the rediscovery of narration that had been banned 
by the (post­)avant­gardes of the 1960s—a rediscovery and a re­introduction 
resulting from the conclusion that avant­gardist registers of expression became 
more and more inadequate. To Rainer, these registers no longer seemed to 
be apt mediums to encompass the madness of social relations. To properly 
articulate subjects of established hierarchies in the art world—feelings of love 
and jealousy in relation to inclusion and mostly exclusion (of female artists), 
sentiments of failure and dependency as crucial aspects of interhuman social 
relations—one needed a different form of articulation. It is exactly this implicit 
“research drive” that allows, as Jenny Nachtigall and Dorothea Walzer con­
vincingly show, a comparison of Rainer’s use of minor genres, like that of the 
rehearsal, and melodrama with Theodor W. Adorno’s “The Essay as Form” (1958), 
which pleads for “a non­doxological form of knowledge acquisition, an  
experience­based and context­sensitive type of learning.”13 In this light, 
Vincent Bonin’s reflections on the interlinkage  between the “cinematic” and 
“psychoanalytic performance” provide a reading of rehearsal practices not 
only as “analytical acts,” but also as “political interventions” into the nexus of 
film/art and psychoanalysis as an institutional field touching on the dispositif 
of the clinic.14
Once more, rehearsal appears at the same time as a means of reflection and 
as one of abstraction, mediating between formal­aesthetic conventions,  
sociocultural constellations, and media conditions. As we have argued above, 
rehearsal appears at moments of instability and change—and regarding its 
oscillations between heteronomous and autonomous labor represents trans­
formation.15 In that sense, we consider rehearsal interchangeable with post­
revolutionary moments in order to touch on unfinished political processes 
and their potential meaning for possible futures. As José M. Bueso elaborates 
in his essay “The Play’s the Thing,” there are a number of films linked to this 
subject that depict pivotal moments in history where “history could have gone 
one way or the other,” where attempts to “go beyond the tension between 
rehearsal and staging” promise the possibility to rewrite (the cinematic, artistic, 
and/or political) play itself.16 Those attempts are characteristic of the (intel­
lectual and political) film history that seeks to respond to the failed revolution 
through a performative analysis of social communication, conceived as a pos­
sible motor for the transformation of ruling power relations in moments of 
standstill. Examples here are Rainer Werner Fassbinder’s Beware of a Holy Whore 
(1971), Jules Dassin’s The Rehearsal (1974), Peter Brook’s Marat/Sade (1967), 
and Alberto Grifi and Massimo Sarchielli’s ANNA (1972–75).
Assuming an inherent bond between artistic and political processes, the always 
already transformative character of the rehearsal lets one raise the question of 
its timings: Is it, as Ibghy and Lemmens suggest, thought to be a principally 
unlimited process? Or does the time of rehearsal, as Kathrin Busch argues 
referring to René Pollesch’s Portrait aus Desinteresse (Portrait for a lack of any­
thing better to do) from 2008, point to the margins and limits of production 
and productivity? According to Busch, it is precisely their recognition and ac­
knowledgment that generates new ways of being more apt to describe all those 
fragile and multiple fractured instants and relations between art, labor, and life. 
As in the case of Pollesch’s Portrait aus Desinteresse, the actors and actresses 
leave the stage and their director behind and start directing themselves, ac­
cording to their own ideas: “These guys are my  neighbors; these strange people. 
Sabeth Buchmann, Ilse Lafer, and Constanze Ruhm
9 See Sabeth Buchmann, Helmut Draxler, 
and Stephan Geene, eds., Film Avantgarde 
Biopolitik (Vienna: Schlebrügge.Editor, 
2009).
10  Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript on the Societies 
of Control,” October 59 (Winter 1992): 3–7.
11  Kai van Eikels, “What Your Spontaneity Is 
Worth to Us: Improvisation between Art 
and Economics,” in this volume, 22–30 
(our emphasis).
12  See B. Ruby Rich, “Yvonne Rainer: 
Eine Einführung,” in Yvonne Rainer, 
Talking Pictures: Filme, Feminismus, 
Psychoanalyse, Avantgarde (Vienna: 
Passagen Verlag, 1994), 12f. 
13  See Jenny Nachtigall and Dorothea 
Walzer, “The Rehearsal as Form: An Essay 
on Yvonne Rainer’s Lives of Performers,” in 
this volume, 182–94.
14  See Vincent Bonin, “In Abeyance: It is 
Perhaps Now Time to Leave, Once More, 
the Clinic...,” in this volume, 196–210.
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16  José M. Bueso, “The Play’s the Thing: On 




They wear always­changing costumes. What are they doing here, I often ask 
myself. For some reason they’ve decided to stop time in order to repeat cer­
tain things.”17
Since rehearsal represents zones of transition, where the time of production 
and that of the presentation/performance become confused, it also tends to 
replace the tension between reality and fiction by casting as­if actions in op­
position to the rationality of agency to create a moment investigated in both 
Constanze Ruhm’s essay “Casting as Agency” and in Geene’s reflections on 
the film as rehearsal, as already mentioned above. Seen in this light, the topos 
of rehearsal points to the fictitious kernel of the real, preventing the narration 
from finding its ending in another sense than in the deactivation (Busch) of 
(neoliberal) rhetorics of “possibility” and “potentiality.” This renders the meth­
odology of rehearsal at the same time into a Praxistheorie and a critique of 
“practice” that does not turn reflection and self­reflection into an allover, instant 
solution, or into the key to resolve all kinds of representational problems and 
issues—as it is precisely the rehearsal that provides the space to experience 
that artistic labor/work succeeds and/or, as Susanne Leeb unfolds with regard 
to the drawings of Tamar Getter, fails in a perceptible way. As Leeb argues, 
“Getter’s works stage the fascinating yet self­defeating pursuit of the ideal of 
perfection as a source of necessary frustration.”18 Moments of joy and progress 
occur when the artist does not reflect too much on ideal strategies and tools 
of depictions. It is quite the opposite: when artist(s) let go of mechanisms of 
control, implemented rules become visible and negotiable. This includes an 
openness for unseen deviations that were not intended in the planning of a 
work, were not yet noted in the script, or happen while interacting with others 
and/or the audience.
If the rehearsal, on the one hand, participates in new definitions of authorship, 
reception, and artistic production, on the other hand, its correspondence 
with the transformation of the work turns rehearsal into an overall societal topic. 
Accordingly, contemporary subjects are expected to constantly signal their 
willingness to work on their role in the sense of an always more efficient per­
formance in order to pass as market­compatible. Therefore, the rehearsal ap­
pears as a showcase format that documents and produces narratives about 
successful as well as failing forms of “becoming a subject,” which at the same 
time are the privileged topics of artistic critique. 
Not least, the topos of rehearsal appears of importance because it brings out 
the interrelation of artistic methods and subjects with new technologies, 
thereby attesting to the interweaving of social and fictitious roles as a collective 
and/or collaborative experience—an experience, that, as van Eikels, Matzke, 
and (with regard to the conjunctions of studio and exhibition practices) Sabeth 
Buchmann argue, are embedded in this context into advanced forms of 
judgment and evaluation. Frequently, the suggested gaze backstage is 
staged as a situation before or after the rehearsal, thereby becoming even 
more performative as a strategy of representation, stimulating and regulating 
the interaction of social­media performativity and possible audiences mea­
sured in “likes.” 
The rehearsal also appears as an experimental laboratory, where not only the 
elements pertaining to an artistic­theatrical­filmic production are put to the 
test, but also the formation of the subject through exactly those (cybernetic) 
feedback systems that today serve as what Martin Jörg Schäfer describes as 
“power technologies.” In a conversation, Avital Ronell and Schäfer discuss the 
mutuality of procedures of “test” and of “rehearsal” as being embedded into 
the history and practice of philosophy as well as into the manifold entangle­
ments of politics, media, and economy. Consequently, the nexus of test and 
rehearsal tends to destabilize existing belief systems, according to Ronell, in 
favor of “a harassingly provisional logic that breaks itself up at every moment.”19 
Avant­gardist means of artistic methodology, such as chance, repetition, ac­
cumulation, seriality, and so on, mix with new forms of storytelling and repre­
sentation rooted in social media and the Internet, the “test drive” (Ronell) is 
part of the establishment of contemporary sites that represent hybrid and in­
constant scenarios of information, communication, and interaction.
Obviously, it is not only artists but also curators, activists, mediators, and writers 
who react to those tendencies by giving their functions and discourses a trial. 
They explore and test procedures of rehearsal as a site and medium of col­
lective formation to work through the aesthetic, social, psychic, and economic 
rules and boundaries incorporated, reproduced, and modernized by the ways 
we encounter an expanding field of art. Therefore, artists and curators seek 
to integrate the affective and the emotional, the contingent and unforeseen, 
the failures and blackouts, the simultaneousness of animated events and ex­
hausting routines that level off our ways of learning about contemporary art. 
Inasmuch as the rehearsal appears as a literal manifestation of the “functional 
site” (James Meyer), it articulates a set of rules that are situative and temporary. 
As such, the topos of rehearsal helps us to reflect on the manifold relations 
between the physical, real, documented, mediated, symbolic, and fictional sites 
of art, as well as in workshop­like scenarios aiming at counter­appropriations of 
curatorial, discursive, and architectural competences and skills. In that sense, 
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17 René Pollesch, Portrait aus Desinteresse 
(Portrait for a lack of anything better 
to do), 2008, 60 min. (our translation).
18 Susanne Leeb, “Upheaval in the Despot’s 
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the revision of methodologies pertaining to institutional critique by various 
site­specific strategies relating to the notion of rehearsal serves to enlighten 
one’s own complicity in power relations from an audience’s perspective. This 
would point to just one of the multiple political dimensions of the topic of re­
hearsal—the one regarding institutional space.
In relation to Ilse Lafer’s contribution to this volume,20 we therefore would like 
to address the idea of “curating rehearsal” in terms of a possible model that 
allows us to unfold the exhibition as rehearsal.21 Considering the exhibition as 
an entanglement of content, method, and form, where each component is in­
dissolubly linked, the idea of rehearsal is not reducible to an assumed method 
underlying the exhibition. It is rather the work that an exhibition as rehearsal 
is able to release—a work that isn’t always visible—which implies rehearsal as 
oscillating between “the making of” (rehearsal as narrative subject) and the 
notion of rehearsal as something “in­the­making”(rehearsal as work to be of­
fered). Thinking the exhibition in such a way links to the motif of “passion,” as 
seen in Jean Luc Godard’s film of the same title. By inventing a new form of 
filmic storytelling—based on images rather than on a written screenplay—
Godard explored the work on the screenplay as work with and through images, 
rendering passion as a form of resistance against the script, turning passion 
into a hidden device to generate another form of in­the­making. 
Replacing, or rather encircling the very motif of his film with two other con­
cepts (work and love) and enmeshing them in different forms of movement, 
Godard unveils passion as something that reinvents itself, as an embodiment 
that is the “in­between” of moving concepts, the invisible geography between 
images. Considering rehearsal in this way as spatiotemporal encounter of 
work and … (objects, texts, staging devices, moving bodies), the notion of 
work released from the object, operating between the objects, or between ob­
jects and subjects becomes the exhibition as rehearsal (a work to be offered). 
In this very sense, working on (curators, artists) and with (audience) the exhi­
bition implies literally reflecting and testing its structural conditions (institu­
tional framings, the economics and politics of exhibition making, role models, 
the neoliberal conditions of work itself), but also being actively involved in the 
mutual interference of text/script, image/representation, and performative 
events. Here, a sequence of symbolic and real writings, actions and speech 
emerge that, indeed, ask for a specific constellation allowing to host them. Re­
hearsal appears to become an improvised as well as a staged form of in­the­
making: a biopolitical model, where “life” and “survival” as forms of work of 
and on the subject and its body are put to the test. In such settings, the 
physical movement of the human body through space cannot be neglected. It 
frequently develops a character, or form of expression, that could be de­
scribed as “autobiographical work” that needs to be always actualized anew. 
With regard to the utmost instructive and complex contributions of the  authors, 
we have tried to outline in our introduction the rehearsal as a topos, format, 
medium, site, and tool that can be understood as part of an ongoing process 
of activating and deactivating, staging and de­staging, learning and unlearning 
of the rules and roles that constitute the artistic work as part of highly charged 
social, institutional, and economic systems. The idea of the rehearsal is meant 
to debunk common convictions and fictions about work, labor, and produc­
tivity that it, at the same time, evokes, promotes, contradicts, and undermines. 
Therefore we would like to follow Matzke’s claim that understands “rehearsal 
procedures” as possibilities of thinking “a new indeterminateness of doing,” 
while also recognizing the limitations of “doing” and “acting,” and the (im­)
possibilities of (re­)presenting rehearsal as unmediated lifetime experience. 
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A substantial number of artists from the music, dance, theater, and perfor­
mance worlds are currently giving workshops (on an occasional basis, or even 
as their primary source of income) for corporate employees, especially upper 
management, in which those work performers are supposed to learn improvi­
sation techniques. Organization theory, a discipline that develops new work 
and cooperation models for companies, theoretically supports and promotes 
such transitions between artistic and economic performance. Transferring 
improv concepts and practices to the workplace might seem out of place or 
irregular, but it does produce effects in the working environment. And I believe 
it is important to analyze where economic interests intersect with artistic work, 
which aspects of art are being seized upon, and what it is about the aesthetics 
and artistic practices that makes this economicization possible or even ac­
commodates it.
To the question of why companies are interested in improv, the first and “offi­
cial” answer is that the markets in which they operate have become so turbu­
lent, developments can only be foreseen within a short limited time, and 
workers are often confronted with unexpected situations. However, this need 
for improvisation that workers are faced with only represents the situation in 
which many of us find ourselves in as soon as we come in contact with other 
people and try to deal with them. After all, the reactions of other people (and 
partly even our own reactions) are always to some extent unpredictable. Par­
ticularly in cases where a large number of people are interacting—and strangers 
participate in these interactions—the unpredictability increases sharply. It 
could be that improvisational abilities have atrophied somewhat in our nation­
ally framed, institutionally managed societies, because in many areas of life 
indirect communication through the more predictable institutional procedures 
now replaces, or redetermines, the direct settling of affairs.
From this quotidian improvising, we ought to distinguish improvisation as 
something I choose, something I might try based on the recommendations of 
others because it promises me solutions to problems where I cannot achieve 
my goals through planned procedures—much like the fictional addressee in 
Heinrich von Kleist’s “On the Gradual Formation of Thoughts in the Process of 
Speech,” which is written like a letter to a friend. In his cheerful brutality, Kleist 
places clear emphasis on a moment of improvisation that tends to be over­
looked or trivialized in the discourses of organization theory and management 
(but also in group therapy and teaching); namely, the moment of conflict or 
competition. When he gets bogged down working out a math problem or a 
legal case, as Kleist’s narrator imparts—which may be due precisely to knowing 
too much and being capable of too many things, so that in effect the abundance 
of possibilities clogs, as it were, the present—then he starts to explain the issue 
to his sister, although she knows nothing about  either mathematics or law. 
The purpose, hence, is not mutual discussion, an  exchange of information, 
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exclusive or privileged circle of persons. Kleist’s poetics of improvisation, 
which also comes up with various other examples, transforms the “General” 
from a military rank into a figure of generalizability. All activities that rely on 
being performed, and their style of being performed, can be carried out with 
masterful self­command. By self­command we mean today a certain kind of 
excellence, namely, a way of doing something very well that expresses, in 
light of the admiration we grant it, a particular superiority—a superiority over 
others who do (or could do) the same work, and simultaneously the superior­
ity of a capable ego over another ego in the same person that fails to achieve 
it. The proof of performative self­command, no matter where it takes place, 
sends a message about the drama of a successful self­conquest to those 
who testify to this self­command by allowing themselves to be impressed by it.
We live in a society in which many of us participate in this game of self­ 
command—and the processes of work and of cooperation in particular have 
become the primary venues for competition for performative self­command. 
One reason for this is that so­called post­Fordism has led to a crisis of assess-
ment. Flexible teamwork is central to the post­Fordist reorganization of work. 
For more and more workers, it is a standard requirement to communicate with 
others in a way that allows for optimal assignment of responsibilities and use 
of individual contributions, and for arranging work procedures through mutual 
discussion—as well as determining the nature and amount of their output in 
goal agreements, while competent negotiation and capable presentation of 
the results may be more important than the action undertaken. If working 
means working together in teams, which consistently decide during the course 
of the work process how they are going to do something and how individual 
competence will be realized in a collective performance, how is the contribu­
tion of each individual employee to be judged? Compensation for work still 
mostly takes place via the abstract exchange medium of money, which in its 
generality implies an ability to generalize the paid work. Even though different 
forms of work vary enormously in how well or poorly the workers are paid in 
deregulated employment markets, at least the same work in the same place 
ought to receive the same compensation (or if not, one should be able to de­
mand it in the name of equal pay for equal services, and criticize current prac­
tices). But how does one evaluate the collective  accomplishment on the level 
of the individuals involved when the work of each individual not only refers to 
that of others, but acquires a value in the first place through what each one 
but rather “a movement on the part of [his] sister indicating she wants to inter­
rupt [him],” which puts the young man on high alert: “For my strained mind 
becomes even more excited by the need to defend this inherent right to speak 
against attack from the outside. The mind’s abilities grow like those of a great 
general who is faced with a very difficult situation.”1 In this state of high excite­
ment, the narrator is now talking for his life—he stutters and stammers, produces 
“inarticulate noises,” and saves himself through long drawn out, connecting 
words and superficial appositions during the empty time in which no continua­
tion occurs to him. Through this process of continuing to speak at all costs and 
connecting with himself through talking to deflect the attempted interruption, 
he finally succeeds in doing what previously seemed to elude him: at some 
point he blurts out the solution. 
The “other” is, in this specially initiated improvisation, a partner whose task is 
above all to be the opponent in a dispute not about content, but rather about 
speech, about performative dominance over speech. And he (or in this case: 
she) performs this task without actually contributing anything. The person I 
call on for improvisational formation of my thoughts only embodies the threat 
of fighting me for control of the situation. This option of reclaiming dominance 
over a situation after consciously exposing oneself to the risk of losing that 
dominance seems highly attractive as a dynamic of improvisation for work 
performance in twenty­first­century companies. It brings a type of self­com­
mand into play that was new in Kleist’s day, around 1800, but is quite familiar 
to us: performative self-command, which does not relate to a status, enjoyed 
because of noble birth or office, but rather becomes evident in action, in the 
actuality of performing—and actually consists in nothing but this evidence. 
The institutional political self­command possessed by someone who inherits 
a throne or, in the age of modern nation­states, takes on the office of a ruler 
or administrator, is essentially potestas (e.g., a power that exists in the form 
of possibility). Performative self­command, in contrast, is a power that people 
gain only by effectively carrying out actions, and this requires them to put their 
status at risk to begin with. Here, improvisation stands for the deliberate cre­
ation of a state of exception: I put myself in a situation that I cannot control 
by my rank or office, which therefore at first suspends my control over myself 
as well. And in this suspension, I regain control over myself and the situation.
This reorientation toward performative self­command uncouples self­command 
from politics in the sense of institutional authorities, from government action 
authorized by rulers or the state. It suddenly appears on this side of the central 
public sphere, in a scene of private work and study. And Kleist’s political­military 
framing of such a domestic, economic problem­solving  exercise betrays 
something important about performative self­command: it has no exclusive 
or even merely privileged sphere of activity, and it no longer applies to an 
1 Heinrich von Kleist, “On the Gradual 
Formation of Thoughts in the Process of 
Speech,” trans. Christoph Harbsmeier, 
University of Oslo website, accessed 
March 1, 2016, http://www.hf.uio.no/ikos 
/english/research/projects/tls 
/publications/Kleist[1].pdf.
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been recognized in improv theater. Instructions suggest establishing the  
so­called yes­anding principle as a connective agreement.2 This means that a 
player should always relate to what another player does in the form of “yes, 
and …”: first affirming it in order to then continue the matter, or to give it an­
other direction. In extreme cases this could be the opposite of what was sug­
gested by the other, but it must still be formulated in a “yes, and …” manner, 
rather than ignoring or directly rejecting, since both of those will hurt a per­
former whose offerings are literally nothing without being acknowledged. 
Although occasional references to yes­anding are not absent in organization­
theory literature, at the center of economic engagement with improvisation is 
a genre in which the performers work with precisely these kinds of psycho social 
offenses—or with a strategic withholding of recognition that operates at the 
margins of the offensive and tests out this marginal zone as the true realm of 
artistic peak performance; namely, jazz, in those forms where, on the one hand, 
improvisational freedom is guaranteed and where the musicians standing to­
gether on the stage participate pointedly as (virtuoso) soloists in the ensemble 
performance, but, on the other hand, in tune with tradition to an extent that a 
high significance can be ascribed to reputation. Musicologist Nicholas Gebhart, 
in his study Going for Jazz: Musical Practices and American Ideology,3 investi­
gates the relationship between ideas of peak artistic achievement in jazz and 
an “American ideology” that combines capitalistic production and evaluation 
forms with a basic tone of aggressive emotionality—an affectionately aggres-
sive emotionality. For in the interactions between professional jazz musicians, 
a certain conviviality combines with an aggressive­pugnacious spirit into a 
special frame of mind. The instrumental “talk” in the collective performance 
of jazz is similar, according to anthropologist Claudia Mitchell­Kernan, to the 
playful “duels” that African­American communities call “signifying.”4
In signifying, one actor provokes another by offending him or her in a masterly, 
amusing, or original way, either verbally or by means of twists that cast doubt 
on the competence of the other. In jazz this can happen when a musician does 
not play what the conventional continuation of the routine pattern would re­
quire—and thereby creates a situation in which it will sound like a mistake, 
unless a fellow player rescues the phrase through an original, spontaneous 
invention that sounds excitingly different from the routine, rather than simply 
wrong. Whether the result of this break in routine will be recognized as a gaffe 
has contributed to others’ work—through their organizational value for the 
team?
Since the 1990s, we have observed a downright inflationary multiplicity of 
evaluation services advertising processes that companies can use to measure 
the work performance of their departments and individual employees. Yet the 
variety of competing approaches and methods itself is already an indication 
of how little certainty there is about which data should be gathered, and above 
all how it is to be interpreted, since the relationship between the company’s 
balance sheet and employee activity becomes more difficult to reconstruct 
the more complex internal structures become. Employees may contribute great 
specialist knowledge and rack up hours of overtime in the office without actu­
ally providing any benefit to team practice. Is it because they lack the ability 
to synchronize their expertise with colleagues? Or is the problem to be found 
with one of these colleagues, who is not making use of valuable preparatory 
work, perhaps consciously or unconsciously blocking it? Could it be that cer­
tain personalities just do not go together and it would be better to put them 
on separate teams? Or does the workflow have to be moderated until the peo­
ple involved adjust to each other? Or does someone need to be fired and re­
placed with a more suitable employee?
Despite all attempts at objectification and standardization, post­Fordist liber­
alization of work processes has caused an upsurge in personal dependencies. 
The evaluation of workers increasingly takes place in the dimension of affec­
tive reactions, based on their conduct—in the dual sense of behavior and of 
self­presentation as a service subject in an intersubjective network of cooper­
ation. It is precisely here that a motive can be discerned for corporate inter­
est in artistic improvisation processes. Improvisation in the performing arts is, 
after all, not only one of the disciplines in which performers impress an audi­
ence by demonstrating their confidence. The performers also evaluate and 
judge each other in the course of their common efforts. How an improviser 
reacts to what the other has just done—whether he or she reacts at all; to 
what extent he or she tries to make something of what the other has done; 
and what kind of a model he or she supplies to the other co­performers or 
makes as a response to the first one: all this produces a value judgment that 
the fellow actors recognize, understand, and incorporate into their own reac­
tions. Conversely, the value of this value judgment depends on how highly re­
garded a given participant is by the other players—and finally also on whether 
this judgment itself enhances the performance as a whole, or at least creates 
an opportunity for enhancement in its effect on the reactions of the one being 
judged and the others. 
Achievement criteria are intimately bound up with the dynamic of social 
 recognition and esteem in these ways of interacting. This problem has long 
2 See Vera Dusya and Mary Crossan, 
“Theatrical Improvisation: Lessons for 
Organizations,” Organization Studies 25, 
no. 5 (2004): 727–49.
3 Nicholas Gebhard, Going for Jazz: Musical 
Practices and American Ideology (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2001).
4 See Claudia Mitchell-Kernan, “Signifying 
as a Form of Verbal Art,” in Mother Wit 
from the Laughing Barrel: Readings in the 
Interpretation of African-American 
Folklore, ed. Alan Dundes (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973), 310–28.
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evaluation remains provisional, if it orients itself toward the actual reactions 
of co­performers rather than general and time­resistant standards.
In such a work process there is nothing definitively wrong, because it is only 
when other team members react that what I have done is shown to be a mis­
take or an impetus toward new paths—indeed, perhaps it is the very push into 
the unknown that the process will have needed. “We paint ourselves in and 
out of corners all the time, the saxophonist Jeff Clayton once said.”5 Improv 
explicitly allows making mistakes, or risking making mistakes, as an attempt. 
But that also means there is no definitive right choice, no matter how well I 
can do something for myself, as long as the others are not able to derive some 
gain for their performance from what I am doing. If I cannot at least get them 
to expect that sort of advantage for themselves, my knowledge and ability 
become useless. And whether I navigate with my solo contribution to the 
team performance on the track of a shared enhancement or end up marginal­
izing myself is something that I only find out each time I do it, because the 
evaluation of the work does not take place outside the work period, but rather 
coincides with the carrying out the respective cooperation. The value of what I 
do is—and remains—as provisional as the action in the mode of improv itself.
The word “improvisation” comes from the Latin im-provisus, or unexpected. 
Still, improvisation as trying something out initially requires everything that 
happens in the process to be provisional. This has a liberating, unburdening 
effect, especially at the beginning, and as long as improvisation is imagined 
as a repeated beginning. But in the long term, to the extent that the improvi­
sation process makes its participants become aware of time passing, the darker 
sides of this deliberate provisionality are also revealed—and this includes 
deferred recognition and a type of interpersonal esteem that is also only con­
ditional, always delayed a little further, to the next challenge and the challenge 
after that.
Translated from the German by Aileen Derieg
that puts the entire performance into a bad light and exposes the reactor as a 
failure, or as an innovation that brings them and their fellow musicians fame, 
depends entirely on the reaction. And how disconcerted or how excellent the 
reaction seems will determine whether the improv session comes across as 
the scene of a (lost) battle or of a collective virtuosity, where the battle as such 
is not obvious; rather, the performers up the ante through mutual playful 
challenges, test their confidence on one another, and win prestige with every 
test passed.
Kleist presents improvisation as a battle in a war of the subject with himself, 
where the other functioned solely as an oppositional figure. Here, in contrast, 
several people compete in the mode of improvisation with each other, and 
this competition is also part of their cooperation: the performative gibes and 
ripostes create an elastic consensus that no performer can ever break, if the 
collective project is not to collapse. In this atmosphere, as jazz cultivates it 
and makes it extremely productive, the organization theorists identify the ideal 
milieu for interlocking cooperation and competition, which business jargon 
calls “co­competition” or “co­opetition.” For the post­Fordist enterprise, it is 
crucial to incorporate moments of competition into mutual relations, so that 
the competition never ends—as the battle does, when the victor punches the 
air and the other lies prostrate as the loser. In capitalism at all levels the goal 
is to organize endlessness: dynamics that in and of themselves cannot come 
to any conclusion.
Since Adam Smith’s claim that competitive egoisms have charitable effects 
for the community, the task of economic reason is seen as binding destruc­
tive powers into a dynamic in which they bring forth productive effects. Advo­
cates justify the competition model by pointing out that it is so far the most 
successful solution to this task. From the battle, only its affect, aggression, is 
absorbed to animate a form in which several competitors act against each 
other for an individual advantage. This robs them of the decision a battle will 
bring, obliging them to repeat the competition incessantly. Even monopoly, 
or “market dominance,” may not represent a final victory. As soon as a victori­
ous finale becomes apparent, the more successful competitor must orient 
their actions toward the time after that, which would be their own victory and 
the defeat of the competitors; and precisely through the immanent reorienta­
tion involved in carrying out the competition itself, the victory does not take 
place—it is skipped and postponed: a “new” challenge takes the place of the 
old, in which the old one, which was not fought to an end point, continues to 
exist and waits to become the new one again.
Evaluation must adjust to this dynamic. And because of this, it helps in the es­
tablishment of co­competition as a form for how we interact—at work and in all 
those areas of life influenced by an expanded understanding of productivity—if 
5 Cited in Alessandro Duranti and Kenny 
Burrell, “Jazz Improvisation: A Search for 
Hidden Harmonies and a Unique Self,” 
Ricerche di Psicologia 27, no. 3 (2004): 
84f.
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I. Divvy Up and Evaluate
Shot in an eat­in kitchen repurposed as a film studio, Before the Rehearsal,1 a 
2009 film by the French artist Maya Schweizer, documents a rehearsal of the 
Afro­American and LA­based comedy ensemble Slow Children Crossing—the 
actors are working on a send­up of the edutainment genre—and a subsequent 
group discussion led by a coach in which the comedians explore not so much 
improvements to their performance on conflictual gender relations as ways to 
optimize their self­marketing. The scene has all the hallmarks of improv the­
ater—desultory dialogue, routine physical exercises, ephemeral actions such 
as screwing a light bulb into a socket, and so forth. Still chatting, the performers 
start watching episodes of sitcom shows online. As the film scholar Madeleine 
 Bernstorff has argued, such shows “often function by having you watch peo­
ple on television who are sitting across from you and looking at an invisible 
television in whose place you are sitting as the viewer.”2 Let in on the genesis 
of the “performative product,”3 the viewers­turned­prosumers confront the 
same questions the performers ask themselves: for example, “whether they 
should start by focusing on their stage presence or whether priority should 
be given to media presence with a DVD, maybe television and the internet, 
YouTube clicks.”4 There is no question that artistic production here blends 
into the administrative work of organizing it. We get the impression, for in­
stance, that the shows the performers watch structure their (self­)perception 
as well: “we don’t just watch the actors rehearsing, we also see them practicing 
to be marketable, entertaining subjects.”5 In other words, the documentarist’s 
camera represents the very nexus of labor and medium such self­optimization 
requires, enabling the performers to supplant the position traditionally occu­
pied by the director with controlled self­observation. Moreover, it ties in with 
collaborative structures that emerge within the framework of the institutional 
division of labor. The same film Schweizer presents in exhibitions and art­house 
theaters is used by the group as a promotional video and “work in progress” 
advertising their performances.
 Shared 
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1  I have discussed this film in several  
essays published elsewhere, including 
“Probe aufs Exempel: Über den Topos der 
künstlerischen Probe im künstlerischen 
Film,” in Die andere Szene: Theaterarbeit 
und Theaterproben im Dokumentarfilm, 
ed. Stefanie Diekmann (Berlin: Verlag 
Theater der Zeit, 2014), 114–33; and “De-/
Aktivieren: Zu Praktiken der Probe im 
zeitgenössischen künstlerischen Film,” in 
Ausstellen: Zur Kritik der Wirksamkeit in 
den Künsten, ed. Kathrin Busch, Burkhard 
Meltzer, and Tido von Oppeln (Zurich: 
diaphanes, 2016), 121–37.
2  Madeleine Bernstorff, “Before the 
Rehearsal: Commentary,” in Maya 
Schweizer: Dieselbe Geschichte an einem 
anderen Ort weitererzählt, verstreut, 
fragmentiert, täglich, rückwärts und wieder 
von vorn / The Same Story Elsewhere 
Continued, Spread, Fragmented, Daily, 
Backwards and All Over Again (Leipzig: 
Spector, 2010), 110. Unless otherwise 
noted, all translations by Gerrit Jackson.
3  Ibid. 111.
4  Ibid.
5  Ibid.
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And so it is not coincidental that the most in­depth portrayal of and reflection 
on this dialectic may be found in deliberately equivocal rehearsal genres 
 hovering between semi­documentary and semi­fictional cinematic and/or 
theatrical formats of the sort that artists like Martin Beck, Keren Cytter,  Loretta 
 Fahrenholz, Harun Farocki, Omer Fast, Ana Hoffner, Wendelien van  Oldenborgh, 
Mathias Poledna, Constanze Ruhm, Eran Schaerf, Maya  Schweizer,  Clemens 
von Wedemeyer, and Katarina Zdjelar began to adopt and combine with visual 
art techniques in the early 1990s. This development raises the question of the 
specific function of the rehearsal. One answer might be found in the reorga­
nization the theater as well as the film and art businesses have undergone in 
the age of feedback­based “project management”:20 enforcing the primacy of 
public relevance, media presence, and ratings, it has put artists and curators 
as well as the institutions they represent under growing pressure to devise 
more collaborative forms of production. What is crucial for rehearsal practices 
is that the feedback systems rooted in (post­)Minimalist or (post­)Conceptual 
practices are apt, on the one hand, to dismantle hierarchical distinctions (la­
bor and work, work and institutional context, leading and supporting cast and 
amateur actors, artist and viewers, foreground and background, etc.); on the 
other hand, as Before the Rehearsal illustrates very clearly, this ostensibly hi­
erarchy­flattening integration is inextricably linked to the cybernetic “trans­
formation of the mode of production,”21 whose primary purpose, as the French 
authorial collective Tiqqun has argued, is to “improve the circulation of goods 
and persons.”22 In other words, feedback systems always also promote the  further 
A development that has been variously described as a “growing awareness 
of a prevalent culture of performance that triggers a visualization of working 
methods and their attitude toward (self­)evaluation,”6 as the integration of 
 improvisational techniques into neoliberal evaluation management,7 and as 
an oscillation between rehearsal and testing procedures,8 casts closely as­
sociated catchphrases of the day such as “collaborative praxis” and “collec­
tive agency” in a new light: they now appear in the context of fully integrated 
feedback systems. There is a reason why “shared knowledge,” “shared produc­
tion,” “shared skills,” “shared space,” “shared interests,” and similar phrases 
have become shibboleths in the networked fields between art, film, and theater. 
In light of increasingly precarious conditions of production, the question of 
the form in which artistic labor is organized, a traditional subject of institu­
tional critique, has become a pivotal theme of its (re)presentation. Artists, 
Annemarie Matzke notes in her study Arbeit am Theater: Eine Diskursgeschichte 
der Probe, present themselves as being workers as well.9
These observations suggest one reason behind the recent spate of works of 
visual art operating with the rehearsal format: it allows for the model of indi­
vidual authorship, which remains dominant, to be tied back to the “history of 
collective and collaborative labor”10 that has attained fresh relevance with the 
emergence of today’s networked economies and the hybrid collaborative­
competitive relationships they engender.11 The superimposition of “societies 
of control” over the “disciplinary societies” of yesteryear12 has largely severed 
access to traditional categories of the collective such as the working class, 
and so, as Jacques Rancière has demonstrated very persuasively,13 the “public 
principle”14 of art has come to function as a literal and/or metaphorical “stage” 
on which accepted distinctions between individual and collective, artistic and 
nonartistic, productive and unproductive forms of labor are put to the test.15 
With regard to the visions of a caring and sharing society (possibly entailing 
the redistribution of wealth) proposed by aesthetic theories as well as (post­)
Marxist art discourses, the rehearsal would seem to be an ideal format, most 
obviously because it marks the interface between “those kinds of labour con­
tained in artworks” and the “realms of heteronomous labour” that autonomy 
must enter “through heteronomous labour’s (workers’) own collective agency,”16 
which, as the art theorist John Roberts has argued, are crucial to a new un­
derstanding of artistic autonomy in the framework of post­autonomous social 
techniques.17 As I will argue, with reference to Bruce  Nauman’s studio films, 
the dialectic of “deskilling and reskilling” that, according to Roberts, was set 
in motion by the readymade affects rehearsal practices as well:18 they are 
“learning exercises” that always also imply the “unlearning” of abilities and 
skills that have become useless.19
6 Cf. Richard Ibghy and Marilou Lemmens, 
“Rehearsal without Performance,” in this 
volume, 138–50.
7 See Kai van Eikels, “What Your Spontaneity 
Is Worth to Us: Improvisation between Art 
and Economics,” in this volume, 22–30.  
Cf. van Eikels’s concept of “evaluability 
management” in “Collective Virtuosity, 
Co-competition, Attention Economy: 
Postfordismus und der Wert des 
Improvisierens,” in Improvisieren: 
Paradoxien des Unvorhersehbaren, ed. 
Hans-Friedrich Bormann, Gabriele 
Brandstetter, and Annemarie Matzke 
(Bielefeld: Kunst—Medien—Praxis, 2010), 
146.
8 Avital Ronell and Martin Jörg Schäfer, 
“Re-rehearsing the Test Drive,” in this 
volume, 120–29.
9 Annemarie Matzke, Arbeit am Theater: Eine 
Diskursgeschichte der Probe (Bielefeld: 
transcript, 2012), 72.
10 John Roberts, The Intangibilities of Form: 
Skill and Deskilling in Art After the 
Readymade (London: Verso, 2007), 53.
11 See van Eikels, “Collective Virtuosity.”
12 See Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript on the 
Societies of Control,” October 59 (Winter 
1992): 3–7.
13 See, for example, Jacques Rancière, “Le 
théâtre des pensées,” in Le fil perdu: 
Essais sur la fiction moderne (Paris: La 
Fabrique, 2014).
14 Jacques Rancière, “On Art and Work,” in 
The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution 
of the Sensible (New York: Continuum, 
2006), 42–43.




19 See Eric de Bruyn, “Dan Grahams 
filmische Topologie,” in Dan Graham: 
Werke 1965–2000 (Düsseldorf: Richter, 
2002), 352. Exhibition catalogue, 
Kunsthalle Düsseldorf.






programmatic question of whether what we are watching is a performance of 
a rehearsal (or a rehearsal of a performance) or in fact documentation of a 
performance (or documentation of a rehearsal). Given the fact that the artist 
collaborated with a comedy group, her film suggests that the rehearsal may 
no longer be the mark of distinction it once was, setting the theater apart from 
the entertainment industry.33 As viewers, we accordingly face the question of 
what it is that we mean to evaluate: the work performance of a comedy ensem­
ble practicing how to produce successful entertainment, or a work of art that 
pulls the rug out from under the manifestly untenable fantasy of an exclusive 
and hence undivided aesthetic sphere?
The expansion of the zone of artistic research and production into backstage 
and stage areas, casting, sound, and movie studios, workshops and social 
media, employment agencies and therapy centers, shopping malls and hotel 
lobbies, offices and common areas in shared apartments—a phenomenon that 
comes into view not only in Schweizer’s film, but also in the works of the other 
abovementioned artists—attests to a web of “multiple locations around the 
globe” that, populated by a “network of multiple artistic, institutional, and social 
actors,”34 stand for contents of public relevance. In other words, the nexus of 
collective agency and “site production” is often integral to collaborative proj­
ects, one of the “tasks” to be performed by the artists involved in them. For 
example, a brochure issued by dOCUMENTA (13) notes that credit for scouting 
the scene of von Wedemeyer’s film installation Muster (Rushes), a combination 
of footage from three different rehearsal scenarios—the former monastery at 
differentiation and expansion of techniques of social interaction and hegemony 
that cannot be neatly distinguished from what Roberts calls “heteronomous 
labour’s (workers’) own collective agency.” As Schweizer’s video, like numerous 
other models of community constructed in the mode of  rehearsal, makes us 
aware, “organization in networks, ‘participative management’ […] consumer 
polling and quality controls” have significant implications also for contemporary 
concepts of work and authorship.23
Consider, for example, three works commissioned for dOCUMENTA (13) and 
produced in partnership with the public television stations 3sat, ZDF, ORF, 
SRF, and ARD, and German and international galleries and museums: William 
Kentridge’s The Refusal of Time, Omer Fast’s Continuity, and Clemens von 
Wedemeyer’s Muster (Rushes, all 2012). These artists—the latter two in particu­
lar—have helped define the rehearsal genre, which, it appears, encourages 
compliance with the imperative to collaborate. The implications of the latter 
are thematic in the (documented or staged) mode of the “learning exercise”: 
pieces such as evaluation­based work performances in which evaluation serves 
to assess not only the quality of the work but always also the “quality of social 
interaction.”24 Such social interaction is the point, notably, of institutional ef­
forts to promote collaborative projects, which circulate both as material works 
and as “immaterial” advertising media. “In the recent past,” Wikipedia—itself a 
showcase example of the “sharing economy”—notes, “business models char­
acterized by the joint […] use of resources that are not needed on a constant 
basis […] have become increasingly significant, especially online, where con­
tent and knowledge are no longer merely being consumed, but also being dis­
seminated using Web 2.0 technologies.”25
 
Put differently, the exposition of the “‘workly’ quality”26 characteristic of re­
hearsal formats also brings into focus the nexus between “immaterial labor”27 
and “immaterial media”28 in the sense of the communication­ and distribution­
oriented production of knowledge and information—assets that, as “common 
goods,”29 are emphasized in the “mission statements” of progressive institu­
tions that define themselves as coproducers of (major) art projects.30
To the extent that works presented and performed in the rehearsal mode, such 
as work by Fast, Schweizer, and von Wedemeyer, exhibit a mixture of role­
performance in the spirit of institutional critique31 and post­minimalist learning 
exercises, the linkage between processes of artistic subjectivation and social 
transformation (the rise of the media society) would seem to be crucial. As in 
Before the Rehearsal, the structurally voyeuristic glimpse of what is going on 
“behind the scenes” plays with the fiction that “no game” is being played here,32 
that we are observing “real” work and reflection being performed—yet this 
play at once appears as work, simply because it stages the presentation of a 
fiction as work on the fiction: Before the Rehearsal thus confronts us with the 
23 Ibid., 75.
24 Roberts, Intangibilities of Form, 109.
25 “Share Economy,” on Wikipedia, accessed 
April 25, 2016, https://de.wikipedia.org 
/wiki/Share_Economy.
26 Kim Paice, “Continuous Project Altered 
Daily,” in The Fall of the Studio: Artists at 
Work, ed. Wouter Davidts and Kim Paice 
(Amsterdam: Antennae Valiz, 2009), 48.
27 Maurizio Lazzarato, “Immaterial Labor,” in 
Radical Thought in Italy: A Potential 
Politics, ed. Michael Hardt and Paolo Virno 
(Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis 
Press, 1996), 139.
28 See Gertrud Koch, Kirsten Maar, and Fiona 
McGovern, eds., Imaginäre Medialität— 
Immaterielle Medien (Paderborn: Wilhelm 
Fink, 2011).
29 See Magda Tyzlik-Carver, “Interfacing  
the Commons: Curatorial System as  
Form of Production on the Edge,” Digital 
Aesthetics Research Center website, 
accessed April 25, 2016, http://darc.imv.
au.dk/publicinterfaces/wp-content 
/uploads/2011/01/Tyzlik-Carver.pdf.
30 See “Unexhibit,” on the Generali 




31 Prominent examples include Christian 
Philipp Müller’s Kleiner Führer durch die 
ehemalige Kurfürstliche 
Gemäldesammlung Düsseldorf (Small 
Guide through the Former Electoral  
Gallery in Düsseldorf, 1986); and Andrea  
Fraser’s (video) performances Museum 
Highlights: A Gallery Talk (1989) and May I 
Help You? (1991).
32 With reference to R. D. Laing’s behavioral 
training, see de Bruyn, “Dan Grahams 
filmische Topologie,” 358. 
33 See Matzke, Arbeit am Theater, 21–22.
34 Wouter Davidts and Kim Paice, 
introduction to Fall of the Studio, 6.
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represented, and still represents, a type of labor that works not only on the 
product to be made but also on the maker’s body. If we define the rehearsal 
as “working on the working,” it is, as Matzke has argued, the paradigmatic 
scene and medium of (self­)transformation:42 to rehearse is to change oneself 
and what one does. Hence the hope that the rehearsal will let the artist elude 
the reification of his work—after the rehearsal is (always) before the rehearsal.43 
Indicatively, the resulting inextricable conjunction between the respective 
apparatuses of rehearsal and production is reflected by the very “fall of the 
studio,” which was concurrently reborn in the format of the studio performance 
(and its media of dissemination).
III. Walk the Gaze
Nauman’s famous studio films, including Dance or Exercise on the Perimeter 
of a Square (Square Dance) (1968) in which the artist recorded himself per­
forming a half­banal, half­grotesque (dance) routine in an artist’s studio, are 
especially illuminating in this context.44 In a nod to time­based procedures in 
structural film, the black­and­white films have a running time of ten minutes, 
or one reel of 16 mm film. The field of view is chosen to include a piece of 
wall and a square marked out on the floor with duct tape,45 with the camera 
set up ever so slightly above eye level to suggest an outside view of the scene.46 
What the film documents is utterly trivial, confirming the suspicion aroused 
by the title that we may be watching no more than an exercise (though a public 
one): the quality of the choreography makes it rather unsuitable for public 
Breitenau near Kassel, which exemplifies the highs and lows of German his­
tory—is due to the show’s artistic director Carolyn  Christov­Bakargiev.35 The 
rehearsal model thus also attests to how profoundly the concept of “site­spec­
ificity,” formerly associated with institutional critique, and its recourse to 
temporality, functionality, and media36 have been transformed in what is called 
post­studio practice: a transformation in which the urgent question of where 
to locate artistic production (and where it locates itself) intersects, on a funda­
mental level, with that other question—that of the social locus of art.37
II. Rehearsing (in) the Studio
The studio not only constitutes the “spatial ontology” of artistic creativity,38 it 
has also undergone a fundamental temporalization in which it has been de­
centered and dislocated. That is hardly a new insight: as Kim Paice’s analysis 
of Robert Morris’s Continuous Project Altered Daily demonstrates, its double 
status is connected to the increasingly equivocal distinction between the pro­
cess of making and “finished works” that is characteristic of work in which 
visual and performative arts overlap. By the late 1960s—when Bruce Nauman 
made the studio films that, by blending post­minimalist dance rehearsal with 
Dadaist video performance, parodied what doomsayers were  decrying as the 
“fall of the studio”39—rehearsals were an established part of studio practice:
The artist’s apparent interest in blurring lines between genres and places 
related to his being a sculptor and a dancer, who was sharing a studio 
with other dancers, who themselves had highly inventive practices. He 
was undoubtedly inspired by and valuable to partners Simone Forti and 
Yvonne Rainer, with whom he shared a studio on the top floor of a build­
ing on Great Jones Street. The studio “was completely open,” recalls 
Rainer, and “Morris made small sculptures in a corner, like the Box with 
the Sound of Its Own Making. Simone rehearsed us in See Saw at one 
end. I rehearsed my first solo, Three Satie Spoons.”40
The coexistence and intermingling of genres that were utterly incompatible by 
the accepted standards of medium­specificity is illuminating for the issues 
discussed here because it sheds light on the influence that a practice in which 
rehearsals were routine may have had on how the visual artists in the orbit of 
the Judson Dance Theater approached their work.
The interest visual artists shared with dancers in post­disciplinary improvi­
sation—as Rainer has argued, it promised not so much a recovery of natural 
or individual expression but rather an understanding of “changes in ideas 
about man and his environment”41—points to the overarching significance 
the  rehearsal had in New York’s avant­garde scene at the time. The rehearsal 
35 dOCUMENTA (13)/ anders fernsehen, ed. 
Presse- und Öffentlichkeitsarbeit 3sat 
(Mainz, 2013).
36 See James Meyer, “Der funktionale Ort/
The Functional Site,” in Platzwechsel 
(Zurich: Kunsthalle Zürich, 1995), 25–41. 
Meyer discusses works by Ursula 
Biemann, Tom Burr, Mark Dion, and 
Christian Philipp Müller.
37 I am grateful to the curator and writer 
Laura Preston, who raised this question in 
a conversation with students at UCLA 
about Harun Farocki’s films.
38 Davidts and Paice, introduction to Fall  
of the Studio, 4.
39 See the title of Davidts and Paice’s book.
40 Paice, “Continuous Project Altered Daily,” 
45.
41 Yvonne Rainer, “A Quasi-Survey of 
Some ‘Minimalist’ Tendencies in the 
Quantitatively Minimal Dance Activity 
Midst the Plethora, or an Analysis of 
Trio A,” in Minimal Art, A Critical 
Anthology, ed. Gregory Battcock (New 
York: Dutton, 1968), 264.
42 Matzke, Arbeit am Theater, 37.
43 After the Rehearsal is the title of a work by 
the artist Eske Schlüters. With a view to 
the temporal dimension of the rehearsal, 
Matzke observes that “to reflect on work […] 
is always also to reflect on the work in the 
theater as preparatory work, rehearsal 
work, and work on the production.”  
Ibid., 18.
44 Eric de Bruyn points out that the films 
were shot in the studio of the painter 
William T. Wiley. Eric de Bruyn, “The Empty 
Studio: Bruce Nauman’s Studio Films,” in 
Hiding Making—Showing Creation: The 
Studio from Turner to Tacita Dean, ed. 
Rachel Esner, Sandra Kisters, and Ann-
Sophie Lehmann (Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 2013), 192.
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was not merely a skilled craftsman but a genius capable of intellectual and 
conceptual invention allows us to see that the studio was a place where visual 
and performative practices intersected as early as the seventeenth century. 
As Alpers has argued, rehearsing helped Rembrandt create a pictorial world 
that undercut iconographic conventions and owed its existence solely to his 
stagecraft.53 It also allowed him to devise a business model for his studio that 
enabled him to be independent of patrons and anticipated the modern artist 
producing for a market.54 Part and parcel of this model was the image he cul­
tivated of a beholder whose deep involvement in the painted action made 
him a uniquely qualified judge of his own productions; his eye’s only possible 
rival was that of a true connoisseur. The same ambition is evident in Edgar 
Degas’s endless variations on the motif of the ballet rehearsal: the figure of 
the implicit beholder present in each picture—he might appear in the guise of 
a maître de ballet or a musician—visualizes the “subjective position of pro­
duction”55 as one of appraisal and judgment of the work coming into being at 
the moment of the (painted) act of highly gendered looking, or, in other 
words, before the (male) painter’s own eyes. Degas links this instant of a work 
in the making to the strenuous physical discipline that is even more palpable 
in the ballet rehearsal than in the virtuoso onstage performance; the distant 
resemblance to Nauman’s self­experiment is presumably not accidental.56
The filmmaker Harun Farocki pinpoints the same connection in a discussion of 
Jean­Luc Godard’s Passion (1982), whose characters are shooting a film by 
recording scene after scene in blocking rehearsals and reviewing the rushes. 
Regarding a scene in which Hana, one of the two female protagonists, undresses, 
he notes: “We realize […] that ‘to undress’ is a metaphor for another kind of 
exposure—self­scrutiny, or even self­criticism. Perhaps Jerzy and Hana ex­
pend more effort looking at the video than they did making it. That activity 
has always seemed to me the biggest part of filmmaking.”57
performance, while on the other hand this is not a case of purely private 
busywork. Rather, what the camera brings out is the indeterminable hybrid 
status of what it lets us see—it looks like the rehearsal of a “redirection activity” 
for what we would expect to witness in a studio: an artist busily making a work. 
The room is bare except for a few pieces of apparel (perhaps costumes?) 
scattered across the floor that may, as Eric de Bruyn has argued, be emblem­
atic of the “collapse” of the modern studio and hence of the Fordist work 
regime that has governed it since the dawn of modernism.47 By formatting the 
nexus between the partial view of the space and physical movement, the 
camera’s static gaze sublates the studio’s “spatial ontology” in the “temporal 
ontology” of the medium that enables Nauman to literally internalize the for­
matting and normalizing function of the viewer’s gaze, usually excluded from 
the sphere of artistic production, by means of repetitive movements.48 The 
artist, de Bruyn writes, “exhibits a simplified conception of ‘training’”49—a 
training, one should add, whose objective is the supplantation of the (director’s, 
choreographer’s, conductor’s, or else the artist’s own) scrutinizing, controlling, 
correcting, and evaluating gaze for the viewer’s.
The film puts a damper on the widely credited simplistic notion that the fall of 
the studio opened the gates of the art world to the democratic spirit of audi­
ence participation. Beneath the surface of the undecidable oscillation between 
performance and rehearsal in Square Dance as well as Nauman’s three other 
studio films looms a monotony that unmistakably undercuts the fantasies of 
emancipation and creative self­realization that buoyed the generation of ’68. 
Though the artist may have been relieved—or may have broken free—of the 
necessity to produce objects, that compulsion is unexpectedly replaced by a 
different set of constraints that may reach far deeper and transform his body 
as well as soul: the camera’s eye, in that sense, also stands for the mechanism 
of (self­)observation we have long internalized—not least in the way that, as 
Schweizer’s film illustrates, we are all thoroughly involved in the techniques 
and technologies that make us performers of our selves.
By letting us see the studio artist’s body as a “new mode […] of interaction be­
tween humans and technology,”50 Nauman’s film, like Schweizer’s, reveals the 
documentation of a rehearsal to be a generative and fictionalizing register rather 
than a tool of retrospection and verification.51 To peer behind the scenes, we 
realize, is the very act that ostensibly “makes” the work before our eyes. 
Considered in this light, the trope of the studio rehearsal also echoes painterly 
traditions consistent with realism. For instance, as the art historian Svetlana 
Alpers has pointed out, Rembrandt was in the habit of composing several­ 
figured portrait studies based on arrangements resembling “blocking rehearsals”: 
he assembled groups of human actors in his studio and then worked as he 
circled around them, “stopping to look [and] making suggestions about their 
gestures.”52 What was meant, in Rembrandt’s case, to demonstrate that he 
Sabeth Buchmann
45 The setup recalls Samuel Beckett’s  
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46 De Bruyn, “Empty Studio,” 199.
47 De Bruyn, “Dan Grahams filmische 
Topologie,” 356ff.
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49 De Bruyn, “Dan Grahams filmische 
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50 Roberts, Intangibilities of Form, 23. The 
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The (gendered) nexus between scrutiny and production has another aspect 
that Farocki’s own films articulate. In Leben—BRD (How to Live in the German 
Federal Republic) (1990), exemplary social subjects (neglected children, apa­
thetic mothers, parents­to­be, befuddled seniors, unemployed people with 
criminal records, policemen­in­training, customer consultants, etc.) find them­
selves exposed to the scrutinizing gazes of authority figures such as instructors, 
teachers, therapists, coaches, and so forth. The film’s implicit and explicit 
subject is the lifelong process of (self­)testing, which begins in childhood and 
continues throughout adult life and even into old age; a process Farocki as­
sociates with product testing and that therefore demonstrates its embedment 
into consumer culture. The characters and merchandise are under examina­
tion, and so what they do under our watchful eyes are effectively Probe-Hand-
lungen,58 both “sample actions” and “rehearsals for action”: “virtual” reality 
checks highlighting the regulative and normalizing effects that are also appar­
ent in Nauman’s and Schweizer’s evocations of the immanent outside gaze. 
By tying his chosen approach of “participant observation” back to the social 
technologies that reveal a structural connection between educational­thera­
peutic behavioral practice and techniques of digital simulation,59 Farocki thus 
addresses the intrinsic logic of the same feedback systems that power the 
share economy as well. It is then up to the viewers to recognize themselves in 
these sociologically representative sample subjects whose behavioral pat­
terns, rote actions, and consumer preferences are quite literally being reviewed.
IV. Conclusion
As I hope the examples sketched above illustrate, the rehearsal is a tool that 
produces a programmatically risky entanglement in the complicity between 
participative and collaborative approaches and the quality, evaluation, and 
control­management regime increasingly pervasive in society today. Pract ices 
of the share economy are hardly exempt from such complicity. By shining a 
glaring light on this complex problem, the rehearsal formats, practices, and 
techniques I have discussed initiate a reflection, especially on the social reg­
ulations underpinning artistic practices that aspire to privilege collective agency 
over authorial control: the question they raise of whether and how the “kinds 
of labour contained in artworks” may be both extracted from and anchored in 
the “heteronomous labour’s (workers’) own collective agency” has implications 
not least importantly for the nodes of aesthetic and political participation that 
are of particular relevance to contemporary art.
I would argue that these works, and others, offer a number of disconcerting 
indications that the “play” that comes into view in the rehearsal only pretends 
not to measure the value with which we endow the labor on our work perfor­
mances with the same solemnity with which we have internalized (self­)
evaluation as the readiness to enter perpetually improvable cooperative 
partnerships between producers (who promise to generate surplus value) 
and consumers (who promise to generate profits).
I would like to thank Ilse Lafer and Constanze Ruhm for their feedback, which 
has been a constant source of inspiration.
Translated from the German by Gerrit Jackson
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Voir le scenario1 (“look at the screenplay”): a recurrent formula traversing im­
ages, bodies, and places in order to write the (im)possible story for a film, 
roughly, in the sense described by the American philologist Milman Parry for 
the “formula style” used by Homer in the Iliad and in the Odyssey as poetry 
not composed for but in performance.2 Taken in this way, these kinds of for­
mulas are, as Giorgio Agamben further explains, “hybrids of matter and form, 
of creation and performance, of first­timeness [primavoltità] and repetition.”3 
It is of particular interest that against this backdrop, Agamben identifies the 
twenty­six figures from Aby Warburg’s pathos formula “nympha” of the forty­
sixth panel of the Mnemosyne-Atlas neither as an original nor simply only a 
copy. Instead, the nymph stands for a being “whose form punctually coin­
cides with its matter and whose origin is indissoluble from its becoming”:4 a 
being, in other words, that presents itself as time. Pathos formulas are conse­
quently “phantasmas […] around which time scripts its choreography.”5 If we 
take into consideration that the passion connoted by pathos enters into the 
field of meaning of passio over the course of the history of the concept—even 
though originally only passive moments were denoted there,6 Jean­Luc Godard’s 
“work” on Passion (1982) could be described as choreographed time spanning 
between pathos and formula.
A screenplay needs something; it needs nine months. A whole story, love 
and work.7
Voir le scénario is more than a formula. It comprises a series of operative pro­
cedures that shape the actual contents of Godard’s video­poem Scénario du 
film Passion (1982). Subsequent to the actual film in time—as a kind of after­
image or of the same type as Raymond Roussel’s Comment j’ai écrit certains 
de mes livres8—with Scénario du film Passion the filmmaker presents a form of 
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1 Unless otherwise noted, quotations in  
the French are taken from Jean Luc 
Godard’s film Scénario du film Passion (1982). 
2 Giorgio Agamben, Nymphs, trans. Amanda 
Minerva (London: Seagull 2013), 4 (brackets 
and italics in original). Originally published 
as “La passion de la facticité,” in 
Heidegger: Questions ouvertes, Cahiers 




6 Kathrin Busch, Passivität (Hamburg: Textem 
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lecture series, “What Can an Exhibition Do?" 
(2015/16 ), at the University of Applied Arts 
Vienna. Here I would especially like to 
thank Stephanie Kaiser for her suggestions 
and discussion contributions.
7 Godard, Scénario du film Passion. 
Quotations in this essay from the German 
transcription of the film have been 
translated by Aileen Derieg. Joachim 
Paech, Passion oder die Einbildungen des 
Jean-Luc Godard (Frankfurt am Main: 
Kinematograph Nr. 6, Schriftenreihe des 
Deutschen Filmmuseums, 1989). 
8 Raymond Roussel, How I Wrote Certain of 
My Books, trans. Trevor Winkfield (New 
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image, to see it from behind, as though being behind the screen instead 
of in front of it. Instead of being behind the concrete screen, as though 
being behind the image and in front of the screen. Or even: on the in­
side of the image itself. The way certain painters convey the impression 
that you are actually in the images.13
Voir le scénario, est du travail would consequently mean that the filmic narration 
results from the image or the selection of images and the work on the image/
the images: image and work = narration is then the equation in brief, according 
to which the “work” on the (cinematographic) image has always appeared to 
be tied to the technological and economic production conditions of the film 
industry.14 Godard’s endeavor to realize Passion not as a written text but rather 
as a screenplay­in­the­making, the work in the factory, and Jerzy’s unsuccess­
ful attempt to generate a story from tableaux vivants of historical paintings 
thus stands on the one side of the equation (image and work), the reverse of 
which is the unredeemed or perhaps unredeemable promise of the narration. 
This is the reason for the crisis in permanence, which reveals itself to be a cri­
sis of the sensual­aesthetic, economic, and  social dimension of the cinema at 
the same time. From this perspective,  Godard’s voir le scénario, or “image and 
work = narration (in crisis),” thus provides the basic matrix for the film structure 
in which the pathos (of the images), comparable with the not yet completed 
touch in Tintoretto’s painting, shows itself in the state of in­the­making.
Voir le scénario, est du travail is therefore the formula that traverses every 
 action and coincides with the realization of the film. The aforementioned 
 protagonists each correspond with three places: the film studio in a Swiss 
 village, in which Jerzy reenacts the historical paintings by Rembrandt, Goya, 
Delacroix, El Greco, and Watteau; the factory as place of work, with Isabelle 
and the owner, Michel; the hotel managed by Hana, in which the social differ­
ences and conflicts between work on the film and the factory culminate.  Godard 
superimposes a further structure on this topology, based on the principle of 
9 Godard, Scénario du film Passion.
10 Godard, quoted in Volker Pantenburg, 
Film als Theorie: Bildforschung bei Harun 
Farocki und Jean-Luc Godard (Bielefeld: 
Transcript Verlag, 2006), 129. Unless 
otherwise noted, all translations are by 
Aileen Derieg.
11 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 
trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1989), 180.
12 Volker Pantenburg, Film als Theorie, 129.
13 Godard, quoted in ibid., 135. Originally 
published in Jean-Luc Godard, “Lutter sur 
deux fronts,” in Jean-Luc Godard par  
Jean-Luc Godard, Tom I: 1954–1984, ed. 
Alain Bergala (Paris: Cahiers du cinéma, 
1988), 322. 
14 See Sabeth Buchmann and Karin 
Gludovatz, “Farbe macht Arbeit: 
Überlegungen zu Jean-Luc Godards 
Passion,” in Kunst und Arbeit: Zum 
Verhältnis von Ästhetik und 
Arbeitsanthropologie vom 18. Jahrhundert 
bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Anja Lemke and 
Alexander Weinstock (Paderborn: Wilhelm 
Fink, 2014), 161.
the screenplay that, contrary to the conventions of the film industry, is not 
based on a story that can be told, but rather on one that is to be seen: “I 
didn’t want to write a screenplay, I wanted to see it.”9 Seeing here means telling 
a story with and through the effect of images, as Godard draws from the history 
of European painting from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. In 
 Scénario, though, seeing also means reconstructing the gaze at the images, 
(re­)producing it as work on and with images. Related to the traditional inter­
dependence of screenplay and film, Passion could consequently be consid­
ered the realization of a not yet written/seen Scénario, which produces the 
film itself as work, as work on the Passion. Or, in other words, an “in­the­making” 
based on a doubling of the film in film, two nested, nervous narratives that, 
like countermovements, intersect, overlap, drift apart, coincide, where love 
and labor—the central topoi of the filmic narrative—are realized as an allegory 
of Passion. 
Voir le scénario, est du travail (“seeing the screenplay is work”) is a complicated 
equation. It is complicated because it is played through in respectively  
different ways in Passion and contains a multitude of modes of manifestation. 
Perhaps its most simplest expression is that of a movement of love between 
three figures in Tintoretto’s painting Bacchus, Venus and Ariadne (1576), which 
Godard transfers to his three main protagonists Isabelle (Huppert), a factory 
worker, Jerzy (Radziwilowicz), a Polish filmmaker, and Hana (Hanna Schygulla), 
a hotel owner and wife of the factory owner, Michel (Piccoli). It is not so much 
the iconographic level, but rather the moment of touching not yet completed 
that interests Godard. This is the moment when Bacchus hands the wedding 
ring to Ariadne, and Venus, floating between the two figures—as a connecting 
third—places a crown of stars on Ariadne’s head. The gestures of the figures, 
their bodies arranged in a circle, are what the filmmaker in Scénario imitates 
with his hand in front of the screen, describing this as the dynamic movement 
between love and labor, which is supposed to be realized in Passion from out 
of the image and between the images as a story. The basis for this is a specific 
way of dealing with the filmic image; on the one hand, Godard’s formula that 
“cinema is not one image after another, it is an image plus another, which to­
gether result in a third,”10 or as Gilles Deleuze has described it: “Given one 
potential, another one has to be chosen, not any whatever, but in such a way 
that a difference of potential is established between the two, which will be 
productive of a third or of something new.”11 On the other hand, according to 
Volker Pantenburg, with Godard there is “the utopia of ‘penetrating into the 
image’ and finding a place ‘within the image,’ from which thoughts ‘about the 
image’ can be articulated.”12
The image itself, what is that? A reflex. A mirroring on a disk, does it 
have density? Now it is conventional in cinema to remain outside this 
mirroring, external. Contrary to this, I wanted to see the back of the 
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from images. This, however, requires video technology, which means replacing 
the means of cinematographic narration through editing and montage with 
the technique of “image mixing.” It is therefore hardly surprising that Scénario 
was shot entirely in the studio, the director’s workplace, showing Godard him­
self in front of his video mixer and a screen that is to be newly filled again and 
again: 
I stand before the non­visible.
Here the white beach, Mallarmé’s famous white page. 
Like a sun much too bright at the beach.
Everything is white. 
Yes, that’s right. You have to do the work of a writer [...] 
But you don’t want to write. You want to see it, you want to conceive it. [...] 
Seeing a screenplay is work.18
Paul Valéry saw Stéphane Mallarmé reading his “Un Coup de dés jamais n’abolira 
le hasard“ (A throw of the dice will never abolish chance) “in the most unpre­
tentious way imaginable, as though he wanted to prepare me for an even greater 
surprise; then he let me look at the text arrangement. It seemed to me that I 
was looking at the form and pattern of a thought, placed for the first time in 
finite space.”19 Godard’s Scénario du Film Passion could be considered in ex­
actly the opposite way as the (pictorial) figuration of a story, which first reaches 
language through “reading” the pictures. The comparison seems obvious 
here, to the extent that Mallarmé wanted to newly found the principles and 
rules of poetry and, like Godard, introduced his “revolution” with reference to 
other media. “From music: in the preface to ‘Un Coup’  Mallarmé suggested 
that the poem could be read as a score. From dance: language becomes ges­
ture on the page.”20 Related to cinema, to Godard’s “revolutionary” formula 
voir le scénario, it is the media of painting and theater that he draws on to gen­
erate a screenplay to be seen from the written screenplay. Language is conse­
quently used more as an interruption or a hindrance  (Isabelle’s stuttering, the 
constant coughing of the factory owner), whereas music, in its at once compli­
cated and surprising function as an “in­between image” is equated with the 
image. What can be presented in Scénario as image mixing, as seeing speaking, 
thus requires complex transformation processes at the level of the analogue 
doubling whereas the film­in­film by Jerzy, which is also titled Passion, thema­
tizes work on the film as work on the tableaux vivants—which are already 
doubled images by definition—Godard’s meta­film succeeds in interlinking 
Jerzy’s work on the image with the work in the factory and the social interaction 
in the hotel. It would be insufficient, however, to consider the factory as being 
solely allegorical; in other words, a moment of reflection on the production 
conditions in the cinema industry. Godard’s point seems rather to draw work 
itself as a political and social topos and to negotiate it under the auspices of 
love. The role of Jerzy, the filmmaker in exile, is also to be understood against 
this background. The factory strike, incited by Isabelle but unsuccessful, im­
plicitly integrates the Polish trade union movement Solidarność, which was vi­
olently repressed the year Passion was made, into the events depicted, but 
without becoming caught up in a merely mimetic simulation of the political.15 
Jerzy accordingly functions not only as an alter ego for his own failure with 
the filmic narration, but also reflects Godard’s political, activist ambition during 
the Paris revolts around ’68, his disappointed withdrawal, and his critically  
received return to cinema in the early 1980s—Passion is considered the second 
film of this era, following his Sauve qui peut la vie (1980). 
The work in the factory as a dimension of film production, as an allegory for 
work on the screenplay, is given an additional twist with the factory owner, 
 Michel, to the extent that he also turns out to be Godard’s alter ego. “I am 
 Isabelle’s employer, she is my employee, I have many employees, a big family, 
the whole team,”16 says Godard in Scénario, while projecting a shot of the first 
discussion of work with the film team on the screen. What he then presents to 
the crew as the starting point and foundation for the film plot is Tintoretto’s 
Bacchus, Venus and Ariadne, describing it as a process of in­the­making that 
is already a “finished picture” for the crew. The real conflict looming here be­
comes a constitutive component of the fiction of the film. It shows the argu­
ments between Jerzy and his production assistant, between Isabelle and the 
factory owner, the film producer and Jerzy, the revolt in the factory, Jerzy’s 
struggle with the angel (from Delacroix’s Jacob Wrestling with the Angel, 
1857–61) and is continued at the level of the tableaux vivants. In Passion itself 
there is no “finished picture,” since none of the reenacted images, for which 
extras are significantly recruited from the factory, reaches the status of com­
pletion: they are passion/pathos in work. 
“The after­life of images is not in fact a given,” Agamben says, “but requires 
an operation [work]: this is the task of the historical subject (just as it can be 
said that the persistence of retinal images calls for the cinema, which is able 
to transform it into movement).”17 For Passion we could add that what consis­
tently fails at the level of the tableaux vivants in Jerzy’s film­in­film, Godard’s 
Passion and his Scénario du film Passion seem to provide as “after­image”: 
namely, the reversal of the relationship of image and story and telling a story 
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trans. Malcolm Cowley and James R. 
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in the shot extensively prepared in the film—in which the gestures of work 
and of love find one another, become identical in pathos—Godard refers to a 
painting by El Greco. Significantly, he has El Greco’s Assumption of the Virgin 
(1577–79) reenacted as a tableau vivant, tying it into the scene where Isabelle 
is deflowered by Jerzy.27 The rotating upward movement of the camera along 
the ecstatic­convulsive dynamics of the tableau corresponds with the “Agnus 
Dei” from Fauré’s Requiem, which Isabelle, sitting naked on the bed against 
the back light, slowly recites to herself.28 In contrast to the scenes prior to this, 
El Greco’s Assumption of the Virgin—in keeping with the pathos—is close to 
being the purest “tableau” in Passion, opening up in the direction of an inde­
terminate black (in the darkness of a cinema?). Unlike Diderot, Eisenstein, and 
Brecht, however, Godard withholds from the viewer the “concise moment” 
that is manifested in the complete tableau vivant. In relation to El Greco’s 
Assumption of the Virgin, what the focusing search movement of the camera 
makes impossible is in other places the programmatic dissolution of the fram­
ing structure: for instance, in the juxtaposition of the strike in the factory and 
the four paintings by Goya (The Third of May 1808, The Parasol, The Nude Maja, 
Charles IV of Spain and His Family), where Godard dispenses with separating 
the tableaux from one another, but instead organizes them like a single picture 
in foreground, middle, and background using image mixing. In the opening 
tableau, on the other hand, which places the question of painterly light and 
the narrative as the fundamental conditions of cinema in the foreground, he 
draws the gradual creation of Rembrandt’s The Night Watch (1642) in the studio 
into the filmic image. What Godard provides, in other words, is not an image 
as a “pure segment with clean edges,” which Barthes claims to recognize with 
Diderot, Eisenstein, and Brecht. Instead, these are nervous images just being 
constructed, which in the (rehearsal­like) process of the in­the­making are in 
danger of falling apart again. These are images fraying at the edges, merging, 
overlapping (image mixing), and which never show themselves as images for 
exactly this reason, but rather as work on the image. The recurring question 
of “poetics and poiesis of light”29—as a crisis of transferring painted light to 
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film, with a simultaneous reflection on its media and economic conditions. 
But perhaps it is precisely in the film that what  Michael Newman developed 
for Mallarmé’s “Un coup de dés” becomes evident: that the text is at once rev­
olutionary poetry and a reflection on the revolution.21 At the same time, though, 
it is not so much the media used that initiate the “revolutionary”—if the term 
is to be taxed here for this—but rather the manner in which these media assist 
the realization of Godard’s formula. In relation to the central topoi of love and 
work, seeing (the screenplay) necessarily brings expressive qualities into play 
in the image work and drama, and in body images and their corresponding 
language gestures; in short, pathos. Or to put it another way: it is the work on 
pathos that first realizes Godard’s formula. From this perspective, taking re­
course to the genre of the tableau  vivant only makes sense. As silent theater 
reduced to pure pictorialness, it is also an object of film archeology, to the ex­
tent that movement and montage, as well as the aesthetic of the standstill make 
up its media history.22 Unlike theater or in analogy to film, the tableau vivant—
in keeping with its model—is limited by an unambiguous framing (frame) and 
thus organized in terms of a pictorial space of perspective. By taking up this 
aspect in his essay “Diderot, Eisenstein, Brecht,” Roland Barthes achieves a 
remarkable comparative study.23 Along with Denis Diderot’s theater, Bertolt 
Brecht’s epic scenes, and Sergei Eisenstein’s films are a sequence of images, 
of which the essence is found, according to Barthes, in the staging of the 
“concise moment.” The operative procedures used for this thus correlate with 
Diderot’s theory of the tableau. Inspired by the immersive effect of the paintings 
by Jean­Baptiste Greuze, Diderot sought with his tableau vivant–like stagings—
in keeping with the illusionist theater of the eighteenth century—to instruc­
tively move/touch the audience. With Eisenstein and Brecht, on the other hand, 
this intention was given a critical demonstration in the “social gesture.”24 The 
interlinking between painting, theater, and film outlined here takes a signifi­
cant, if not to say “revolutionary” turn in Godard’s Passion. 
Because Isabelle is a worker, I had to look around in a factory. See the 
workers’ gestures; didn’t these gestures perhaps have something to do 
with the gestures of love, which were also supposed to come up? Didn’t 
this have something to do with the workers? […] Isabelle and love and 
the work and the work of love and the love of the work and the hatred of 
the work, the hatred of work, the hatred of cinema, the love of cinema 
and work.25 
Prefaced by the interest in the gesture (of work, of love), what is condensed 
in Godard’s brief discourse on work and love in Scénario, and expanded by 
the dimension of cinema, is also the proximity to Diderot’s concept of being­
in­the­picture and Eisenstein’s pathos structure—which the filmmaker gener­
ates starting from the dynamic principle or the ecstatic effect of El Greco’s 
paintings.26 It is therefore not a coincidence, as Joachim Paech explains, that 
21 Ibid.
22 Sabine Folie and Michael Glasmeier, 
“Atmende Bilder: Tableau vivant und 
Attitüde zwischen ‘Wirklichkeit und 
Imagination,’” in Tableaux Vivants: 
Lebende Bilder und Attitüden in 
Fotografie, Film und Video, ed. Sabine 
Folie, Michael Glasmeier, and Gerald Matt 
(Vienna: Kunsthalle Wien, 2002), 18. 
23 What is remarkable about this is that 
Bertold Brecht’s epic theater was a 
counter-concept to the illusionist theater 
favored by Diderot. See my essay, “Behind 
the Fourth Wall,” in Behind the Fourth Wall: 
Fictitious Lives—Lived Fictions (Nuremberg: 
Verlag für Moderne Kunst Nürnberg, 
2010), 127. See also Roland Barthes, 
“Diderot, Brecht, Eisenstein,” in ibid.,  
139–47; or Roland Barthes, “Diderot, 
Brecht, Eisenstein,” trans. Stephen Heath, 
Screen 15, no. 2 (1974): 33–39. 
24 See my essay “Behind the Fourth Wall,” 
127.
25 Godard, Scénario du film Passion.
26 See Paech, Passion oder die Einbildungen 
des Jean-Luc Godard, 30–38.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
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and the “in­the­making,” first derails the economy or the calculability of a film 
(or an exhibition), but then immediately reflects them as a repressive regula­
tion, as Godard laconically explains at the beginning in Scénario: “A bathing 
girl one hundred francs, a policeman fifty francs, a lover three dollars. And bit 
by bit this turns into: a policeman falls in love with a girl in a bathing suit, who 
is being pursued by her lover. [...] The screenplay comes from the accounting 
department.”35 The absurdity of economies becomes apparent here on the 
side of the film (and the exhibition) also prompted Godard to provide a syn­
opsis for the planned film with no screenplay, to rehearse some of the tableaux 
vivants, to conduct interviews with the actors, or to make a preselection for 
the music. This may change the perspective of the relationship of film and 
“after­film” (scénario), but what becomes apparent here are moments of re­
hearsal—at the level of images, language, and music—which were realized, as 
it became evident, in the film. This means that the making­of and in­the­making 
merge seamlessly, but without becoming identical—a characteristic that also 
proves to be the condition and the result of the Godardian formula: voir le 
scénario.
Postscript
Godard’s Passion/Scénario du film Passion stand for the beginning of a collec­
tive work, with the intention of realizing an exhibition as rehearsal. Against 
this background, the analysis above is not based on film theory, but rather on 
exhibition theory—as though it were not a matter of describing the film, but 
rather the model or the matrix of an exhibition: as afterimage and model image 
at once. Accordingly, the exhibition endeavors to relate works as an expression 
of temporary productions and production contexts to one another in such a 
way that they can always also be understood as (work­)rehearsals that allow the 
visitors to put themselves in the picture. The way an aspiration of this kind 
always results in difficulties, conflicts, and resistance, was something Godard 
played through extensively, but at the same time, he also showed that and how 
this could be given a positive turn in the process of in­the­making.
This kind of a concept of cinema could be placed alongside Jean­Paul  Martinon’s 
text “Theses in the Philosophy of Curating,” in which the philosopher distin­
guishes between “curating” and “the curatorial.” On the basis of ten brief the­
ses with such expressive titles as “Embodied Knowledge,” “The Other of 
the illumination of the scene, which already became virulent in the tableau 
vivant stagings of the eighteenth century—substantiates exactly this aspect. 
“It’s not working, the light is impossible, it comes from nowhere. […] So let’s 
stop,”30 says Jerzy, for instance, attempting to illuminate Goya’s The Third of 
May 1808 in keeping with the original. Jerzy’s failure with the light implies at 
the same time a failure with Godard’s formula voir le scénario, or “work + image 
= story,” to the extent that “the possibilities of cinematographic image produc­
tion or the possibilities of cinematographic narration,” as Sabeth Buchmann 
and Karin Gludowatz explain, seem to be “tied to the technical deployment and 
representability of light.”31 Godard’s meta­film significantly relies on the inter­
linking of “work + image,” as he connects the strike preparations in the factory 
through the adaptation of the means of painting (the use of back lighting and 
silhouette) with the Goya tableau. What works in Scénario by simply cross­
fading the portrait of Isabelle over Goya’s painting, requires complex scenic 
work and light direction in the film. The essential aspect here, however, is 
Jerzy’s interruption of the work on the tableau, the unfinished status of the 
image, the fraying of its edges into the space of the studio, the space of work, 
and the space of the viewers. This provides the precondition and the possibility 
of producing Godard’s formula voir le scénario in a potentially endless multi­
plication of the “in­between” (of the images). Considered in this “light,” voir le 
scénario, est du travail proves also to be possible images and (framework) 
actions to be imagined by the viewers.32
If “passion” as suffering and fervor “designates that which happens without 
our cooperation,” in other words, which places the affected person in the state 
of potentia, dynamis, and which is conducive to doing and cognition in a posi­
tive sense,33 then Godard’s Passion—the realization of his formula—is, at the 
same time, a “suffering” that draws the viewers into the in­the­making: an offer, 
in other words, of active, (self­)reflective partaking. This is the reason for the 
pathos, the passion in work, which eludes the unlimited objectification of the 
image and thus also its law­abiding (re­)producibility. 
“Ah, there are laws in film, Monsieur Courtard?”
“No, monsieur, there are no laws.”34
There are indeed laws, as Godard could have added to the conversation be­
tween Jerzy and his cameraman, since his meta­film makes it clear that voir le 
scénario, as a screenplay realized in film, can only be achieved through re­
flection on the laws of film. This is exactly the reason why Godard’s formula 
is comparable with Mallarmé’s revolutionary poetry and his reflection on the 
revolution. In addition, this also addresses a rule that is constitutive for re­
hearsal; namely, that breaking the rule, or what is new, is only recognizable 
under the conditions of the rule. This kind of rule violation, as it is evident in 
the simultaneity of, or in the oscillation between processes of the “making­of” 
29 Buchmann and Gludovatz, “Farbe macht 
Arbeit,” 161.
30 Quoted in Paech, Passion oder die 
Einbildungen, 15.
31 Buchmann and Gludowatz, “Farbe macht 
Arbeit,” 161.
32 Pantenburg, Film als Theorie, 134.
33 Busch, Passivität, 42.
34 Paech, Passion oder die Einbildungen, 15.
35 Godard, Scénario du film Passion.
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Narrative,” “Mapping and Playing Chess,” “Warrior of the Imaginary,” and “The 
Ignorant Body”—to name only a few—he presents the curatorial as an “event 
of knowledge” that opens up with the viewers in a process of in­the­making. 
In contrast to curatorial work, this cannot be planned, has no definite place. It 
is something that interrupts when “a line is drawn, a fullness is reached or a 
horizon of understanding is acknowledged.”36 At the same time, this kind of 
interruption is to be understood as an intensification, which does not negate 
the given (“a drawn line, reached fullness, acknowledged horizon”), but instead 
underscores, emphasizes it, while newly inventing itself as an “ignorant body.”37
A definition of the curatorial like this raises a number of questions, of which 
perhaps the most urgent is that of curatorial practice. What if we give the cu­
ratorial (in­the­making) precedence over curatorial practice (the­making­of), 
which means mentally playing something through, which has, as Martinon says, 
no language (yet)? What would this actually mean for an exhibition as rehearsal? 
Perhaps it is a bit venturesome to seek a common denominator between 
 Martinon’s curating/the curatorial and Jean­Luc Godard’s Passion/Scénario 
du Film Passion that could contour an exhibition as rehearsal. What they 
prove to have in common, though, is the unfinished, the interrupted, the 
principle of doubling or multiplication that takes into consideration the 
share of the viewer in the “work” on the film, the exhibition; in other words:  
an oscillation between processes of in­the­making and the making of, as 
even the curatorial can only be envisioned in relation to and in distinction 
from curatorial practice. I would like to go a step further and maintain that 
the exhibition as rehearsal could invent itself as an ignorant body. It would 
thus be on the side of the equation opposite the simultaneity or interlinking 
of curating and the curatorial on the other. This seems just as plausible as 
“writing” the story of a film from and with images — and yet according to 
Martinon, it is by definition un­attainable. It is exactly here that Godard’s voir 
le scénario, est du travail becomes interesting as a model or a matrix for the 
endeavor of conceiving an exhibition as rehearsal.
Translated from the German by Aileen Derieg
36 Jean-Paul Martinon, “Theses in the 
Philosophy of Curating,” in The Curatorial: 
A Philosophy of Curating, ed Jean-Paul 
Martinon (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 
2013), 29.
37 Ibid., 30.
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Fig. 1
Conception rehearsal for Heiner Müller’s The Scab, 1987 
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A photograph shows a gathering in a rehearsal space; backdrop sections can 
be seen in the background. The mood is concentrated. Almost everyone is 
looking at a black box. The stage designer, to the far right, bends over it and 
looks inside with a serious face. The others are also watching closely, tensely. 
Only two are not captivated by the box, look at one another and the director 
at them: this is a document of a rehearsal as a staged constellation of gazes. 
This photograph shows a rehearsal concept meeting for the production of 
Der Lohndrücker (The Scab) directed by Heiner Müller in 1988, whose manner 
of rehearsing will be discussed later.1 
What is drawing the attention of the gazes? The picture segments do not allow 
the viewer of the photograph a glimpse into the box. One can only surmise 






1 Heiner Müller’s Der Lohndrücker, 
Deutsches Theater, Berlin, 1988. 
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designer and the director. The concept meeting is one of the first performances 
in the rehearsal process: the stage designer performs his design by playing 
through its possibilities. He turns the other participants into the first viewers 
of an imaginary staging process with the model. At the same time, it becomes 
clear who is doing the planning and who is the audience that observes the plan, 
that is being shown—who sets an artistic position and who has to deal with it. 
The hierarchies are thus clearly distributed in the concept meeting. 
The photograph stages the working situation rehearsal in a particular way: it 
is not the model that is being observed, but the observers. The lacuna of the 
picture—what can be seen in the box but is not visible to the viewers—refers 
directly to the problem of the performance situation rehearsal. What is ob­
served here is the layout of the space, into which the mise­en­scène is to be 
designed. From the perspective of performance, it is the “empty space.” What 
will take place here is not yet visible, but is what will be developed in the com­
ing weeks and months. And yet what is evident in the gazes of the observers 
is the attempt to already see what could happen in the box. An insight is given 
into what could be: projections into a scenic future. Rehearsal as a practice in 
becoming.
Rehearsals stage specific working constellations that are characterized by spe­
cific options for action: Who watches from where? Who has access? Who 
shows what? Who may speak? Who may make judgments? Rehearsals are thus 
always also performances that stage observer situations. It is not only the 
actors who show and the director who watches, but the director also plays, 
shows, presents, while the actors watch. Unlike other art forms, the artistic 
practice is intersubjectively organized: the process also includes prompters, 
stage designers, technicians, and wardrobe supervisors. And (usually) unlike 
in fine art or literature, theater does not end with a product. Producer, process, 
and product cannot be clearly separated from one another.
The missing product also marks what is unavailable in artistic producing, which 
is constituted solely in doing. Yet this doing is a moment that always also im­
plies the squandering of moments: something is engendered that only exists 
in the moment, which cannot be repeated, and for which there is no guaran­
tee of success (in the moment of performance), even though the rehearsals 
navigate in the direction of a repeatable mise­en­scène. What distinguishes 
artistic practice in theater is thus not a revision or further development of 
something fixed, but rather that it is necessary to start over from the beginning 
again and again. There is no end to work on a theater production and it can 
fail at any time.
Yet rehearsals as stagings of working scenarios are also different from other 
artistic practices on another level as well. Unlike the concept of solitary artists, 
who, through engagement with their singularity and unpredictability brings 
forth something apart from themselves, theater and the rehearsal as a collec­
tive art form requires similar structures in the production conditions, but dif­
ferent working contexts. In performative art, time for working together has to 
be planned if something shared is to be produced. The rehearsals for a mise­en­
scène usually target a concrete performance and premiere date, but require 
making appointments for working times, are frequently organized around a 
detailed division of labor, and tied to a common rehearsal location. The par­
ticipants are connected through contracts. Investments of time and money 
are needed, which create respective dependencies. To this extent, every re­
hearsal practice is always also working on the institutionalization of its own 
activity at the same time. If we look at the historical practices of theater re­
hearsal, we note that they have always been subject to permanent transfor­
mations, which tie artistic practices to general and cultural processes. In other 
words, the way rehearsals are conducted in the theater says something about 
the society in which this theater is made. The rehearsal thus always also en­
genders concepts of theater, art, and society.
Rehearsals should not be grasped solely as the production of a mise­en­scène, 
but should be understood as “processes of producing,” as organizational 
 processes in which theater itself is constituted, but where the concomitant 
conditions are not fixed but transient, for the success of which there is no 
guarantee, permanently reorganizing and changing. Looking at the production 
of theater in this way first makes working in theater visible altogether: it with­
draws the work from the private realm of the producer and performs the work 
itself. Querying working in theater always also means taking a closer look at 
the social dimension of the work—in the form of its “publication” in front 
of others.
The question is thus raised of the connection between the idea of an artistic 
practice beyond work—as a doing without time and place, characterized by 
openness and unpredictability, by singularity and individuality—and the forms 
of collective creativity that have to be organized in theater rehearsals. This is 
to be discussed in the examples of different concepts of rehearsal work, which 
are distinguished by a consciously contradictory relation to concepts of work: 
Bertolt Brecht’s theater work in the Berliner Ensemble of the 1940s and ’50s, 
Heiner Müller’s work in the late twentieth century, and a  contemporary position, 
specifically the collaboration between the director Laurent Chétouane and 
the actor Fabian Hinrichs. To what extent does the  artistic practice undermine 
and transgress the working context theater? Where does it transgress and un­
dermine the organization of work, its regulations and controls?
62 63Annemarie Matzke
In the descriptions of Brecht’s rehearsal practice, similar scenarios are repeat­
edly highlighted. A lack of discipline in the rehearsals, no training for the actors, 
and endless discussions are mentioned. If we look at the rehearsal conditions, 
there was certainly something lavish and immoderate about Brecht’s rehearsal 
work, in terms of time and personnel as well as economic expense. The his­
torical transformation of rehearsal work is also evident: whereas two rehearsals 
were sufficient in the late nineteenth century, with Brecht and  Constantin 
Stanislavski there were over a hundred stage rehearsals and various technical 
rehearsals.
At first glance, Brecht’s rehearsal work can thus be described as undermining 
standards of achievement. Instead of conscientiously working toward the date 
of the premiere, there is an indeterminacy of the rehearsal situation, which 
seems to attempt to evade the compulsion to produce. What is emphasized is 
the time spent together, which appears to be specifically not planned and 
controlled. The hierarchies of production—in the division of labor between di­
rector and actors, assistants, and dramatists—dissolve in the  congeniality of 
the rehearsal. These seem to be friends interacting with one another, rather 
than colleagues working together.
Looking at the rehearsal as a lavish practice contradicts many of Brecht’s ideas 
of a theater practice, which he defines as starting from craft and industrial labor. 
“Theater people simply carry out their trade in the theater, just as bakers carry 
out theirs in the bakery,” he explains, repeatedly emphasizing that actors are 
employees like any others, who must be aware of their status.3 At the same 
time, his point of orientation was the standardization of scientific procedures, 
which he also called for in producing theater. The focal point of these compari­
sons is always a criticism of the obfuscation of production conditions in the 
theater. What Brecht demands from an “experimental theater” is to not only 
work on the procedures and methods, but to change the conditions of produc­
tion. The aim is an artistic practice that not only reflects on its own conditions, 
but in its model character should also lead to changing social reality.
In addition to this demystification of artistic creativity, though, on another level 
Brecht was also interested in reformulating the concept of labor beyond the 
paradigm of production and usability: in searching for a lightness in produc­
ing, which is no longer defined by concepts such as compulsion or disci­
pline. “And yet the most difficult thing about art is that it must conduct its 
Making What Is Hard Easy
In 1967 Carl Weber, one of Brecht’s assistants and dramaturgs, described in a 
lecture his first rehearsal visit at the Berliner Ensemble. They were rehearsing 
Urfaust (1952/53):
I walked into the rehearsal and it was obvious that they were taking a 
break. Brecht was sitting in a chair smoking a cigar, the director of the 
production, Egon Monk, and two or three assistants were sitting with 
him, some of the actors were on stage and some were standing around 
Brecht, joking, making funny movements and laughing about them. 
Then one actor went up on the stage and tried about 30 ways of falling 
from a table. They talked a little about the Urfaust­scene “In Auerbachs 
Keller” […]. Another actor tried the table, the results were compared, with 
a lot of laughing and a lot more of horse­play. This went on and on, and 
someone ate a sandwich, and I thought, my god this is a long break. So I 
sat naively and waited, and just before Monk said, “Well, now we are fin­
ished, let’s go home,” I realised that this was rehearsal.”2
The rehearsal as break and the break as rehearsal. In the scene described 
above, laughter, conversations, the movement of the participants through the 
room, eating sandwiches, and smoking confuse the young guest. The open­
ness of the situation seems to contradict the paradigms of producing oriented 
to the target of a premiere: the activity seems to be marked by randomness, 
arbitrariness, personal needs, and fun, not by planning and control. Expecta­
tions about a working situation—a special form of concentration, the separa­
tion between acting actors and the reflecting director team, instructions from 
the director and their execution by the actors—are undermined and simulta­
neously raise the question of the theater rehearsal as working time. How does 
the creative moment—linked with a concept of spontaneity—relate to the 
jointly agreed rehearsal time? Tying creative acts to a common rehearsal time 
is a difficult endeavor. An idea comes when it wants to, not when we want it 
to. This does not exclude the possibility that the artistic creativity of individual 
artists is also subject to a rigorous time regime. For the topos of spontaneity 
is also closely linked with the image of the artist as “incessantly creating,” 
“restlessly” and “obsessively” devoted to doing—who is ready to be surprised 
at any time by an artistic idea. This time regime, however, is self­chosen and 
not negotiated with other participants. Theater practice requires giving up all 
autonomy over creative time and places theater­makers in a paradoxical situ­
ation: they have to agree on fixed working times and yet cannot guarantee 
that what they plan to do will take place within these working times. Rehearsal 
work under Brecht’s direction was characterized by a conscious subversion of 
time economies. Rehearsal time was, first of all, time spent together, which 
was seemingly unlimited.
2 Carl Weber, “Brecht as Director,” TDR 12, 
no. 1 (Fall 1967): 102–3 (emphasis mine).
3 Bertolt Brecht, “Über eine 
nichtaristotelische Dramatik” [On non-
Aristotelian drama], in Schriften zum 
Theater 1, vol. 15, Gesammelte Werke 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1967), 254. 




The rehearsal process as a lavish practice, on the other hand, can be read as 
a pre­view of the ideal of a different theater beyond the usability of the pro­
duction paradigm, which Brecht, under the compulsion to produce a present­
able performance, did not achieve. Doing theater not as targeted and frictionless 
labor. The aim was a different form of dramaturgy, as Heiner Müller interprets 
Brecht’s theory: “Brecht thought epic theatre was impossible; it would only 
become possible if the perversion of turning a luxury into a profession were to 
cease—the constitution of theatre out of the division of stage and auditorium. 
Only if this is abolished, at least in tendency, does it become possible to make 
theatre with a minimum of dramaturgy, almost without dramaturgy. And that’s 
what it’s about now: to produce a theatre without effort.”6
The utopia of a theater without effort envisions an artistic practice beyond the 
categories of the working world and economic effectivity. Without the separa­
tion between stage and audience space, process and product would also no 
longer be thought of as separate: doing theater envisioned as a producing 
that acknowledges the endlessness of its activity and at the same time points 
beyond its own boundaries.
Islands of Disorder (Heiner Müller)
Whereas with Brecht strategies of squandering and detouring continued to 
be legitimized by their productivity, Müller proposed a different model of 
theater beyond the world of work: “Theater is crisis. That is actually the defi­
nition of theater—or it should be. It can only function as crisis and in crisis, 
otherwise it has no relation at all to society outside the theater.”7
Müller’s proposal of a theater of crisis also applies to producing, rehearsals, 
preparations, and what happens backstage. He does not tie into the myth 
of an artistic crisis, which is ultimately supposed to be resolved in the genius 
artwork, but instead considers the crisis as a constitutive element of the­
ater. The theater is declared as a lavish practice, which resists the logic of 
usability. Specifically because theater does not seem to function within an 
transactions, even the most hopeless, with complete lightness,” explains Brecht.4 
If the working world is distinguished by limiting and rationalizing the pro­
duction time, then rehearsal work should elude exactly these economies of 
time. “If you want to cope with something hard, you have to make it easy”5—
this paradox determines the rehearsals. Moments when Brecht stopped the re­
hearsals because no solution was reached, Carl Weber’s description of the 
openness of the rehearsals, the recordings of rehearsals documenting long 
conversations beyond the concrete rehearsal issues—all these examples 
stand for a certain concept of theater­work: the work should be liberated 
from every external compulsion and every effort. Only in this way could the 
openness emerge that would engender something other than the familiar 
logic. In this way, it becomes possible to imagine a model of artistic practice 
that eludes the compulsion to produce. As the various  documentations of 
Brecht’s rehearsals show, however, time was squandered within a clearly de­
fined time frame.
During the rehearsals for the Katzgraben production directed by Brecht in 1954 
at the Berliner Ensemble, the assistant directors measured the time of the 
performance in the final run­throughs before the premiere. The stopwatch en­
ters into the realm of the theater: differences between single scenes were noted 
in seconds; the time for each scene change was registered. The stopped 
times were compared with the data from the previous run­throughs, and each 
change in timing was entered into a table. With each rehearsal run­through be­
fore the premiere, the performance time was shortened: the performance in 
the process of acceleration. Taking time as “stopping” time considers the pro­
cess of producing as an increase—acceleration presumes a progress of the 
performance. This progress is documented with measured time and can be 
proved. The tables make it easy to forget that it is not a matter of piecework 
here, not a question of the settings of a machine, or of athletes wanting to 
beat their own records, but of the course of a performance following its own 
dramaturgy of time.
Yet this table not only marks a turning point within the rehearsals—from openly 
seeking to targeted producing—it also points out different conceptions of the 
rehearsal as artistic work. Two phases can be identified within the overall re­
hearsal process: the not strictly targeted seeking of the stage rehearsals, and 
the goal­oriented working toward the premiere. Two different economies of 
time are distinguished here: an exploring one marked by leaps, breaks, inter­
ruptions; and a linear one that aims, in relation to the performance, to “pull 
itself together,” to “speed up” the process, as Brecht says. Thus, there is a 
shift from a form of nonwork, in the sense of squandering and the openness 
of the situation, to a targeted, disciplined working. Contingency and plan—
openness and fixation—as two poles of rehearsal work, which gain a respec­
tively different valuation within the process.
4 Bertolt Brecht, “Zur Antigone des 
Sophokles“ [Antigone of Sophocles], in 
Schriften zum Theater 3, vol. 17, 
Gesammelte Werke (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1967), 1212.
5 Helene Weigel and Berliner Ensemble, 
eds., Theaterarbeit (Dresden: VVV 
Dresdner Verlag, 1952), 383.
6 Cited in Hans-Thies Lehmann, 
Postdramatic Theatre, trans. Karen  
Jürs-Munby (London: Routledge,  
2006), 26.
7 “Theater ist Krise: Heiner Müller im 
Gespräch, 16. Oktober 1995,” by Ute 
Scharfenberg, in Manifeste europäischen 
Theaters: Grotowski bis Schleef, ed. 




as gathering material. He refused to fix arrangements, was reserved 
about giving instructions for the scenes, let a tremendous amount of 
material be gained by playing through “helplessness.” […] Since there is 
hardly any description of what is visible, what can be experienced, it is 
difficult for the actors to fix what they have achieved, which leads to in­
security. Gudzuhn: “I had seventy rehearsals and feel as though I have 
only had seven.”13
Müller’s “silence” resulted in insecurity. This insecurity is described by some 
actors as productive. Although Ulrich Mühe called the rehearsals “torture,” 
beyond any “safety net,” at the same time he also recognized them as a  special 
challenge: Mühe would have to go beyond his position as an actor and be re­
sponsible for himself. Other actors literally became speechless in the face of 
the predominant perplexity: “Koerbl, anxious and nervous or perplexed, has 
no more text, has no voice,” according to the rehearsal notes by the director’s 
staff member. Müller refused to set a recognizable conception, provided few 
instructions, seemed to make no decisions, and gave no commentaries or ex­
planation for long stretches. His refusal of a director position worked against 
the given production conditions and the director’s position of authority. Müller’s 
forbearance and laissez­faire approach to conflicts undermine the position of 
a conceptualizing and ordering artistic subject, constituting a “different” frame 
of rehearsing at the same time.
Even though Müller opened up the rehearsals as a possibility space, the posi­
tion of the actors pushed into this kind of situation is substantially more pre­
carious. As Müller consciously called his professional identity into question, 
theirs was questioned too. They were forced into an uncertain situation with­
out knowing what was expected of them. Unlike Müller, however, they thus 
 reacted to a frame that was given to them. Whereas Müller voluntarily and con­
sciously exposed himself to this kind of practice, the actors were  exposed to 
it. Their dependent position focuses the gaze on the production conditions, 
economic thinking oriented to functionality and rationality but it assumes a 
resistive position—breaking out of the rational thinking of the labor society.
Whereas Brecht rejects any special position in society for being an artist, and 
declares theater­making a profession like any other, thus equating artists with 
all other workers, Müller is interested in calling the concept of the profession 
into question in general. “Director is not a profession. That’s not what I am 
 anyway; I can only work with people who have ideas of their own,” he ex­
plained,8 criticizing the form of the division of labor in theater as an “industrial 
product of the nineteenth century.”9 The fact that this remark was formulated 
in an interview for the book Regie: Heiner Müller (Director: Heiner Müller) is 
not without a certain irony, because Müller worked within the structures of 
the city theater, which developed in the nineteenth century, and was credited 
as the  “director” of his productions. His statements are to be read in the con­
text of a program of artistic production based on not­knowing and not­being­
able­to. Müller speaks of “working on the disappearance of the author” and 
seeks an exposition of the “production in the product.”10 This concept of artis­
tic practice is framed in the metaphor of blindness: an artistic activity that 
eludes the control of the author in the overwriting, quoting, and shifting of 
material. Art as a “blind practice” can approach unused reserves: “As long as 
the power is blind, it is a power. As soon as it has a program, a perspective, it 
can be integrated and becomes a part.”11 A concept of aesthetic practice is 
thus formulated, which consciously contradicts the concrete conditions of 
theater production, as is conventional in the theaters where Müller produced. 
The rehearsal form is traditionally oriented to the presence of a director and 
his or her verbal communications, to the corrective of the director’s gaze that 
is supposed to see everything. So how can the rehearsal practice of a direc­
tor, who does not want to be a director and questions the theater itself as an 
institution, be described?
Müller’s rehearsal work for the production Die Hamletmaschine (Hamletmachine, 
1977) has been extensively documented. Descriptions that include new crises, 
and contradictory positions are documented without offering a solution. What 
permeates the actors’ descriptions of the rehearsals is a criticism of the posi­
tion of the director, who refuses to evaluate, to comment on what he has seen: 
“‘Heiner, you have to say something, we’ve gone as far as we can’—‘I want 
to see what you can come up with.’”12 In the rehearsal notes it says again and 
again: “Müller says nothing.” Furthermore, an actress berates the director 
team as “fat, reactionless lumps.” After two months of rehearsals, the direc­
tor’s staff member Stephan Suschke draws the conclusion:
The main problem seems to be the different understandings of the state 
of the development of the production, resulting from the rehearsal 
method. Until this run­through Müller understood the rehearsals primarily 
8 Heiner Müller in conversation with Dieter 
Kranz. The quotations are taken from 
Stephan Suschkes documentation of the 
Müller production, which includes rehearsal 
notes, photographs, critiques, interviews 
with Müller; see Akademie der Künste 
Berlin, Archiv Darstellende Künste: 
Sammlung Inszenierungsdokumentationen 
Index ID 677 [Academy of Arts Berlin, 
Performing Arts Archive: Documentation on 
stage productions].
9 Martin Linzer/Peter Ullrich, Regie: Heiner 
Müller [Director: Heiner Müller] (Berlin: 
Theater der Zeit 1993), 9.
10 Heiner Müller, Rotwelsch (Berlin: Merve, 
1982), 97.
11 Ibid., 178.
12 Rehearsal note from October 13, 1989, 
Documentation of Die Hamletmaschine, 
Akademie der Künste Berlin, Archiv 
Darstellende Künste: Sammlung  
Inszenierungsdokumentationen Index 
ID 677.
13  Ibid. 
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power, which is newly negotiated in the moment of crisis. As the director 
exposes himself to the gaze of the actor, the actor in turn gains subject status, 
which enables him to continue. Rehearsal practice can be described as a 
“practice in becoming.” It is a practice that is aware of the positions of watch­
ing and showing, but their potentiality is first negotiated together.
In this sense, rehearsals can be understood as a staging of a constellation of 
work, but one that subverts the concept of producing. What is meant is more 
an idea of rehearsing as doing, which calls into question the conditions of 
working itself. This is not a matter of mystifying artistic practice as something 
mysterious or inexplicable, nor of a disclosure of production conditions. The  
artistic practice of making theatre is not simply to be envisioned as the  opposite 
of the concept of work, but instead it marks a lacuna. Each of the  rehearsal 
procedures aims for a new indeterminateness of doing, as a recognition of 
chaos, of shared not­knowing and planlessness. In the best case, this includes 
an acknowledgment of not knowing what will happen and yet believing that 
something happens in the time spent together: without purpose or goal.
Translated from the German by Aileen Derieg
which rarely give the actor a choice about which director to work with. At the 
same time, inherent to the concept of this kind of paradoxical  rehearsal method 
is the idea of a change in theater production beyond a  concrete program, 
which in turn obligates the actors to a concept already  designed by the direc­
tor. The rehearsals become a non­defined space, which in the worst case leads 
to paralysis. Yet it is this contradictory position that focuses the gaze for one’s 
own theatrical practice: the rehearsals become  negotiations of artistic prac­
tice—in their resistances and possibilities.
In their rehearsals, both Brecht and Müller designed scenarios of work and 
nonwork. Yet these scenarios are still also always within the context of theater 
production, the conditions of which engender specific contradictions to a 
concept of openness. Here, it is especially the forms of collectively producing 
and the relationship between director and actors that are thus challenged 
in a particular way. If working contexts also always engender intersubjective 
relations in their organization, then a different model of collectivity in doing 
is proposed that attempts (within externally set rules) to undermine the orga­
nization of production. Even if wasting time, crisis, and chaos turn into a goal­
oriented staging in both rehearsal processes, the idea of a theater emerges 
in the forms of theater practice outlined here, which is supposed to be more 
than the work in theatre and breaks open the boundaries of rehearsals and 
mise­en­scène.
In conclusion, I would like to discuss what this can mean in today’s theater 
practice on the basis of Eva Könnemann’s documentary film Die Tragöden aus 
der Stadt (The Tragedians of the City, 2008), which shows the collaboration 
between the director Laurent Chétouane and the actor Fabian Hinrichs. Having 
retreated to the country, the director and the actor are rehearsing their pro­
duction of Shakespeare’s Hamlet. 
“Show me how you do it, so I can watch,” demands the actor. The actor’s de­
mand is a provocation for the director. Before that, Chétouan had explained 
to him that one does not rehearse alone. It is the director’s gaze that first turns 
what is happening into theater. According to Chétouane, “You have to look at 
yourself through me.” Hinrichs finds himself in a crisis. He does not believe the 
gaze from the outside and demands a reversal of the gaze regime. Then he 
wants to assume the position of the director, the observing subject, to be 
able to reevaluate his object status as an observer. In a scene in the film, 
Chétouan, who clearly feels uncomfortable, enters into this demand. He takes 
the stage, sits down on a chair, all under Hinrichs’s gaze. Hinrichs cannot bear 
this for long, however, and takes the stage again himself. In changing roles, 
both finally sit down next to one another. Hinrichs starts to imitate Chétouan 
and takes on his movements. Directing and acting present themselves here as 
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Stefanie Diekmann: Looking over your filmography, one gets the impression 
that you’ve always been interested in processes of rehearsal, at least in an 
extended sense.
Eva Könnemann: The first film in which the theater rehearsal is the subject 
was Die Tragöden aus der Stadt (2007). But before that I’d made several 
films that explored artistic processes, primarily in music. My guiding 
question was always: How does a work of art—be it music, a text, or else 
a theatrical performance—come into being?
Ekkehard Knörer: Was this exploration of music already about collective 
processes?
EVK: There’s a short film I made about a fictional band—it features actors 
playing the band’s members, but they also composed music for the film 
and subsequently performed as that band.
SD: With a view to your later projects, it’s interesting to note that the band 
actually had to play and perform. Might it be the crux of the rehearsal that, 
as a process, it can’t be faked, that you can only observe it, and that the best 
times to observe it are moments of tension or strenuous negotiation, because 
it’s only at those junctures that there’s really something at stake?
EVK: Yes. I discovered this aspect while working on the short Light Boy 
(2003)—the title is also the band’s name. At first it was about the char­
acters and certain things that happen to them, such as the singer’s 
 disappearance. I was actually mostly keen on the plot. But then the 
band kind of went behind my back and wrote several songs. They knew 
I wanted to shoot a scene at Golden Pudel Club in Hamburg in which 
they would pretend to be giving a concert. On the night of the shoot, 
we set up the stage and lighting, did a sound check, and suddenly it 
turned out they’d written five songs and were giving an actual concert. 
Here the band was for real, something I’d never planned on. I liked that, 
and so I came back to it as a methodical device later on.
SD: However open the processes in the various films are, that moment of live 
performance, of going out there and facing the audience, always looms on 
the horizon. That made me wonder: To what extent does the prospect of this 
confrontation, of the moment when the performers must deliver, format the 
process or make it observable in the first place, by being the final destination 
that lends it structure? How, specifically, did you come to make Die Tragöden 
aus der Stadt?
A Heavy    




 Eva Könnemann in Conversation  
 with Stefanie Diekmann and Ekkehard Knörer
74 75Eva Könnemann in Conversation with Stefanie Diekmann and Ekkehard KnörerA Heavy Compression to Bring Out the Moments of Crisis
EVK: Well, the film doesn’t offer a commentary on anything, though it 
heavily compresses to bring out the moments of crisis. My purpose was 
not to paint the most objective and comprehensive picture possible of 
what happened. Crisis was in the air from the start of the rehearsals, so 
the film also conveys something that happened. Still, it represents a 
choice of focus—I might well have chosen to show more of the good 
moments, where something comes together and the mood is buoyant. 
It all concludes with a happy ending on the stage, but the rehearsal film 
ends just before the premiere, with the complete falling out between 
the two protagonists, their inability to understand each other. Those are 
 obviously deliberate choices.
SD: The moments of crisis in Die Tragöden often revolve around something 
that’s also a major issue in the two subsequent films: the question of role 
 allocation and role concepts, though not with regard to how a character 
is conceived, but rather: What’s the function in which I’m actually here, 
what do I have to deliver, what’s expected of me? There’s a moment where 
Hinrichs tells Chétouane, “Ok, so you go ahead and do it. You sit down there. 
I want to see right now how you do that.” And Chétouane replies, “No, I can’t 
do that, I’m the director.” That moment encapsulates a debate in which 
the very question of who does what is at stake. Would you also say that this 
questioning of each protagonist’s role echoes in the subsequent projects?
EVK: I do think that many of the films I’ve made examine questions of col­
laboration. How does collaboration function? It’s important to note that 
when multiple people work together, hierarchies will always emerge that 
can than be taken apart or called in question. In Material Beton (2013), 
we tried to dismantle these hierarchies as much as possible, but that re­
vealed how problematic any such attempt is. At bottom it’s always also 
about relations of power.
EKK: In ensemble (2010), you personally arranged the constellation of these 
relations of power, these peculiar and not entirely perspicuous relations 
that are both somewhat hierarchical, with the figure of the director as the 
 ultimate source of authority, and designed to foster collective creative 
 processes. Was that a direct response to what you’d experienced during 
the rehearsals for Die Tragöden?
EVK: With Die Tragöden, there had been several instances of internal cen­
sorship—I’d striven to protect the two by not showing everything. I think 
that was what gave me the idea of making a second film about theater 
rehearsals in which no such safeguard was necessary. So I cast a theatrical 
ensemble and offered everyone to choose a pseudonym—they didn’t have 
to be themselves as they acted in this constellation, so that there was room 
EVK: The original plan was to make a film that would be set backstage 
during a performance—Hinterbühne, or “backstage,” was actually the 
project’s working title. I wanted to show all the entrances and exits, while 
staying in that space behind the stage, the place where the actors break 
character. Then I heard that Fabian Hinrichs and Laurent Chétouane were 
making plans for a production of Hamlet. Their initial idea was to produce 
two different versions: first a solo version starring Hinrichs, then an en­
semble production. The latter would have been especially interesting to 
me with regard to the backstage scenario. Still, I decided to start by 
shooting during the rehearsals for the monologue version. The second 
production never came together. So I was left with eighty hours of foot­
age from the rehearsal process. At first the material just sat there for a 
pretty long time, almost half a year, because I was frustrated that the en­
semble production they’d envisioned never materialized.
SD: When did you realize what it was about the material that interested you—
during the shoot, or only when you reviewed it later?
EVK: As I was shooting, it struck me that something was happening be­
fore my eyes: a genuine encounter, a very contentious engagement, a 
collision between two exceptionally strong personalities who were ear­
nestly struggling to find common ground. The deal we’d made was that I 
would always be there for the rehearsals—I wasn’t just going to drop in 
and turn the camera on as I pleased. I remember Laurent saying that I 
had to become part of the landscape: the landscape in which the re­
hearsals took place.
EKK: Were you more than just the proverbial fly on the wall? Did people also 
approach you as a director or artist during the rehearsals? For example, did 
they ask you to resolve disputes?
EVK: Not on the scene. When I was there, I really was the fly on the wall 
and no one approached me in any way. They also didn’t feel the presence 
of the camera—that worked really well. Outside the rehearsal room, by 
contrast, both sides used me—to put it harshly—on a regular basis to talk 
about and work through what had occurred and to vent.
SD: That’s a partial answer to my next question: whether a backstage area 
within the backstage area took shape. So that, in a certain sense, it’s a making 
of and backstage film that takes the viewer, though not to the literal back-
stage area, into the creative process. But then there’s also a process behind 
the creative process, and that’s the plane of commentary, which in turn 
shifts into the film’s offscreen register. Perhaps that’s no longer backstage 
but the “real” offscreen action.
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EVK: I think that pretty much everyone felt this shift in the course of the 
process because the stress of the rehearsals and the pressure of the im­
pending premiere took their toll. In the end, the rehearsals went awry. 
Here was a group of improvisers who didn’t interact well with each other. 
It’s not like I didn’t have a bad conscience—after all, I’d cast these people 
and brought them together. It felt like I’d assembled a band and recruited 
musicians not used to listening to each other, so naturally the result was 
a cacophony.
SD: And that wasn’t your intention from the outset? I remember an open 
Q&A session where someone in the audience quickly brought up the Big 
Brother comparison. So the impression was obviously that this was an invol-
untary community of types chosen to be as heterogeneous, incompatible, 
and likely to run afoul of each other as often as possible.
EVK: The intention was definitely to show mainly the difficulties of com­
munal action, but I overdid it. I underestimated the potential for conflict 
inherent in the group, and I had no idea that this particular constellation 
would make it impossible for people to get their act together and create 
a collaborative work. Of course everyone involved has his or her own skills 
and talents, but that’s of little use when the group is dysfunctional as a 
group. I inadvertently put together an ensemble that was bound to fail.
SD: What I find very interesting about ensemble is the coexistence of differ-
ent orders of space. On the one hand, there’s the claustrophobic aspect—
once you’re inside, you are, for the time being, stuck inside; but then there 
are, within that inside, various zones and areas, each with its own rules. On 
the other hand, the rehearsal’s boundaries in time are very fluid. It’s not always 
easy to tell when a rehearsal starts or what’s part of the rehearsal and what 
isn’t: Are we now actually working on the play? Or is this still the kind of ques-
tion that ought to be resolved outside of the rehearsal proper? In spatial 
terms, there’s an identifiable boundary between off and on, but I felt like it’s 
incredibly difficult to pinpoint the moments when the switch from off-time 
to on-time and vice versa takes place.
EVK: Those are exactly the moments I’m especially interested in—the 
half­private moments of irresolution, of sitting and waiting. One example 
in ensemble is a scene after a Bierchen-Probe (rehearsal over beers)— 
always an occasion when private life and work tend to blur into each 
other anyway because many people get pretty soused, so that even the 
professional actors’ efforts to stick to their roles fall apart. There’s a similar 
instant toward the end when two actors lie on the floor and wriggle 
out of their boots, you can tell they’re genuinely exhausted, and they’re 
slowly gliding out of the scene, a fade­out rather than a cut. More 
for a kind of freedom, a disassociation from the personal in their acting. 
Conversely, it gave me a freedom as well. I didn’t have to try and faithfully 
represent these people. I paid all participants actors’ wages, organized 
the rehearsal room, and selected Georg Büchner’s play Danton’s Death.
EKK: What did you tell them? That you were shooting an improvised feature 
film? Or a documentary with fictional elements? Or something else entirely?
EVK: I gave them a fairly businesslike description of the setup and ex­
plained that I wanted to make a film about a theater rehearsal, or more 
precisely, about a simulated theater rehearsal on the basis of an arranged 
situation. The film would be fictional but shot like a documentary. I also 
told them that the rehearsals would be for real and that there would be a 
performance.
SD: There’s a certain subset of people in ensemble who have fairly defined 
roles, like the musicians and the assistants, who are pretty passive much of 
the time. Meanwhile, others—primarily the ones who have to go onstage and 
act before an audience—have to work with completely undefined roles. 
Somehow this situation affects the director’s position as well. Was that mixture 
something you’d always planned on? Or did you hope that it would be an 
especially rich source of creative friction?
EVK: That wasn’t something I planned—it just turned out that way. The 
musician was simply very good at what he did and extremely versatile. 
That sort of virtuoso skill breeds confidence. He also had a clearly defined 
assignment. With regard to the assistants, we’d decided to use clip­on 
and stationary microphones, but we didn’t have boom arms. We also had 
to make do with a limited number of input channels on the mixing console, 
which is to say, we had only so many clip­on mikes, and the assistants, 
like the set and costume designers, usually didn’t wear one. I gradually 
realized that was a major mistake. They were powerless to intervene, or 
when they did, the sound was so bad that the material was unusable. Not 
giving the actors clearly defined parts and assignments was the direc­
tor’s decision—he took a very open approach to the project. He refused to 
be cast in a role of authority. His background is in performance art and 
he usually works with a nonhierarchical group.
EKK: You said that it was to some extent up to the actors how much they 
would playact, to which extent they would understand their involvement as 
role-play or appear as themselves. Did the balance between those two ap-
proaches shift over time? My impression was that some of them started out 
with the intention to stick to their role but then ended up switching to the 
other side, the side of being themselves, as it were.
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you can tell when you watch the film from the talk he has with the director. 
He says that the production in its current state isn’t ready to go on stage. 
And, if I recall correctly, he adds: “So go ahead and try again, but it’d be 
a miracle if you can work it out on time.” The director then speaks to the 
actors and proposes that the scheduled premiere should be relabeled as 
a kind of interim presentation of the results of the rehearsal process.
SD: It’s an attempt to take this looming deadline, a definite point in time that’s 
unavoidable simply because it’s been set, and reinterpret it as fluid, which is 
to say, as not too unlike the ambiguous state that existed before. A study of 
the rehearsal as a genre is a pretty good way to grasp the dramatic signifi-
cance that the scheduled endpoint has in a creative process, especially in 
the theater. This is perhaps a good moment to bring up your next project after 
ensemble, Material Beton (2013), which occupied you far longer than the two 
months you’d spent in Hamburg. This time the idea was to determine very little 
beforehand, to make as few authoritative choices early on as possible.
EVK: This, too, was a group project, but now I myself was a member of 
the group—the attempt to make a film as a group, to work as a non­ 
hierarchical collective. It was important to me that the basic choices 
that defined the project weren’t mine—I insisted that the group as a 
whole come together to make them. So I approached the people who 
joined me for the project in a spirit of freedom and openness. I really 
tried to specify as little as possible. There were six of us, and everyone 
had to take turns wielding the camera. More generally, everyone on this 
film had to do everything.
SD: That sounds a bit like really existing socialism: people are almost delib-
erately promoted to positions they have no training or little talent for—but 
it’s a matter of principle, and so that’s how it’s done.
EVK: Once again, the motivation for the project grew out of an earlier 
film—in this instance, ensemble. I’d felt a certain unease—yes there were 
assigned roles, yes it was playacting, though the film was the product of 
collective creative action and not just the implementation of a script I’d 
written by myself. Still, in the end, it was my film, my view of what had 
transpired, and so it failed to capture the sense of communality that had 
emerged during the rehearsals and on the set and that was at the basis 
of the film.
EKK: Ensemble is a reflection on a rehearsal process and what happens in it. 
By contrast, it’s not readily apparent what Material Beton is actually a reflec-
tion on—though the work of making a production, of setting it in motion, is 
certainly part of it. So it adumbrates yet another level of reflectivity. There 
 generally, it’s during the moments of getting dressed and getting un­
dressed that people—lingering, as it were, in a transitional zone—talk 
about the rehearsal or maybe try out their delivery of a line their charac­
ter has in Danton’s Death. In other words, those are the moments where 
different registers overlap—they’re still outside and simultaneously al­
ready inside the work.
SD: You’d given yourself—or the ensemble—more than six weeks for the re-
hearsals. Everyone knew about this schedule from the start, so here they are 
working on the production for a month and a half and then they have to go 
on stage. That struck me as a highly forcible construct, highlighting the way 
in which any theatrical performance is in some ways an authoritative fiat.
EVK: I’m very interested in processes, but no less in what it means to 
bring something to an end. One of the most problematic aspects of the 
theater, to my mind, is the format it imposes on time: two months, then 
the performance. When I make a film, I usually don’t know when it’ll be 
finished, I work without deadlines. The pressure exerted by the impend­
ing performance in the theater generates a peculiar kind of narrative. 
Like the miraculous turnaround toward the end of the rehearsal period: 
there’s a crisis, and then, in the final days before the opening night, in 
the last week, everything suddenly comes together.
EKK: But a miracle that occurs routinely is not a miracle. And this suggests 
that the authoritative fiat is extremely important, because without it the whole 
thing wouldn’t be serious. If you’d said, “You go rehearse and we’ll see what 
happens,” the outcome would probably have been a very different one. With-
out the idea of the performance scheduled for a given date, it would no lon-
ger be a rehearsal. It would be more like a kind of group therapy.
SD: Beyond the arbitrary authoritative decision and the miracle that’s appar-
ently only so dependable, there’s a third aspect: the fact that theatrical pro-
ductions remain works in progress even after the premiere—half a year later, 
the performance will run ten minutes longer than on the opening night, or it’ll 
be eight minutes shorter. This corresponds to what you’ve said, that sense 
that there’s never enough time. Hence the afterthoughts, the constant revi-
sion of what seemed to be final decisions.
EVK: That brings something else to my mind that has bearing on your 
questions. In ensemble, there’s a sort of preview performance that trig­
gers the culminating crisis. A week before the opening night, the the­
ater’s artistic director dropped in and watched the rehearsal, and as it 
happened, everything went wrong on that particular day. Everyone felt 
it. So Tom Stromberg, who plays the artistic director, was appalled, as 
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are always—and on several levels—numerous different issues that need to be 
negotiated at the same time. The stipulation that the process as such is sup-
posed to be a collective one necessitates ongoing negotiations, and the nego-
tiations are not staged but subject to constant reflection in the discussion. And 
the film treatment then reflects on this process from yet another angle. I always 
got the sense that it wasn’t clear at all when you were actually done with 
anything. I constantly thought: Why don’t you set stop rules for yourself. Just 
pick one person who gets the final say, and be it that he or she tosses a coin. 
But you didn’t even have such a rudimentary internal structure.
EVK: You’re right. It would have just gone on and on and on. Perhaps I 
should briefly explain the project’s setup: the film is based on the fiction of 
a group of artists who build a concrete sculpture, a large collective sculp­
ture. Then there’s also a second group shooting a film about the first group 
and the genesis of the sculpture. Both groups consisted of the same peo­
ple, so there was really just one ensemble. During the day, we always 
worked on the sculpture. Everyone was part of the group working on the 
sculpture, but we took turns operating the camera. In the evening, we 
turned into the second group—we called it the auteur group—making the 
film about the sculpture group, and whoever had been behind the camera 
during the day presented the footage to the others and then we talked 
about it. The discussions always lasted an hour, because we recorded and 
transcribed them to make these conversations the film’s second layer. As 
we edited the film, we found ourselves debating many creative decisions, 
so we also recorded these discussions about the editing because they 
turned out to be the true locus of authorship. We edited the film to give it 
some form and bring the process to a conclusion, but kept producing 
more material because we  recorded each new editing discussion, which 
gave rise to new contentions, and it all become ever more complex. At 
some point we realized: this is interminable. So the end really came be­
cause we were exhausted. One day we simply stopped recording the con­
versations. And the very last decision—the question was whether to include 
one image or not—was actually made by tossing a coin.
SD: My impression was that there were no templates for this kind of situation. 
With ensemble, you still had templates, and certainly with Die Tragöden, but 
not for Material Beton. It’s obviously about collective creation, but that’s not in 
itself a template. So there’s nothing to rebel against, no authoritative fiat, and 
hence no stop rule. Instead, there’s an absolutely serious attention to what de-
cision-making implies. If you take decision-making seriously, it never ends, 
because any decision entails the next. Ultimately, the only possible resolution 
is a deliberate act of arbitrariness, like a coin toss.
Translated from the German by Gerrit Jackson
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The theatrical rehearsal, it is generally believed, is primarily defined by its 
dynamic in time. Its structure is informed by impending events: an opening 
night or rehearsal, a weekly rehearsal plan, a revival or return, a répétition or, 
at least virtually, a future result. By contrast, the spatial and local coordinates 
associated with a rehearsal are not generally part of how we think about the­
atrical practice. Even the term “rehearsal space” primarily brings temporal 
associations to mind—the decor is not yet finished, the setup is provisional, a 
rehearsal room is available only at certain times—the audience is unlikely to 
see any of these.
The spatial dimension of the rehearsal is more sharply contoured and dynamic 
in filmmaking, where the processes identifiable as the studying of parts, 
 practice variants, or patterns of behavior are inextricably bound up with their 
concrete positions in space or in some instances the transformation or trans­
location of places. This locational dynamic brings the meanings associated 
with a particular chosen place and perspective into play. Unlike the “empty 
space of the stage” (Peter Brook), the scene of a film production is generally 
invested with significations that predate the shoot, especially when it is an 
authentic location. Films that thus combine an improvised and varied action 
presented for review with the procedure and perception of cinematographic 
spatial and locational displacement create opportunities for social and aes­
thetic experiences for those involved with a project. To flesh out and explain 
this hypothesis, I will discuss examples of three different filmic practices: 
one, the collaboration between Hollis Frampton and Joyce Wieland, as mani­
fested in their joint avant­garde film A and B in Ontario (Canada, 1984); two, 
Lars von Trier’s approach to filmmaking in The Idiots (Denmark, 1998), a work 
of the “Dogme 95” movement; and three, the so­called Fontainhas films the 
Portuguese director Pedro Costa realized with immigrants from the Cape Verde 
islands (Portugal, 1996–2014).
A and B in Ontario
In A and B in Ontario, Wieland and Frampton film each other. They start in an 
apartment, focusing their cameras’ lenses on each other across a room or 
through doorways. At times, both artists stand side by side or one behind the 
other as they face a mirror; at other times, one walks, camera in hand, while 
the other shoots from a standing or seated position. They subsequently con­
tinue their mutual observation outdoors, in urban traffic, and then in a recre­
ation area on the shore.
Such changes of location and the chosen cinematographic rule of filming 
each other aside, A and B in Ontario lacks the intrinsic logic of a plot to hold 
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the scenes together and to make sense of the action—a plot, say, of mounting 
tension, open conflict, and reconciliation, or of rivalry culminating in a deci­
sive contest. As a consequence, additional aspects of an antagonistic relation­
ship between Frampton and Wieland, be it a social, stylistic, or erotic one, is 
hinted at but never comes into focus. The competition between the two artists, 
which manifests solely in their filming of each other, is never spelled out. In­
stead of proposing a resolution, decision, or assessment, A and B in Ontario 
aims to realize new inventive ways of implementing the underlying rule: two 
filmmakers capture each other as they explore the possibilities of a variety of 
settings.
Each wields a Bolex 16 mm camera. Frampton’s camera has a lens turret that 
allows him to alternate between three fixed focal lengths, whereas Wieland’s 
camera is equipped with a zoom lens. Moreover, both artists attempt a variety 
of camera movements and alternate between conventionally lit and contre­jour 
shots. In the edit Wieland compiled many years later, the film alludes to classic 
narrative rhetorical devices such as getaway and pursuit, games of hide and 
seek, or gestures of rapprochement and divergence. But, and this is important, 
such elements of signification are never mediated, or fully made sense of, by 
a larger dramatic meaning. The elements of action in A and B in Ontario never 
find their place in overarching significative or motivic constructions. The film 
instead concatenates the gestures and actions recorded by the cameras in open 
sequences structured by patterns of repetition and variation. In other words, 
its mode of operation has much in common with a rehearsal.
The Rehearsal Status and Definiteness in Filmmaking
The fact that film editing involves the cutting and splicing together of pieces 
of footage indicates that the individual perspectives they aggregate must al­
ways be regarded as a preliminary selection—every abridgment of a shot or 
alternation between shots suggests as much. The provisional nature of any 
shot is even more manifest when, in a typical production, the same scene is 
recorded on location in multiple alternative versions involving different vanish­
ing points, shot parameters, or emphases in the acting. On the other hand, 
the sort of conventional dramaturgy imposed in the editing studio aims to 
smooth over such differences and decide indeterminacies with a view to the 
final film to be created, or else to camouflage them or lend them meaning as 
tokens of the film’s realism. Technological practices as well as rhetorical and 
representational techniques have evolved in the course of film history that 
allow directors to impose the desired continuity, harmony, and validity of a 
single perspective. A paradigmatic example is the point­of­view shot: meaning 
emerges in the complementary relation between a take showing a subject 
and a second shot revealing the object of that subject’s perception.1 Various 
supporting techniques and representational principles can serve to corroborate 
such identification: adherence to certain rules concerning the angles in which 
the motifs are placed and from which they are shot as well correspondences 
between shot parameters, lighting conditions, motifs, and art direction ele­
ments. Conversely, films that deliberately undermine such continuity or our 
habitual sense of reality by contravening these rules have a rich field to mine.
Yet it is by no means only the production of optionality and discontinuity that 
manifests the provisional and rehearsal­like quality of film scenes. A film scene 
is like a rehearsal also in that it is a technologically preserved preliminary result 
presented for review as definitive. Unlike in theater where the public is usually 
excluded from rehearsals of which nothing eventually remains but is a result 
that has undergone, and continues to undergo, progressive transformation, 
film records at least selected definitive traces of a production in the trial stage. 
In that sense, a film is also like a (culinary or product) “sample” or an “extract” 
from a literary production: its mode is that of an immediate and (publicly) test-
able materialization.
Narrative Functions of the Rehearsal
One film that is not only a rehearsal in this fundamental sense but also explicitly 
reflects on its status is A and B in Ontario. It lays out all the functions I have 
mentioned: the proposal­like quality, which is to say, the optionality and dis­
continuity of instants of improvised compliance with and infringement of 
rules, as well as the review of provisional results preserved in the process. A 
and B in Ontario is most effective as a film when these recognizably different 
functions are brought together in constellations that highlight the tensions be­
tween them. Not only did Wieland, in editing the film, subject the accumulated 
footage to a review with the purpose of arranging the individual variants in a 
new and perhaps more compellingly narrative sequence. Both artist­filmmakers 
also worked, each by him­ or herself and in a process of mutual observation, 
to sample their respective filmic options, latitudes for movement, and maneu­
vering rooms, always looking for adequate filmic reciprocations and corre­
spondences as well as surprises.
1 On the function of the point-of-view shot 
in cinema, see Edward Branigan, Point of 
View in the Cinema: A Theory of Narration 
and Subjectivity in Classical Film 
(Amsterdam: De Gruyter Mouton, 1984); 
Edward Branigan, “Formal Permutations of 
the Point-of-View Shot,” Screen 16, no. 3 
(Autumn 1975): 54–64; Raymond Bellour, 
“To Alternate/To Narrate (on The Lonedale 
Operator),” in Raymond Bellour, The 
Analysis of Film, ed. Constance Penley 
(Bloomington: Indiana University  
Press, 2000), 262–77; and Stephen Heath, 
“Notes on Suture,” Screen 18, no. 4  
(Winter 1977): 48–76.
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When Wieland edited the aggregated footage, she retained the scenic con­
nections between the various shooting locations, bringing out the different 
potential each holds with regard to the rule of the artists’ filming of each other. 
In the cramped apartment, the two protagonists repeatedly meet, using the 
existing furniture, mirrors, doors to hide or to uncover the other; the wide­
open landscapes of park and beach, by contrast, allow them to let not only 
gazes and encounters but also their reciprocations to drift apart. Nearby and 
distant elements of the environment insert themselves: a playground, the sea, 
the horizon, sailboats, walkways, and numerous passersby and local residents. 
A salient example is a scenic sequence that starts with Wieland filming Frampton 
as he, wielding his own camera, goes down a playground slide. The expected, 
dynamic countershot, showing Wieland from the point of view of a camera 
gliding downward, arrives surprisingly late, after several intercut scenes, and 
is perceptibly clipped. With such loosely staggered locations and scenic situa­
tions, the film presents an open­ended array of moments in an open as well as 
intimate and embracing as well as deep relationship between the author­
protagonists. Beyond the (definitive) testimony to a specific juncture in this 
relationship offered by each individual shot, it is the film’s renunciation of op­
timization or condensation that ties the mode and gesture of the trial run to­
gether with the serenity and promise of a seemingly inexhaustible realm of 
possibility.2
Acting as Rehearsal and Test
What Frampton and Wieland’s avant­garde film thus suggests through the mu­
tually reflective alternation between the perspectives of two cameras—the 
optional quality of perception, thinking, and action—is also a theme in more 
established art­house cinema. In particular, it is an important issue in films 
that construct their narrative as a reflection between different planes of fiction­
ality. One widely used form is the play within the play: an action being staged 
is framed, and commented on, by a temporally and spatially separate meta­
action performed by the same actors; this, too, may be regarded as dramatizing 
the interplay between option, improvisation, and review. A paradigmatic ex­
ample of this sort of filmic rehearsal is Lars von Trier’s film The Idiots (1998). 
On the first fictional plane, it features a series of rehearsal performances, pos­
itively theatrical histrionics, in which each of the protagonists tries to find his 
or her inner “idiot,” almost like an actor getting into a character. On the one 
hand, the development of idiotic forms of expression and ways of engaging 
with others is meant to enable the cast to break free of the mechanisms of 
personal isolation; on the other hand, the group seeks to hold a critical mirror 
up to the “normal” outside world, highlighting the conventional hypocrisy with 
which it deals with people who do not fit the norm. To add to the complexity 
of this play within the play, meta­fictional scenes are inserted between the var­
ious role­development trial phases. In these mock interviews, several of the 
actors comment on the staged project’s evolution and the group dynamics: 
looking back, reflecting, sometimes drawing conclusions or offering interpreta­
tions and assessments. Intercut between the rehearsal scenes, this commentary 
takes on other functions as well: it drives the action forward and stimulates the 
viewer’s interest in each following rehearsal scene. The interviews lend 
rhythm and structure to the main action in which it gradually emerges that for 
one member of the group, Karen (Bodil Jørgensen), the role rehearsal is not 
just playacting but a form of therapy. Traumatized by the sudden death of her 
son, she is trying out potential strategies of coping with depression. Last but 
not least, the alternation between rehearsal scenes and interviews reflects the 
mode of cinematography as a mode of transition in that the performances of 
the actors on both planes correspond to each other. Although different in 
many ways, the scenes of both types are comparable: both are about a play 
with differences of opinion and the willingness to let oneself in for unfamiliar 
rules or questions. In the rehearsal scenes, it is primarily Stoffer (Jens Albinus) 
who prods his fellow members of the project cast to act more resolutely idiotic, 
while in the commentary, the offscreen voice of the interviewer (in the Danish 
original, Lars von Trier himself) demands greater resolve and more precise 
answers from his interlocutors. The same idiosyncratic gestures and attitudes 
of the actors appear on both representational planes. Moreover, all footage, 
including pan shots, was recorded using a handheld camera, heightening the 
film’s air of spontaneity and improvisation.
Complying with Rules, Violating Rules
That last feature points to the set of rules several Danish movie directors im­
posed on themselves in the mid­1990s to promote their film productions: the 
manifesto “Dogme 95,” which they also called, with a dose of irony, their “vow 
of chastity.”3 If it committed them to stringent limitations, it was no less impor­
tantly also meant to articulate a critique of the illusionism, empty pathos, and 
gimmickry of the dominant blockbuster­style of moviemaking. Seeking to re­
forge the cinematic image’s relation to reality, the filmmakers pledged and en­
couraged others to cut down radically on filmmaking technology: the “vow” 
banned camera tripods and anachronistic props or objects not found on loca­
tion, and prohibited staging plots set at any other time than the present, add­
ing music to the soundtrack after shooting, or crediting the director in the 
2  For further information concerning A and 
B in Ontario, see R. Bruce Elder, “Notes 
After a Conversation between Hollis and 
Joyce.” in The Films of Joyce Wieland, ed. 
Kathryn Elder (Toronto: Cinematheque 
Ontario, 1999), 183–94.
3 Lars von Trier and Thomas Vinterberg, 
“Dogme 95: The Vow of Chastity” (1995), 
in The European Cinema Reader, ed. 
Catherine Fowler (London: Routledge, 
2002), 83–84.
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for ways to express their “inner idiot” and evolve forms of behavior and inter­
action in keeping with their fiction, which is to say, the “normality” of their play. 
The challenges mount when the group takes its rehearsals to public places, 
combining them, for example, with visits to a swimming pool or a restaurant 
or a tour of a rock wool plant—paradigmatic situations in which the individuals 
involved in the experiment are exposed to the anxious and/or scrutinizing gazes 
of strangers. Two aspects are noteworthy: first, these public situations—some 
are more welcoming to disabled people, some less so—and the responses of 
outsiders ranging from irritation and insincere friendliness to intolerance pro­
vide incentives to embrace the role of the idiot more fully, to test variations of 
it, to overplay or, then again, undercut it. For example, after the group has 
toured the plant under the guidance of a PR officer oozing with affected sym­
pathy, they shock their host by telling him that one of the idiots will steer their 
bus on the way home. Second aspect: such confrontation with others raises 
the bar for the performers’ resolve to stick to their role and see where they can 
take it. Authenticity, it emerges, is an effect generated by an increasingly ex­
pert performance. Even more than the experiment in the sheltered rehearsal 
space of the villa, interaction with the public becomes the litmus test—not un­
like a stage production in which the actors, having completed their rehearsals, 
face a public audience.
These tensions grow even more challenging for the idiots when they take their 
play to scenes that “mean something” to them in their private or professional 
lives. One such existential place fraught with personal affective relation­ 
ships and social obligations is the advertising agency where Axel (Knud 
Romer Jørgensen) works. Moving the rehearsal there sharpens our perspective 
on Axel’s readiness to deliver a provocative idiot performance without flinch­
ing in two ways. His fear of losing his job and hence his livelihood puts him on 
the defensive, and so when, in his role as an employee of the agency, he is 
tasked with outlining a baby food campaign, he has nothing to show to his boss 
but a small piece of paper with the words “baby food” on it. At the same time, 
the laconic brevity of this draft suggests an ironic analogy linking the experi­
mental idiot show to the “creative” advertising executive’s professed affinity 
for “crazy ideas.”
But the dramatic culmination of The Idiots comes when Karen, who—in the (fic­
tional) reality of the film—suffers from depression, is driven by her bad con­
science to see her family, whom she had abandoned without saying goodbye 
after not having attended her son’s funeral. In the familial space of meaning, 
which, for Karen, is thickly laced with affective intensity as well as processes 
opening or closing credits. In other words, “Dogme 95,” at least as originally 
conceived, sought to counter the movie industry’s “star cult” with the ambition 
to make “honest” movies—to devise a filmmaking practice that would do justice 
to the (intersubjective­collaborative) process and the (technical) materiality of 
the medium.
Von Trier’s film evidently conforms to several of these rules, especially with 
regard to the cinematography. But a closer examination also reveals several 
unmistakable violations of other explicit stipulations in the manifesto. The 
 Idiots was obviously shot on video rather than the Academy 35 mm stock re­
quired by the manifesto’s ninth commandment. Moreover, the soundtrack in­
cludes music that, in contravention of the second commandment, does not 
originate in the respective scenes in any recognizable way, and rumor has it 
that The Idiots was edited using light filters, another practice strictly banned 
by “Dogme 95.”4 Questioned about such discrepancies, von Trier left no doubt 
about his serious commitment to the rules he had helped lay down three years 
earlier and the cinematic renewal he and his fellow dogmatists aspired to; on 
the other hand, his own transgressions indicate that his method of trial and 
error explicitly involves not only the making of rules and compliance with them, 
but also their violation. The latter was obviously the purpose of the  rehearsal 
techniques he employed: they tellingly enabled him to experiment with pro­
grammatic inconsistency by activating the antagonism that is implicit in any 
mode of playacting, and, more fundamentally, originates in the mutually con­
stitutive relation between the making of rules and an essentially contingent 
practice. The effect of this antagonism is especially manifest and powerful in 
The Idiots because the filmic narrative’s fictional content parses the perme­
able boundaries or the constitutive dialectic between the normal and the 
abnormal. The rehearsal process thus ranges across an entire complex of con­
flicting as well as interlocking sets of principles: on the one hand, the rules of 
the idiot game agreed upon by the characters within the fiction; on the other 
hand, the aesthetic rules and technical stipulations governing the process of 
fictionalization, which in turn clash with the unusual regulatory ambition of 
the “Dogme 95” manifesto.
Migration between the Scene of Rehearsal 
and the Space of Meaning
The ensemble in The Idiots practices in a variety of locations, each of which 
mediates a different relation to the conventional reality out there. The central 
scene of their rehearsals is the sheltered space of a vacant villa and garden in 
Søllerød (the Copenhagen suburb where von Trier himself grew up).5 The en­
semble has exclusive use of the villa and grounds (where they are only briefly 
disturbed by outside visitors), and so the characters are largely free to look 
Rainer Bellenbaum
4 See Andreas Jacke, Krisen-Rezeption 
(Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 
2014), 193.
5 Ibid., 190.
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pictures recall painted tableaus—and the half­suppressed agitation with which 
the sisters, Vanda and Zita, who live and struggle with drug addiction, present 
themselves to the camera. The fact that, following a decree issued by the au­
thorities, the neighborhood was gradually razed around them as he was shoot­
ing added to the dramatic quality of the daily recording sessions.
The interaction between Costa and the two sisters is thus defined by conditions 
and forms widely different from the “duet” between Wieland and  Frampton 
described above. Still, both collaborative projects share a salient feature: the 
improvisational openness to the space, milieu, and scene of representation. 
Not coincidentally, in both cases, it was completely unclear at the time of the 
shooting when the projects might be completed. A and B in Ontario was not 
released until seventeen years later. Costa similarly worked for a long time with­
out knowing when he might be able to finish the film, for which he had no 
budget.
When No Quarto da Vanda was eventually released—and garnered awards 
 including the FIPRESCI Prize at the 2001 Yamagata International Documentary 
Film Festival, Japan, and the France Culture Award for Foreign Cineaste of the 
Year at the 2002 Cannes Film Festival—that was not the end of the  rehearsal 
process for Costa and his Cape Verdean immigrant collaborators. Asked why 
he conceived of his work with the residents of Fontainhas as a kind of rehearsal 
and what the objective of his method was, Costa replied that practice was nec­
essary to move beyond the roughness and empty talk of everyday encounters 
and to create dialogue that cuts to the heart of  something.7 His interest revived 
when the demolition of their slum left his protagonists without the support of 
a community that had grown over decades and forced them to abandon their 
accustomed way of life. The director’s new project focused on the immigrants’ 
lives in the outlying housing project to which they had been forcibly relocated. 
The picturesque poverty of Fontainhas was replaced by the sterile modernism 
of cheaply built housing blocks. The filmmaker and the residents faced the 
challenge of bringing this barren space to life with content—not unlike a theater 
ensemble looking to fill the empty rehearsal space with its imagination. Costa 
discovered together with immigrants who had lost their home away from 
home their personal and historical recollections of events such as the Portu­
guese Carnation Revolution and especially their memories of coming to Portugal 
of alienation, the performance (still within the film’s fiction) suddenly ceases 
to be improvisational and takes on the tragic air of a consequential decision—
an instant of freedom in which the future is blank, both undetermined and in­
conceivable. The fact that this moment of heightened conflict, this “perfor­
mance test,” is the film’s climax and end underscores the cathartic potential 
of the staged hybridization of documentation and fiction, of experimental and 
standardized production technique, of formal and social rules. Set in the third 
of a sequence of three emblematic places—the sheltered rehearsal space (the 
villa), the unprotected stage of an anonymous public sphere, and the private 
sphere of the family, which is now experienced as political—the climax is 
brought about in a conjunction of dramaturgy and topography, a device that 
brings the overarching social significance and explosive potential of the re-
hearsal into sharp relief.
Rehearsal as Dialogue between Author/Director and 
Performer
The Portuguese director Pedro Costa’s collaboration with several Cape Verdean 
immigrants living near Lisbon turns out to be a filmic rehearsal process extend­
ing through an entire series of productions. Costa discovered the potential of 
filmic rehearsal work while shooting his film Ossos (1996), which is mostly  
set in the Fontainhas slum of Amadora, a suburb of Lisbon. For an earlier film, 
Casa de Lava (1994), he had worked on the Cape Verde islands, and the par­
ticipants in that project had given him letters to their relatives who had left for 
Portugal. Volunteering to deliver their messages, he met the immigrants in 
Fontainhas; the initial contact grew into a bond of mutual trust. But when, a 
little later, Costa arrived in the squalid neighborhood with trucks full of filming 
equipment and tried to recruit the residents, some of whom were drug addicts, 
for the enactment of a prefabricated story with a clear moral, he encountered 
resistance. Most of the immigrants he hired as actors were incapable or unwilling 
to speak the lines he had written for them. They were much more cooperative 
when it came to unscripted test takes. Costa was eventually able to complete 
Ossos with this footage and a heavily pared­down version of the dialogue 
scenes. He had gone out on a limb, switching from a rigidly script­based form 
of moviemaking to an improvisational mode of production, and the experience 
recognizably informs his subsequent projects. His next film, No Quarto da Vanda 
(In Vanda’s Room, 2000), was again shot in Fontainhas, but now he worked 
without a script in a predominantly documentary register, with a minimum of 
technology (essentially, a video camera), and, for much of the time, without 
technical support. For half a year, the filmmaker visited the community every 
day, camera in hand as though he were going to a rehearsal to record the daily 
life of two sisters in their home and neighborhood.6 The resulting filmic portrait 
is a moving testament to the synergy between Costa’s cinematography—his 
6 Pedro Costa in a talk on the occasion of 
his retrospective at Kino Arsenal, Berlin, 
September 25, 2015. See also Ohad 
Landesman, “Lying to Be Real: The 
Aesthetics of Ambiguity in Docufictions,” 
in Contemporary Documentary, ed.  
Daniel Marcus, Selmin Kara (New York: 
Routledge, 2016), 14. 
7 Costa in an interview with the author on 
occasion of his retrospective at Kino 
Arsenal, Berlin, on September 25, 2015.
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retaining this, rejecting that—to take the transgressive  potential implicit in 
the interplay between the documentary and fictional registers to another level. 
In The Idiots, however, fiction is clearly still predominant: the intercut inter­
views are feigned documents, no less staged than the main action.
By contrast, when Costa undertook his film projects to examine questions of 
immigration and postcolonial isolation, he worked with individuals and milieus 
directly affected by these issues. His protagonists do not only reflect on their 
memories of refugee migration, the economics of poverty, and their struggles 
with social exclusion, they eventually improvise their recollections. In this way, 
Costa’s films, although they, too, fictionalize their material, maintain a high 
degree of documentary fidelity and bring memories to life. Not least importantly, 
a filmic practice of this kind ties in with the procedures of the avant­garde 
movement represented by A and B in Ontario: medium­ specific reflection brings 
into focus not only the parameters of the cinematographic apparatus, but also 
its potential to build real and effective connections across boundaries, and to 
become a conduit for nonverbal communication.
Translated from the German by Gerrit Jackson
and the difficulties and setbacks they experienced trying to find their place in 
the country’s society. The sterile architecture around them became a shared 
rehearsal space, and because it was associated with the loss of other specific 
places, the continual filmic encounters between Costa and selected former 
residents of Fontainhas also established a shared space of reflection and rec­
ollection. This evolving constellation is manifest, among other aspects, in the 
growing emancipation of the performers, who became coauthors of the filmic 
narrative. So it is not primarily the director who, in Juventude em Marcha 
(Colossal Youth, 2006) and Cavalo Dinheiro (Horse Money, 2014), arranges “his” 
protagonists’ recollections. The films instead allow us to observe the reflec­
tive reappropriation of these memories by the individuals themselves, in an 
elaboration of the fluid boundaries between real and rehearsed representa­
tion in the sense of an inevitably fictionalizing reactivation of experience hard­
ened into history. Examining the trauma of its main protagonist, Ventura, 
Cavalo Dinheiro enacts its origin in a knife fight in numerous variants, blending 
retelling, dream­play, and improvisation with different casts to illustrate how 
recollection is transformed into a knowledge available to the subjects them­
selves as a reflective and productive tool of their own making. The film pro­
ductions of the Fontainhas cycle thus trace the arc of an extended rehearsal 
process that begins, in Ossos, with an interaction between director and per­
formers defined by the resistance elicited by a perceived hierarchical social 
difference and eventually, in Cavalo Dinheiro, limns the possibility of (self­)
empowerment.
Conclusion
Each of the three filmic practices I have discussed is characterized by a dis­
tinctive conjunction of playful, constructive, and documentary­observational 
approaches. Frampton and Wieland’s A and B in Ontario exemplifies the tradi­
tion of avant­garde filmmaking that undertook an experimental exploration of 
the medium’s technical and performative qualities as well as its instrumentalizing 
tendencies and affective potentials. Through such reflection on the specificity 
of the medium, the photographic moving image achieved a new playfulness: 
rather than abandoning itself to fictions, it acquired the ability to present al­
ternative perspectives and attest to the spaces and conditions framing a par­
ticular action and production. After the cataclysm of World War II, it was widely 
felt that the cinema needed a fresh start, and even established art­house film­
making, which largely relied on fictionalization, eventually remembered the 
medium’s documentary potential, which became fundamental for the pro­
grammatic objectives of the renewal movements advertised as neorealism or 
nouvelle vague. In light of these historic developments, when the “Dogme 
95” manifesto came out in the mid­1990s, it was actually a late ironic reflex, 
though it allowed its authors and their undogmatic improvisational practice—
Rainer BellenbaumThe Rehearsal in Film
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By thematizing rehearsal processes in performative works unfolding over 
time, it is possible to demonstrate and depict working on art itself and the 
conditions for producing it.1 Revealing artistic processes and the work of 
construction is considered a means of critical aesthetics, where it is a mat­
ter of querying the criteria of the creation of an aesthetic formation. This es­
say will question which artistic procedures are possible, in analogy, in a 
static work. How can these critical ideas of rehearsal be reflected on as a 
topos in a painting?
1 Cf. Annemarie Matzke, Arbeit am Theater: 
Eine Diskursgeschichte der Probe 
(Bielefeld: transcript, 2012), 13, 39–40.
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In Velázquez’s (1599–1660) The Spinners, or The Fable of Arachne (1655–60),2 
labor is staged as a scenic event and represented “as a form of value creation.”3 
Beyond this explicit level of representation, Velázquez borrows from a theatri­
cal aesthetics of effect and epically structured dramaturgy. He thus achieves 
a self­reflected, critical reflection on the arrangement of narration and visual 
representation at the dramaturgically implicit level of dramatic image plot as 
well. 
The “Quasi Rehearsal” and the (Spider’s) Web of Narration
The painting The Spinners, or The Fable of Arachne consists of two layers of 
imagery. The background is divided again into the depicted space and the 
space represented in the tapestry hanging on the wall. One of the figures in 
this tapestry, Arachne, is standing next to the goddess Pallas Athena and 
seems to step out into the space. Velázquez painted the tapestry so that the 
picture is clearly separated from the space with a border on the upper edge, 
but toward the bottom of the tapestry, the picture directly meets the floor. The 
figure thus appears to move from one image level to the other—similar to the 
way a figure in a postmodern film can “step out of the screen” or switch to a 
different narrative level.
Due to the arrangement of the space and the ambiguity of the Arachne figure, 
the back of the space depicted in the painting has the effect of a stage, where 
the last act of the fable Arachne from Ovid’s Metamorphoses is just being re­
hearsed. The theatrical characteristic of the scenery in the back is emphasized 
by a viola da gamba leaning on a chair, which seems to represent “the instru­
mental music of the intervals,”4 or is intended to fill the back picture space with 
music. 
Most of all, though, the effect of theatricality is evoked by the presence of mul­
tiple observers, who attend this theatrical, but apparently only moderately 
dramatic play, like casual viewers. The viewer standing on the right in the pic­
ture turns her gaze not to the play, but rather to the front and through the 
front picture level all the way to us—the viewers of the picture. Her gaze dou­
bles and extends the dynamics of the figure stepping out of the picture, but 
her gaze can also be understood as an inviting gesture, which addresses the 
viewers as “seeing and being seen at the same time.”5 This gaze can thus be 
interpreted as instructing the viewers of the picture on the “self­consciousness” 
of the painting.6
Velázquez’s accentuation of the theatrical and the indication of the “self­con­
scious” structure of the picture invites the viewer to analyze the narrative 
painting from aspects of dramaturgy, taking up the narrative threads laid out 
Christine Lang
in the scene in the back—and continuing them. The painting can indeed be 
interpreted as a theatrical or filmic staging conducted through figures; for 
similar work in theater and cinema, Velázquez adapted the myth of Arachne 
based on Ovid’s Metamorphoses for a dramatic “performance as a painting.”7 
What is depicted on the tapestry is the moment of the Arachne myth, when the 
helmed goddess Pallas Athena raises her arm to transform the earthly artist 
Arachne, as punishment for her hubris, into a spider.8 In Metamorphoses it says 
that Arachne disrespectfully depicted diverse motifs from various amorous 
adventures of the gods in the tapestry, including the kidnapping of  Europa by 
Zeus disguised as a bull. Velázquez chose this motif and realized the story­in­
a­story construction from the Metamorphoses in a painterly picture­in­a­picture 
(in­a­picture­in­a­picture …). At the same time, he expanded the intertextual 
play by quoting the painting The Rape of Europa (ca. 1559–62) by Titian  
(ca. 1488–1576), which had in turn already been faithfully copied by Peter 
Paul Rubens (1577–1640).9 By taking up the theme of replicating and “wan­
dering motifs” (historically closely linked with tapestry art), and by quoting his 
teachers and predecessors and referencing them, Velázquez creates a com­
mentary at the implicit level of the painting, which inverts the Arachne myth 
2 The painting in detail on the Museo del 




(accessed May 1, 2016).
3 Matzke, Arbeit am Theater, 36.
4 Carl Justi, Diego Velazquez und sein 
Jahrhundert (Bonn: Cohen, 1888), 328. 
Unless otherwise noted, all translations 
are by Aileen Derieg.
5 Cf. Victor I. Stoichita in reference to a 
different painting by Velázquez: Christ in 
the House of Martha and Mary (ca. 1619–20). 
Victor I. Stoichita, Das selbstbewusste 
Bild: Vom Ursprung der Metamalerei 
(Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1998), 27.
6 Victor I. Stoichita traces the beginning 
of the emergence of these kinds of  
“self-conscious” pictures, which turn the 
picture into a “theoretical object” in a 
picture-in-a-picture constellation, back to 
the first “doubled” picture Christ in the 
House of Martha and Mary (1552) by the 
Danish painter Pieter Aertsens. Ibid., 15.
7 Both Aristotle and Friedrich Schiller 
consider the procedure of painting as 
being closer to presentist “drama” than to 
the reporting “epic.” Ivan Nagel discusses 
the terminological history of drama and 
epic in art and aesthetics theory in detail 
in terms of painting in his book Gemälde 
und Drama: Giotto, Masaccio, Leonardo 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2009).
8 The Spinners has a long history of 
art-historical research. In 1888, in keeping 
with the thinking and the focus of his 
era, Carl Justi compared the scene in the 
foreground of the picture with a “snapshot 
photograph,” and called the painting one 
of the oldest “worker or factory pieces.” 
Justi, Diego Velazquez und sein 
Jahrhundert, 332. His student Aby 
Warburg pointed out in 1927, that the 
picture has less to do with an art-historical 
realism, but is much more an “allegorical 
glorification of weaving art.” Quoted in 
Martin Warnke, Velázquez: Form und 
Reform (Cologne: DuMont, 2005), 46. 
9 On this, see also Svetlana Alpers, The 
Vexations of Art: Velázquez and Others 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
2005), 168.
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or Arachne’s hubris. Through the creation of the painting, Velázquez thus 
developed a discourse on art production and its understanding of value.
“Raise the Curtain” for a Double Stage
With the doubled structure of the painting, Velázquez takes up a method 
that he had already developed in his early still lifes, or bodegones. As in The 
 Spinners, in the bodegones there are two picture levels that are related 
to one another and narratively refer to one another. The foreground of The 
 Spinners is defined by a profane motif with “characters taken from life,”10 
while a religious­mythical motif is presented in the background in a kind of 
framed picture­in­a­picture. 
At the same time, it is not only the back part of the space, but also the pro­
fane space in the foreground that is declared a theatrical stage space through 
the use of the artifice of a red curtain as an “iconographic motif in the picture.”11 
It is because of the curtain that the scene in the workshop is connected to 
the background scene, thus also becoming a stage play. In addition, the cur­
tain opens up “an interplay between depiction and self­consciousness” of the 
entire painting. The curtain expresses that viewers stand not only before a 
painting, but also before “the depiction of a painting.”12 Together with the di­
rect gaze of the figure looking out from the picture, the curtain inscribes artistic 
self­reflection into the painting as a concrete sign. At the same time, the aes­
thetic means of this painterly self­reflection are related to those of contempo­
rary art production oriented to the performative, in which rehearsal processes 
are exhibited or placed at the center. The rehearsal, as an activity from theater 
practice, designates the working practice that aims to develop a performative 
process through repetition.13 If rehearsal processes and the rehearsal itself 
become the theme and motif of a cultural production, this serves primarily to 
reveal the conditions of the process and to make visible the instructions and 
their conditions that otherwise remain hidden in normative works. This proce­
dure that can be carried out in performing arts clearly has a corresponding 
procedure in painting; it is a resemblance of structure in drama and painting 
that enables The Spinners to use similar aesthetic means of distancing and 
alienation, like those immanent to the rehearsal as topos.14 As in the process 
of rehearsal, The Spinners also involves the appropriation of an existing text, 
while querying it at the same time. 
The Appearance of the Figures and the Epic Dramaturgy
Almost in the middle of the picture, a female figure can be seen busying herself 
with bits of wool. Velázquez, as an acknowledged specialist for portraits and 
the physiognomy of faces,15 demonstratively blurred the face of this figure 
turned toward the viewer. This can be regarded as indicating that the figures 
depicted in this picture are explicitly “not” arranged as specific, seemingly re­
alistic persons, but rather as “central characters” and auxiliary figures who 
function at an almost equal level next to one another.16 
 
The bright, detailed figure winding thread on the right­hand side of the picture 
most expressly draws the gaze of the viewer. Starting from this figure, there is 
a direct connection through a line of light to the figure in the tapestry. The white 
blouse and similar posture of the arms of both figures, implying defense, al­
lows us to conclude that these two figures are different versions of the same 
mythical Arachne figure—or in film terminology this is a “split protagonist.” 
And if the resemblance of the auxiliary figure holding the curtain aside on the 
left with the two previously described Arachnes is interpreted as intentional, 
she can also be seen as a further figure splitting of this kind that completes the 
narrative of the picture.
On the left front side of the picture, the light scarf and the shirt form an optical 
counter­weight calling for attention. This second central character at the 
spinning wheel is depicted in conversation with the auxiliary figure at the left 
edge and is characterized by several features. These, in particular, are her 
naked leg stretched in the direction of the Arachne working with wool, her 
raised hand as a gesture of admonition, and the ladder leaning against the 
wall behind the figure. In Ovid’s Arachne myth it is said that Pallas assumes 
the form of an old woman—“and counterfeits gray hair around the temples”17—
to admonish Arachne to remain modest despite her talent. Arachne, who 
does not recognize the goddess in this form, challenges her: “Why does she 
not come herself and avoid the deciding battle?” In response, Pallas reveals 
herself: “Laying aside the appearance of the crone, she presents the celestial 
one.”18 
Velázquez thus appears to have taken this transformation of the goddess as the 
point of reference for the painterly depictions of the figure transforming 
10  Stoichita, Das selbstbewusste Bild, 23.
11  Ibid., 80.
12  Ibid., 81.
13  Matzke, Arbeit am Theater, 20. 
14  Nagel, Gemälde und Drama, 21.
15  Alpers, Vexations of Art, 138.
16 The “central character of the drama” is  
a term introduced by Bertolt Brecht in 
epic theater as an equivalent to the term 
of “hero” or “protagonist.” A central 
character is representative of a social 
group. Bertolt Brecht, Über Theater 
(Leipzig: Reclam, 1966), 218. See also 
Kerstin Stutterheim, Handbuch 
angewandter Dramaturgie: Vom 
Geheimnis des filmischen Erzählens;  
Film, TV und Games (Frankfurt am  
Main: Lang, 2015), 236.
17 Publius Ovidius Naso and Johann  
Heinrich Voss, Ovids Verwandlungen 
(Elberfeld: Loll, 1880), 272. 
18 Ibid.
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within the picture. Similar to the Arachne figure in the tapestry picture, this 
figure is found in two different moments of the narration at the same time. On 
the left, she is wrapped in a gray scarf—described by Ovid as a “veiled Pallas”19—
and is in dialogue with one of the Arachnes, who is from an earlier stage of 
the narrative of the myth. The figure on its right side, recognizable by the bare 
leg, develops into a presence as a “disrobing” goddess, who enters into com­
petition in reaction to Arachne’s challenge.
The fact that this figure is a version of the goddess Pallas Athena is empha­
sized by Velázquez with a further symbol: the viewer’s gaze is led from the leg 
to the ladder leaning on the wall high above the body of the figure. This  
ladder can be interpreted as the biblical Jacob’s ladder leading out of the pic­
ture frame into heaven—a symbol for the status of the figure as a goddess 
descended.
In the version of the painting that was expanded in the eighteenth century 
following fire damage, emphasis was more on the space rather than the fig­
ures, and it was aesthetically conventionalized. The symbolic significance of 
the ladder leading out of the picture frame was lost, as was another effect in­
tended in the original: imaginatively extended, the ladder meets the source of 
the light that illuminates the rear space. This light functions as sunlight in 
terms of the naturalist impression of the painting; it is “the sun itself” as she 
“points to it with her finger.”20 At a metaphorical level, this additionally implies 
that this background stage space is a “playground of the goddess of arts,” 
illuminated by heavenly divine light. It is her drama that is performed on the 
stage. This tells, on the one hand, of the agency/omnipotence of the goddess, 
whereas, on the other hand, the temporal causative narrative connections 
are thus completed. Velázquez presents the “fable” of Arachne from Ovid 
using three selected episodes, arranged (as “plot,” so to speak21) on two image 
levels. An element from the first act of the drama can be recognized on the 
front left: the “triggering moment” that is the admonishment by the goddess. 
In the front picture on the right there is a situation from the second act: the 
competition. And then on the back level there is the “climax” of the third act: 
the punishment of Arachne for her hubris. Yet it was not the respectively 
most dramatic and spectacular moment chosen for the depiction, such as the 
competition at the loom and Arachne’s actual transformation into a spider. 
Unlike Rubens, for example, in his painting Pallas and Arachne (1636/37),22 
Velázquez does not portray the goddess’ violent attack on Arachne, aiming for 
affect and engendering a dramatic effect; instead, he offers the story  without 
pathos in a dramatically reduced form, thus preferring a gesture of showing 
rather than that of dramatic depiction. Moreover the same kind of narrative 
strategy already emerges in The Spinners as was practiced and theoretized 
by Brecht in epic theater in the late twentieth century. Today, this can be found 
in fictional film with dramaturgically open, epic, or also postmodern structures,23 
as well as in artistic works that exhibit their rehearsal processes. 
Christine Lang
19 Justi, Diego Velazquez, 329.
20 Ibid., 329.
21 The Russian formalists defined a 
difference between fabula and sjuzet, 
which can be translated as “course of 
action” and “entanglement,” “fable”  
and “intrigue” or, as is usually 
conventional today, as “story” and “plot.” 
Umberto Eco, Im Wald der Fiktionen: 
Sechs Streifzüge durch die Literatur, 
Harvard-Vorlesungen (Norton Lectures 
1992–93) (Munich: Hanser, 1994), 47–48.
22 See Alpers, Vexations of Art, 151f.
23 In dramaturgically open and postmodern 
forms—in comparison with dramaturgically 
closed dramas aiming for immersion and 
“seduction”—it is a matter of establishing 
a distance between the spectator’s gaze 
and the dramatic events and inviting the 
viewers and spectators to reflect on their 
own, and to engage in an active and also 
critical reception. 
Fig. 3
Diego Rodríguez de Silva Velázquez,  
Las hilanderas, o la fábula de Aracne, 1655–60 (expanded format)
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Conclusion of Meaning and Narrative Threads
The rehearsal scene in the background, described in the beginning, which 
functions for the painting as a vanishing point—like “point of integration,”24 
and the ambiguity of this depiction allow us to distill the conclusion of mean­
ing of the painting: it is the “process of transformation”25 derived from the lit­
erary basis of the Metamorphoses and inherent to the topos of the rehearsal, 
and based on this also the adaptation of the figures, a motif that Velázquez 
plays with at the level of depiction and makes the central subject of his adap­
tation of the Arachne material. The central figures in the picture are under­
going a transformation—they are always simultaneously something other than 
what they initially are because these are double­coded metaphorical figures. 
In addition, two further transformation processes form concretely, fully narrated 
themes of the picture: the transformation of work into art and the adaptation 
of seemingly commonplace actors into mythical figures.
In the carefully composed design of his painting, Velázquez combines various 
painting techniques with one another, ranging from detailed development to 
sketch­like additions. There is a special emphasis on, among others, the woolen 
threads marked with strong white highlights that the Arachne figure in the 
front right of the picture is winding.26 These white threads are a motif through­
out all the picture levels, vertically, into the rear level, in the blue gown of 
one of the female figures. The concrete connection established here—the raw 
woolen thread will become the fine gown of the noblewoman—especially 
explains one aspect of the Arachne fable: it is the connection between craft 
and value, making visible the craft­work production process and the assess­
ment of its value by hegemonic powers—whether they are gods as in the myth 
of Arachne or representatives of the nobility in the painting by Velázquez. 
Velázquez spans the discourse of art and work, of a value creation process, 
thematically and associatively, drawing it both vertically and horizontally 
through the picture at the same time. The motif is depicted in the horizontal 
dramaturgy of the picture in the “optical framing” as well as in the “frame­
work plot” of the subject matter, whereas the auxiliary figure on the outside 
left enters into a dialogue with the spinner turned toward her as a “supplier 
of words,” in other words, something of symbolic value, the auxiliary figure on 
the right is a “supplier (or deliverer) of labor,” of wool as a thing of material 
value. The narrative thus implied is supplemented by the bales of wool hang­
ing on the wall on the right, still untreated, waiting for utilization, and the 
pile of finished materials in the background on the left, indicating the results 
of the process of utilization. The rehearsal as metaphor is also reflected in 
this motif as an essentially inscribed motif: that of the transformation of the 
unformed into form. 
What is primarily recounted about these connections in the picture, though, 
is that at the beginning of a chain of value creation there is labor, and also 
that art is the result of this labor. Velázquez thus not only grants the workers 
the largest playing area at the level of representation—the longest playing 
time, so to speak—in his dramatic performance, but he also applies “their 
theme,” “their story,” to the mythical fable of Arachne, therefore inscribing in 
it an emancipatory idea oriented to the profane, which is contained in the 
reference to social reality—similar to the way it happens in casting amateurs in 
theater or cinema. The result of Velázquez’s artistic procedure is, on the one 
hand, that the myth of Arachne is “rehearsed on the stage of what is currently 
human,”27 but on the other hand, workers and labor, as well as artistic working 
processes, are raised on a pedestal here, imbuing motifs not exhibited in more 
normative works with universal validity. 
Translated from the German by Aileen Derieg
Christine Lang
24 The “conclusion of meaning” is “the 
vanishing point where various 
perspectives of the drama are 
coordinated.” Volker Klotz, Geschlossene 
und offene Form im Drama (Munich: 
Hanser, 1960), 112. Further: “The ‘point of 
integration’ in the sense of the vanishing 
point of the central perspective provides 
the single, relatively autonomous scenes 
and plot lines, of which the events are 
composed, with a connecting conclusion 
of meaning.” Stutterheim, Handbuch 
angewandter Dramaturgie, 226. 
25 Matzke, Arbeit am Theater, 203.
26 Especially Tintoretto’s work, which 
Velázquez was able to study during his 
stay in Venice, seems to have inspired 
these white shadings. Cf. Giles Knox,  
The Late Paintings of Velázquez: 
Theorizing Painterly Performance 
(Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2009), 77.
27 Nagel, Gemälde und Drama, 49.
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The Play’s  
the Thing
 On the Politics 
of Rehearsal 
 José M. Bueso
José M. Bueso
The play’s the thing
Wherein I’ll catch the conscience of the King.
—Hamlet1
1. What the World Wants Today
No one is quite certain when it emerged. David Harvey, Naomi Klein, Philip 
Mirowski, and a host of others will give you different dates. For me in retrospect, 
though, one of its many beginnings will be forever tied up with a particular 
scene (and it is fitting that we examine what this scene is a rehearsal for, since 
that is our subject here) that I watched in early childhood. It keeps coming 
back to my mind, much in the same way as in Chris Marker’s La Jetée (1962) in 
which the visage of a mysterious woman haunts the protagonist’s memories 
and for commensurable, if not entirely similar reasons: because only many 
years later was I able to decode it, and close the temporal loop, and because 
it portended the end of one world and the beginning of another that would 
circumscribe my life, along with countless others. 
It must have been late 1971 or early 1972. I wasn‘t old enough to go to school  
yet. But I recall clusters of names I used to hear on TV. Mekong Delta. 
 Londonderry. Munich. Watergate. Allende. Curiously enough, I remember it 
all in color, though I’m sure we had a black­and­white set at that time. Any­
way as the song begins the camera pulls away from a tight close­up of a young 
blonde woman, eyes clear blue; then another; then a young man. Then the 
shot pans across rows of young people of all races and nationalities singing to 
the rising sun. They’re beautiful, pure, hippie­looking in their dashikis, their 
kimonos, their turtleneck sweaters, their garments from all over the world. 
 Finally, an aerial view zooms out to reveal about two hundred singers in a fan­
like formation on a green hilltop: they‘re the spirit of a revolutionary decade, 
distilled into the planet‘s first true global chorus. They’re pristine. And they 
sing:
I’d like to buy the world a home 
And furnish it with love 
Grow apple trees and honey bees 
And snow white turtle doves.
I’d like to teach the world to sing 
In perfect harmony 
1 Shakespeare, Hamlet, act 2, scene 2, lines 
603–5.
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I‘d like to buy the world a Coke 
And keep it company 
That‘s the real thing.
What the world wants today 
Coca­Cola 
Is the real thing
It was all there. Globalization. Multiculturalism. The Live Aid concerts. The 
appeal to ethical immediacy and consensual sentimentality. Francis Fukuyama’s 
The End of History and the Last Man. “What if you held a protest and every­
one came?” asks Mark Fisher. The hallmarks of what he calls “capitalist realism” 
are unmistakably there in the hilltop scene: politics suspended in the per­
fect harmony of a group of caring, loving individuals who can abolish the 
world’s agonies without systemic reorganization, preserving the fantasy that 
Western consumerism, “far from being intrinsically implicated in […] global 
inequalities, can itself solve them.”2
 
Thanks to the finale of AMC’s show Mad Men we know now that we owe the 
Coca­Cola hilltop commercial to none other than Don Draper himself, and 
with it a defining moment in the emergence of what Luc Boltanski and Ève 
Chiapello have theorized as “the new spirit of capitalism,” whereby the lan­
guage and values of the 1968 revolt are absorbed and mobilized into the dis­
cipline of a new phase of capitalist accumulation.3 And, indeed, it is precisely 
this process of recreation and renewal that we witness in the last season of 
Mad Men: after walking out a of a drab, bureaucratic meeting at the New 
York HQ of McCann Erickson, Draper takes to the road, Kerouac­style, and 
traverses the entire North American continent, gradually shedding the 
trappings of his former self, and embracing flexibility, nomadism, and spon­
taneity instead—“the very hallmarks of management in a post­Fordist, control 
society,” as Fisher points out4—until he reaches the Pacific shore where his 
encounter with West Coast counterculture also arguably symbolizes one of the 
founding moments of what, twenty years later, came to be called the “Cali­
fornian Ideology,”5 with its hybridization of market doctrines and hippie arti­
sanship from which some strands of 1990s dotcom neoliberalism emerged. 
Draper’s allegoric journey of redemption and self­renewal ends in a New Age 
self­improvement retreat in the Big Sur coast, a place seemingly removed 
from the spirit of ambition or commerce (though the language of self­help was 
soon to reappear in the arsenal of the entrepreneurial self). The last scene 
shows Draper in a lotus position on a cliff top overlooking the ocean, chant­
ing in harmony with his partners in Zen as the guru intones what to us now, 
forty­five years later, sounds like a perfect corporate mantra: “A new day. New 
ideas. A new you.” Draper smiles. A meditation bell chimes. Cut to the Coca­
Cola commercial.
For online commentator Alan Sepinwall, “to take this genuine moment and turn 
it into yet another commodity” constitutes a disappointingly dark and cynical 
finale to the series. “What Don has on that cliff is the real thing, baby, while the 
Coke ad is a slick and phony attempt to mass­produce that feeling for every 
soda­buying individual with a television set.”6 Ironically, in real life, resistance 
to commodification was factored into—and thus overcome through—the very 
design of the Coca­Cola hilltop commercial itself. When Bill Backer, the actual 
McCann Erikson executive behind the TV spot, first explained the idea to his 
colleagues at the agency, it was received with skepticism:
Bill Backer noticed that Davis’s initial reaction was not at all what he’d 
 expected and asked him, “Billy, do you have a problem with this idea?” 
Davis slowly revealed his problem. “Well, if I could do something for 
 everybody in the world, it would not be to buy them a Coke.”
 
Backer responded, “What would you do?”
“I’d buy everyone a home first and share with them in peace and love,” 
Davis said.
Backer said, “Okay, that sounds good. Let’s write that and I’ll show you 
how Coke fits right into the concept.”7
Commodification, Boltanski and Chiapello explain, “is the simplest process 
through which capitalism can acknowledge the validity of a critique and make 
it its own, by incorporating it into its specific mechanisms.”8 But it’s not simply 
“perfect harmony,” shelter, and peace—after a decade of war, crisis, and revolt—
that the 1971 Coca­Cola campaign was commodifying: “What the world wants 
today” is “the real thing.” It’s the whole package visually represented by the 
pristine faces of the young hilltop singers (and the mirage pursued by Draper 
in his odyssey across North America)—a life of authenticity and freedom.
“Freedom’s just another word / for nothin’ left to lose”: David Harvey uses 
2 Mark Fisher, Capitalist Realism: Is There 
No Alternative? (Winchester: Zero Books, 
2009), 15. Originally published as Le 
nouvel esprit du capitalism in 1999.
3 Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello, The New 
Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Gregory Elliott 
(London: Verso, 2004). 
4 Fisher, Capitalist Realism, 28. 
5 Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron, 
“The Californian Ideology,” in Science as 
Culture 6, no. 1 (1996): 44–72, http://www 
.alamut.com/subj/ideologies/pessimism 
/califIdeo_I.html.
6 Alan Sepinwall, “Series Finale Review: 
‘Mad Men’—‘Person to Person’: I’d Like to 





7 Ted Ryan, “The Making of ‘I’d Like to Buy 
the World a Coke,’” Coca-Cola website, 
January 1, 2012,  http://www.coca-cola 
-company.com/stories/coke-lore-hilltop 
-story.




these lines from Kris Kristofferson’s “Me and Bobby McGee” (popular worldwide 
after Janis Joplin’s 1971 version) as the title for one of the chapters of his A 
Brief History of Neoliberalism (2005), but never thematizes the connection. Let’s 
take a look: “From the Kentucky coalmines / to the California sun / Bobby 
shared the secrets of my heart.” The protagonists of the song are drifters tra­
versing the continent at about the same time and in the same direction as 
Draper in Mad Men. “Busted flat in Baton Rouge, waiting for the train / And I’s 
feeling nearly as faded as my jeans / Bobby thumbed a diesel down just be­
fore it rained / It rode us all the way to New Orleans.” Kristofferson admittedly 
drew his inspiration for these characters from the street entertainers in 
 Federico Fellini’s La Strada (1954). But two very different categories of roaming 
subjectivities are at play here. The itinerant performers in Fellini’s film repre­
sent precapitalist figures who were never absorbed in Fordist/Keynesian bio­
political discipline (nor in any other for that matter), and as such embody the 
potent aura of what Boltanski and Chiapello call the “artistic critique” of capi­
talism, whereas Bobby McGee and his lover are running away from the disso­
lution of that discipline in a westward march toward a new form of seemingly 
unscripted existence that embraces risk and uncertainty, but is actually a new 
form of control based on mobility itself. “One day up near Salinas, Lord, I let him 
slip away / He’s looking for that home and I hope he finds it.”9 At the end of 
the road, we can imagine Bobby McGee looking for a home in 1980 when 
Reagan comes to power. By then, freedom and authenticity (and this is the con­
text for the politics of rehearsal as we shall see below) had already been rede­
fined as the main characteristics of the entrepreneurial subject. Do you want a 
life of freedom, of unlimited expression, unbound playfulness and aesthetic 
experimentation? An uncharted life, an unscripted life, a feast of perpetual im­
provisation, an open­ended rehearsal without the obligation of a play? There 
is only one way capitalism can fulfill this wish: through the market.
In 1865, in Jules Verne’s Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Sea (which was 
beloved by twentieth­century Surrealists), Captain Nemo’s proto­Deleuzian 
war cry was Mobilis in Mobile: “to be fluid, in a fluid element,” and to be “no 
one,” were guerrilla strategies in the fight against imperial navies and bour­
geois subjectivity. In 2016 to be fluid is to be totally subsumed in precarity. If, 
as has often been observed, the discourse of liberal humanism masked actual 
inhumanity, today the neoliberal language games centered on freedom mask 
universal unfreedom. In a few simple steps, authenticity and unbound experi­
mentation are translated into employment flexibility, which leads to no anchor­
ing or grounding in any job stability, which is tantamount to no existential 
security, which means powerlessness, destitution, chronic anxiety, and fear. 
“To live in fear is to be a slave,” Roy Batty said in Blade Runner (1982). The 
loop is closed; the kind of freedom we have embraced (and we can hardly 
conceive any other) is a willed slavery. 
2. It’s the Real Thing
It wasn’t acting, it wasn’t rehearsed, it was an actual moment. And that 
tension in this simulated environment makes you think about what it 
would be like to have it not be a consensual performance. What would it 
mean for an actual body to be experiencing this?
— Heather Cassils10
What are we talking about when we talk about “rehearsal”? To be sure, under­
neath the English term—or somewhere in the woodworks of our discursive 
edifice—there lurk all its cognates, equivalents, or translations into theory’s 
other languages (“theory” being the designation of a worldwide knowledge 
industry comprising a body of discourses more or less normatively expected 
to be disseminated in an English version, regardless of their “original” lan­
guage, i.e., if a text is not in English it’s not yet, not quite, that global thing 
called theory). Thus beneath the Anglo­normativity of rehearsal, there lie the 
semantic fields afforded by other languages: rehearsal in French is translated 
as répétition, but in German the term is Probe. In Spanish the corresponding 
noun is ensayo, which also means “essay” (as in the literary form), “trial” (as in 
“learning by trial and error”—ensayo y error), “test” (as in “clinical test”—ensayo 
clínico), or “attempt” (as in “failed attempt”—ensayo fallido). Interestingly, 
the complementary of ensayo as “theatrical rehearsal”; that is, the actual stag­
ing of a show is called representación. So while the English term rehearsal 
resonates with theatricality, and considering it in isolation seems to confine us 
to that sphere—limiting our discourse—by contrast, taking the rehearsal/ 
répétition/Probe/ensayo semantic constellation as an ensemble offers much 
more interesting possibilities. To begin with, a laboratory smell comes into 
the picture alongside the stage lights, with parliamentary politics in the wings. 
We are talking about both science and art in their modern form—as well as 
politics—and at least two polarities become immediately apparent: repetition 
(and closure) versus experimentation (and openness). At stake are knowledge 
protocols and the site and the performativity of truth. How and where is truth 
to be found, and enacted? 
To complicate matters even further, rehearsal may enter into two different  
dichotomies that situate it on opposite sides of the repetition/experimentation 
divide: on the one hand, a “rehearsed” performance or behavior versus an 
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9 “Me and Bobby McGee,” Roger Miller 1970, 
BNA.
10 Heather Cassils, “Cassils: Transgender 
Artist Goes to Extremes,” by Stephen 





draft of the Passagenwerk that turned into a finalized opus because of his 
death). All these conceptual circularities attest to a system without tran­
scendence, without an outside—the circulation of exchange value with no 
reference to any external use value. As Boltansky and Chiapello observe, con­
temporary capitalism both internalizes the demand for authenticity—through 
its commodification—and simultaneously discredits it through relentless cul­
tural deconstruction.14 In the final analysis, “freedom” as total mobility, 
flexibility, and connectivity is not compatible with “authenticity” understood 
as being true to a self whose stability is obsolete or an obstacle.
It is not exceedingly difficult to fathom the kind of politics that all of these 
dead ends are translated into. The obsession with immediacy and authenticity— 
in temporal, spatial, and conceptual terms—is the distinctive feature of 
what Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams have called “folk politics”: the sort of 
“common sense” (or the implicit script we might say) behind most protest 
movements since the 1990s, from the Seattle riots to Occupy Wall Street 
(OWS).15 This is an antipolitics fueled by the decoupling of rehearsal from rep­
resentation. The prominence of experimentation as an end in itself (the 
open­ended rehearsal without a play) materializes into prefigurative politics 
(“be the change that you want to see in the world”16), while the emphasis 
on the spontaneous and unmediated (the unscripted play without a prior re­
hearsal or structuration of any sort) becomes anarchist horizontalism tout 
court. Play without rehearsal, or rehearsal without a play; the result is an 
antipolitics that either by short­circuiting the dialectics that inextricably binds 
mobilization and insurgency to organization and hegemony, or by installing 
itself in an untenable illusion of permanent insurrectionary tension—as if riots 
or protest camps could last forever—ends up going through bipolar roller­
coasters of  exaltation and depression, and contributing to generalized im­
potence and depoliticization in each round. 
“unrehearsed” one (consider also lab tests in controlled conditions versus 
field tests in nonlinear settings) suggests a stilted, prescribed, or prescripted 
“phony” situation, as opposed to a spontaneous, unpredictable movement 
within a moving element—mobilis in mobile. But on the other hand, the re­
hearsal session (also: the draft, the drawing board, the prototype stage, the 
editing cut, etc.) as a domain of experimentation, trial, and error precisely 
evokes a liquid space of openness and plasticity as opposed to the frozen 
rigidity of something we are forced to designate by means of heavy­handed 
chrono­ontological language: the “final” staging, the “actual” play … the real 
thing. Comparing rehearsals and psychotherapy, Lisa Baraitser and Simon 
Bayley emphasize “that the notion […] requires the foreshadow of anticipated 
performance for it to make any sense at all,” but concede that it may offer 
“something more infinitely compelling than the performance—a period of time 
in which everyday life is held in abeyance, identity is deferred, old knots 
dissolved, and new ideas, emotions, behaviour can be played with”11—which 
brings to mind Draper’s meditation retreat at Big Sur: “New ideas. A new you.” 
The metaphors in  Susan Letzler Cole’s Directors in Rehearsal: A Hidden World 
(1992)—a “dance of creation,” a mountain climbing expedition, a “deep in­
vestigation,” and an “exploration”12—are directly coterminous with the neolib­
eral tropes of entrepreneurial creativity commonly found in self­help books. 
The central theme seems to be “heuristic motion: rehearsal moves towards 
something not  wholly known, and toward something previously unexperi­
enced. It seems deeply implicated in a sense of newness, and in a sense of 
authenticity.”13  Authenticity and freedom: what the world wants today …
This whole conceptual field with all its binary sets is arguably internal to 
contemporary capitalism. The repetition­experimentation dichotomy is ac­
tually a recoding of the opposition between a (rigid) Fordist organization of 
mass production and a (flexible) neoliberal cognitive system. That commod­
ification unifies all these oppositions is also born out by how easily they can 
be conceptually neutralized in the languages of contemporary theory. In a 
 Baudrillardian or Deleuzian reframing, for instance, the rehearsal as opposed 
to the “actual play” is the copy that precedes the original in the logic of sim­
ulacra—but this may be reversed if the play is taken as the derivative repre-
sentation and the rehearsal as the site of original truth. A deconstructive 
reading, in turn, may insist on the dynamics of deferral/deferment at work in 
the differánce between rehearsal and final performance, highlighting how in 
terms of hauntology/ontology each is spectrally constituted by the other, 
shattering all illusions of presence. Finally, not much effort at dialectical think­
ing is required to see that any “final” or “definitive” performance of a play 
may be taken as the point of departure for a new one, thus retroactively be­
coming its rehearsal (just another test), and conversely if a series of re­
hearsals are interrupted, then the last one acquires a summative status that 
transmutes it into the final version of the work (think of Walter Benjamin’s 
11 Lisa Baraitser and Simon Bayley, “Now  
and Then: Psychoanalysis and the 
Rehearsal Process,” in Psychoanalysis  
and Performance, ed. Patrick Campbell 
and Adrian Kear (London: Routledge, 
2001), 61–62. 
12 Susan Letzler Cole, cited in Robert Baker-
White, The Text in Play: Representations  
of Rehearsal in Modern Drama (London: 
Associated University Presses, 1999), 23. 
13 Robert Baker-White, in ibid.
14 Boltanski and Chiapello, New Spirit of 
Capitalism, 451–57. 
15 Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams, Inventing 
the Future: Postcapitalism and a World 
without Work (London: Verso, 2015), 5–25.
16 This slogan is an apocryphal countercultural 
meme that began to circulate in the 1970s 
and ’80s, and was later mistakenly 
attributed to Mahatma Ghandi. See 
Wikiquote, s.v. “Mahatma Gandhi,” last 
modified July 3, 2016, https://en.
wikiquote.org/wiki/ Mahatma 
_Gandhi.
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that the individual enacts over time”20) were blown to pieces by the worst cri­
sis Spain had experienced since the 1930s. The dismantling of the middle 
class unleashed a major rewrite of cognitive scripts at all levels, including (and 
here lies the main difference with OWS, now largely vanished without having 
had an impact on US politics) those structuring the “common sense” of the 
Left across all sectors. Activists, not simply the plain ordinary folks, found 
themselves thinking the unthinkable, and were forced to change gears all the 
time. Unlike their OWS counterparts, enamoured of the purity and authenticity 
of their rehearsal­like spaces, they learned they had to “know things differ­
ently”21 and evolve beyond—without forgetting the lessons of—“assemblyism.” 
Go beyond the tension between rehearsal and staging and rewrite the play 
itself. The play’s the thing. 
Owen Jones points out how Podemos, the new political party inspired by the 
15-M movement, has deftly abandoned the traditional language and style of 
the old left,22 but the change goes much deeper than symbolic or iconographic 
editing. After decades of “capitalist realism,” the very term podemos, which is 
actually a verb tense and not a noun, and literally means “we can,” evokes the 
 enactment of collective empowerment beyond the chronic defeatism of mar­
ginalized radical politics. Podemos is part of a much larger ecosystem where 
reformists, rupturists, and anarchists—those subspecies of the Left eternally 
at each other’s throats—are fast mutating into cooperative, cross­breeding 
symbionts. Reformists discovered radical democracy and online participation; 
staunch rupturists and grassroots militants discovered electoral politics as 
another battleground in the fight for hegemony; skeptic anarchists and com­
munity activists saw they could use town councils to replace the neoliberal 
networks of governance coordinating state and corporate players in cities like 
Madrid or Barcelona with public­communal partnerships. Long­time anti­eviction 
activist Ada Colau became mayor of Barcelona, and then quickly learned 
3. Scripts We Live By
But is there even such a thing as “spontaneous” behavior—the unscripted life—
in the first place? Not quite. According to cognitive script theory, first posited 
by researchers from the fields of computer science and psychology (and 
soon successfully exploited by the advertising industry), human social behav­
ior is prestructured to a great extent by script­like formations learned through 
experience, interaction, and observation. In myriad different situations, from 
eating at a restaurant to chatting with coworkers to attending a funeral, 
whether the context is gender norms, net­surfing habits, or patterns of aggres­
sion, cognitive scripts stored in our memory provide instructions for how to 
behave, what is expected of us, and what to expect from others, once every­
one has assumed their roles.17 These cognitive schemas vary in sophistication 
and flexibility across individuals, cultures, genders, social classes, and age 
groups, and they may be safely assumed to be imbricated with a society’s ep­
ochal common sense and hegemonic ideologies, along with the whole ma­
chineries of desire and affect governing the biopolitics of subjectivities at a 
deeper level. 
Except perhaps for extreme situations, cognitively off­script behavior among 
functioning adults in modern societies may be very rare (consider an average 
commuter’s trajectory through an ordinary day), but on the other hand our 
scripts are relatively flexible and we never cease to rewrite them or acquire 
new ones through social learning. This is probably the key behind the proven 
effectiveness of some of the techniques employed in Augusto Boal’s “theater 
of the oppressed,”18 for instance, which may be interpreted as attempts at dis­
rupting preexisting cognitive scripts (“invisible theater”) or rewriting them 
(“forum theater”) in order to activate social antagonism. In this regard, insofar 
as they possess agency, groups, collectives, and social movements, they may 
also be seen to follow their own (largely unacknowledged) cognitive blueprints 
(Srnicek and Williams’s folk politics is surely one such, as we saw above). 
Whether at the collective or the individual level, situations of societal upheaval 
may be expected to dislocate existing scripts and activate new ones. In words 
from Fernando Pessoa’s Book of Disquiet: “Some days are like whole philosophies 
in themselves that suggest to us new interpretations of life.”19 
The political cycle opened up in Spain in recent years began with one such 
day in May 2011 and, at the time of writing this text, has not reached a conclu­
sion yet. The movement of the squares in Spain gave us the antithetical image 
to the gathering at the hilltop in the Coca­Cola commercial. After four de­
cades, at least two generations that had been playing by the neoliberal rule 
book, expecting to be furnished with the middle­class suburban home with 
apple trees / and honey bees, saw how, on the contrary, what sociologists 
would call their life courses (the “sequence of socially defined events and roles 
17 See Derek M. Bolen, “Cognitive Script 
Theory,” in The Encyclopedia of Gender in 
Media, ed. Mary Kosut and Geoffrey J. 
Golson (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 
2014), 40–41; and Esther Calvete, 
“Cognitive Script Theory and the 
Dynamics of Cognitive Scripting,” in 
Encyclopedia of Media Violence, 
ed. Matthew S. Eastin (Thousand Oaks, 
CA: SAGE Publications, 2014), 77–81. 
18 Augusto Boal, Theatre of the Oppressed, 
trans. Charles A. McBride and Maria-Odilia 
Leal-McBride (New York: Theatre 
Communications Group, 1979). 
19 Fernando Pessoa, The Book of Disquiet, 
trans. Margaret Jull Costa (London: 
Serpent’s Tail, 2010), 97. 
20 Janet Z. Giele and Glen H. Elder, Methods 
of Life Course Research: Qualitative and 
Quantitative Approaches (Thousand Oaks, 
CA: SAGE Publications, 1998). 
21 Pablo Iglesias Turrión and Juan Carlos 
Monedero, ¡Qué no nos representan! El 
debate sobre el sistema electoral español 
(Madrid: Editorial Popular, 2011), 92.
22 Owen Jones, “What I Learned from 
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that local politics alone is insufficient, and threw her weight behind the 
Podemos campaign for the December 2015 general election. Podemos itself 
has rewritten its cognitive script several times, like a cyborg transformer 
shape­shifting back and forth from movement­form to party­form to citizens­
platform­form to coalition­form, as the circumstances required. Through all 
this (and although it is true that, as Alberto Toscano has noted, the trajectory 
leading from the 15­M movement to the present conjuncture is far from lin­
ear23—actually more like a recombinant cascade of events) no one has ever 
thought they had found the one single lever of change, or that institutions are 
anything but nodes of struggle within vast machineries where the shooting 
goes on, like the carcasses of giant enemy starships half­buried in the sands 
of a desert planet, from which we scavenge spare parts. And to our friends 
everywhere we might say: everything is open­ended, but it’s no dry run. This 
play’s the thing.
23 Alberto Toscano, “Portrait of the Leader  
as a Young Theorist,” Jacobin, December 
19, 2015, https://www.jacobinmag.com 
/2015/12/podemos-iglesias-europe 
-austerity-elections-spain-theory-laclau/.
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 the Test Drive 
 Avital Ronell in Conversation with Martin Jörg Schäfer*
Avital Ronell in Conversation with Martin Jörg Schäfer
Martin Jörg Schäfer: It has been more than ten years since your book The Test 
Drive was published in 2005.1 Theoretical books that are also political inter-
ventions sometimes do not age well, no matter how “scholarly.” However, The 
Test Drive seems to have gained urgency: the very title of the book con-
denses a psychoanalytical notion (of the drive as the suture and breaking 
point of nature and culture) with a technological notion (of the drive as a 
purely mechanical setup). Testing as experimentation is not only a mode of 
knowledge production but testing has become embedded into the produc-
tion of existence as such (as The Test Drive has it with Nietzsche). In the flex-
ible working world, the amount of tests and “evaluations” life is continually 
subjected to has not only increased even more over the past decade. The test 
subject anticipates being tested and adopts a theatrical mode of constant 
self-presentation—always wooing a potential audience that might consider 
the subject worthy of a test yet to come. All the trials and tryouts on trash 
TV seem to relieve us from being tested ourselves and, simultaneously, offer 
examples on how to be tested and how to test others. At the very same time 
one is being judged, one quite often takes on the job of testing and judging 
others. One’s capacity of testing is put to the test so to speak. What’s your 
own reading of The Test Drive today? How would you situate its stakes in the 
cultural and political context of 2016?
Avital Ronell: Thank you for the question. It’s enormous and abundant 
and full of urgent implications. It is also very kind of you to indicate that 
this work might be of some importance. This work kind of broke my 
heart: I did not come to present it to my teacher, mentor, and friend 
Jacques Derrida. I had to make a choice. When I received the galley 
proofs in 2004, I really wanted to show it to him. But I feared that if I did 
he might know that I thought he might not make it to the publication of 
the book. I was living in his house and taking care of him. I had to sum­
mon my higher self and tell myself: I know, honey, you want to show 
this to your teacher. But you cannot take the risk of terrifying him. 
Therefore, I did not get his stamp of approval; I have to seek it in tran­
scendental byways. That being said, I had to test myself and my capacity 
to renounce pleasure—or the masochistic pleasure of his disapproving 
me. That would have been devastating but at least something of a re­
sponse that I always sought from him for my work. And he tested me a 
lot. He also rejected some of my efforts and my work—to come around 
later on and approve my work with great delay and affirmation. And I 
said to myself: Well, I’m glad I did not commit suicide over that. That was 
a testing of sorts as well. 
*  This interview was conducted on  
February 26, 2016, in New York City.
1 Avital Ronell, The Test Drive (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 2005).
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What surprised me most recently was the following: I had the bright 
idea to go to France in November when there were the terror attacks. 
And like George W. Bush before him, François Hollande made his first 
statement in synchrony with the political utterance that Bush delivered 
on the eve of destruction that was 9/11: “Our nation is being tested.” 
These attacks on  sovereignty and soil, these terribly destructive events 
seem to be conceived as tests. That would be one point of relevance 
for the continued consideration in a political, ethical, and dramatic 
sphere and scene of disturbance to consider how nation­states and 
sovereignties consider themselves to be tested, and in both cases the 
answer to the test consisted of confused, exegetic codes of biblical 
readings and a more technological understanding of the Geworfenheit 
that testing implied. Rhetorically, one can show how both Hollande and 
Bush are confused. When you are put to the test, the outcome is in no 
way certain. The question may be in the Old Testament, the New Testa­
ment, and its replications as to why there is such a will to testing a de­
mand that loyalty is tested, faith be tested, and so on. This became a big 
issue for Kant, by the way: according to which axioms can faith be put to 
the test. In many ways, the biblical route of testing is rich and compli­
cated in itself. But Bush and (to a lesser degree) Hollande used it to claim 
that we were tested and we passed the test. And that is cheating. That is 
not being tested but to appropriate the rhetoric for a right­wing certi­
tude and the removal of any doubt mechanisms that also belong to 
testing. One tests to failure and destruction. One cannot predict or con­
trol the test. In the test, there is a different relation to existence, being 
and time, and knowledge. A true test may, to the extent that it involves 
risk­taking, just disturb any grid or calculability to which you are beholden. 
To such an extent that it blows itself up—including your world and the 
charts of truth you might have wanted to preserve. 
 
MJS: Since its publication, The Test Drive has been an important book for 
discussing various notions of “rehearsal.” In a certain reading of the Brechtian 
tradition, rehearsal (beyond a solely theatrical context) can be understood 
as a tryout for a different and “better” future, thus opening up the possibilities 
inherent to seemingly immutable situations (and therefore the futurity of 
future itself). The Test Drive exposes the uncanny side of this: the constant 
and systematic testing imposed upon a twenty-first century “subject” (e.g., 
on the labor market) generates a flexible subject in (constant) rehearsal. This 
subject is told to feel creative and happy, always at the brink of self-fulfill-
ment, always making new connections, always up to a fresh start. From a Test 
Drive perspective, rehearsal becomes the very labor by which the allegedly 
most “subjective” qualities can be extracted and included into the circulation 
of goods. Rehearsal seems to be one of the power technologies inherent to 
today’s form of what Deleuze, in his 1990s reading of  Foucault, called the 
“societies of control.”2 But The Test Drive also sheds some light on the inner 
workings of such a subjectivity; that is, the subject bound to rehearse itself 
constantly rehearses its own hollowing out, so to speak. It also constantly has 
to interrupt the presence in the search for yet another potential future; the 
rehearsed/rehearsal subject is a subject in the mode of “breaking up” (to put 
it in the terms of the Nietzsche/Wagner chapter of The Test Drive).3 What 
connections, if any, would you make between notions of testing and notions 
of rehearsing and rehearsal? 
AR: Testing is a mutation, another form of questioning: it probes, it pries, 
it gives all sorts of prods; something gets moved and shifted; there is 
mild trauma that can also escalate into major trauma for which the test 
is responsible. I want to urge us to keep in mind that what you still per­
sist in calling a test “subject” is already artificialized, maybe a leftover of 
the subject of history, the Hegelian and other subject­formations that 
German idealism propped up for us, or Romanticism or  Rousseau.4 There 
might be an effect of subjectivity prompted and rehearsed by testing 
and its various experiences and non­experiences. I think testing effects all 
sorts of major displacements that we want to be aware of, including a 
displacement of a relation to truth, to time, to what can hold. The testing 
temporality that we can be aware of is part of a provisional logic. It 
blows up; it changes. It cannot have the stamp of truth and eternity. But 
it can obsolesce; it can fail. And one of the strongest ways to test in 
technology and in the gym is to test failure. Failure becomes newly ap­
pointed as something that is released and emancipatory about testing. 
Nietzsche says that once the disposition of testing is on the table you 
are no longer bowing to his lordship because the day has not been pro­
ductive or recognizable enough. Instead, when you are in a testing 
mode you can say: I have nothing to show for it. Everything blew up in 
my face today. And I have witnesses. Because testing and experiments 
were very innovative insofar as they took us out of the alchemist closet 
and other closets and took us to the light of colloquy, repeatability, 
witnesses. People had to see the thing work; it’s no longer a secret for­
mula or hocus­pocus. But now, with testing, we are in a different time 
of precarity. Everyone, as you pointed out, is tested, prodded, ready to 
do a pop up. Nietzsche, in his thinking on testing and experimental in­
novation, pointed out America as an exemplary site, because he saw 
that everyone is an actor. And he not only predicted the reign of actors 
like Reagan, Schwarzenegger, and celebrity types of insubstantial be­
ings. It also meant that in America you could go with the flow; you have 
2 Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript on the 
Societies of Control,” October 59 (Winter 
1992): 3–7.
3 See Ronell, Test Drive, 277–325.
4 Ibid., 5–9.
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all sorts of vanishing identities. Rescindability is a major offshoot of the 
sensibility and practice of testing. When you see that you are wrong, you 
just rescind, you take back, you retract—we have to rehearse that over 
again. And that comes  without a sense that you have arrived. So there is 
a Derridean kind of “ destinerring” that is at stake.5 And this is the point 
where testing and rehearsing are interconnected on a very basic level.
MJS: “Warrantors” or main points of references for other books of yours in-
clude Goethe, Heidegger, and Kafka. The Test Drive takes its starting point 
from texts by Edmund Husserl and above all Nietzsche, whom you just men-
tioned. Especially in Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft (The Gay Science or The 
 Joyous Wisdom), Nietzsche describes, decries, and, on another level,  
celebrates the modern condition of self-experimentation. The Test Drive 
proposes an at least double reading of Nietzsche: there’s the mode of self- 
experimentation that relates to what Nietzsche (in a Kantian fashion) calls 
“the delight in the X”;6 that is, to the futurity of a future that is kept open for 
an arrival to come. To Nietzsche, the laughter and joy of knowledge consists 
in relating to this openness. And then (with a Husserlian twist) there is the re-
sentful mode of experimentation that conquers “the great X” and hollows out 
the very life it examines. The Test Drive calls this, with Nietzsche, the “growing 
of the desert.”7 From this point of view, the current transformation of work 
and life into rehearsal seems especially perfidious—the continuous production 
of blueprints for a life yet to come is aligned with the great X of the future. 
Yet this future becomes economized (and sometimes monetized) by turning 
the joyfulness of experimentation into a compulsory element. Where do you 
see the stakes and possibilities of a Nietzschean critique today? 
AR: Let me pick up right there. When Nietzsche switches on his “trans­
valuation” machine, there is at least a double track or a double valiance 
and a double take. That is to say that one object of contemplation or a 
phenomenon or a habit suddenly has a multiplicity of interpretative pres­
sures on it. An example would be Nietzschean nomadism that  Deleuze 
famously hitched a ride on and developed into celebrity status. There is 
the good nomadism as valorized by Deleuze, and then there is the hap­
less and lost and alienated nomadism that is part of a good and a bad 
homelessness that Nietzsche describes. To be homeless can be the abso­
lute affirmation of the good nomadism: you’re free, you’re not rooted, 
you’re deracinated in a joyful way, you’re released and detached in an ec­
static openness to what might come or not come. But nonetheless, it is 
given altogether positive consideration. On the other hand, there is the 
dreary and dispiriting and shocking homelessness that unfortunately 
doesn’t need my descriptions to drive home the point. Therefore, in 
 Nietzsche, there is also the good and bad wasteland: the growing desert 
around us you alluded to as well as a good desertification. But the question 
I would map onto Nietzsche is why test sites are literally in the desert, 
destroying planetary abundance and fertility and hopefulness? Why does 
science have to be cold and barren and destructive? Or could there be 
a test site that I think the Nietzschean writing puts out a call for: a test 
site that promises what he calls “galaxies of joy” that is not glacialized, 
sterilized, and terrifyingly  desecrated but actually opens up to all sorts 
of unanticipated delight? Why has science not signed up to that program? 
This may be, by the way, why we need art.
MJS: With the question of art, the problem of acting you brought up earlier 
comes into play again. Because of Plato’s notorious put down and Aristotle’s 
at least implicit devaluation, acting was not considered a proper form of art 
for a long time. And even when it achieved that status, great reservations or 
rejections remained. Acting also ties in neatly with the double track you 
laid out for Nietzsche’s transvaluation machine: There is the bad actor of the 
modern age, namely, Wagner who plays to our lowest instincts. And then 
there is the versatile actor as an agent of changes and things to come. More-
over, acting relates back to the relations between testing and rehearsing: 
when taken as rehearsal, testing becomes theatrical. In the theater one plays 
(rehearses) with others, yet also for others (the audience or an audience to 
come). One also rehearses for/in the name of an Other or of Others (the di-
rector, an idea, the law, etc.). In a similar fashion, one rehearses in the modern 
workplace to stand out from others. The notion of a (better) community to 
come through rehearsal work seems to be at odds with the (implicitly hierar-
chical) notion of self-presentation. How to disentangle all these others and 
Others, or to re-entangle them differently? Is there a way to rehearse the test 
drive (in the theater, in performance, other art forms, in life) that gains  
Nietzsche’s joyful relation to otherness without falling prey to the test drive’s 
pitfalls? You just indicated that, on a more general level, art might have 
something to do with this.
AR: One of the questions one could pose in terms of Nietzsche’s Gay 
Science is what is the scientificity of such a science. Nietzsche says that 
art prepares us. It is like a great immunity project for science. Without 
art we could not take, we could not endure the shock of non­truth. Art is 
what affirms fiction, shock, acting, and so on. This is something that 
 Plato, in his fascistoid Republic served his eviction notice to. According 
5 See Jacques Derrida, The Postcard: From 
Socrates to Freud and Beyond (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1987), 411–95.
6 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Joyful Wisdom 
(“La Gaya Scienza”), trans. Thomas 
Common (New York: MacMillan Company, 
1924), 6–7.
7 “The desert grows. Woe him who harbors 
deserts!” Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus  
Spoke Zarathustra, trans. Adrian Del Caro 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University  
Press, 2006), 252.
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to him, we don’t need poets, that is, those who will not seduce and drug 
everyone with those hallucinatory and powerful fictions because that 
seduces away from the truth and a lot of other state­bound (in many in­
stances totalizing and totalitarian) values. Science in Nietzsche is prompted 
and propped up by art. What is outstanding in science for  Nietzsche is 
that god has always used veto power against science. God cannot 
stand science because it is not beholden to his powers—also in terrifying 
ways as can be seen in the Oppenheimers and the  Frankensteins. They 
build their monsters because they relentlessly pursue some sort of 
crazed vision that is not constrained by certain virtues and values. This 
is what Nietzsche, with his chronic ambivalence, deplores and adores. 
Eve was the first scientist. She was sassy and bit into that apple, which 
eventually became a computer. Eve needed to know—despite the cen­
sorship of The Man. She tried it out; she got her ass kicked, and she got 
us all in trouble and punished eternally. That need to know, when de­
tached from god’s injunction, has a feminine strain. Despite his misogyny, 
Nietzsche loves Eve; the woman in Nietzsche is Eve. He thinks she 
knocked down all sorts of restraining and gag orders. She was seduced 
as much as she is the seducer; hence, Nietzsche’s play with the words 
Versuch (attempt, try out) and Versuchung (seduction). When you try out 
you are also tempted at the “tempt” and the attempt. There is tempta­
tion but also what we can call an “attemptation” that drives the artistically 
attempted scientific disposition: you just have got to play this out! 
My problem with rehearsal would be the teleological pull. It usually wants 
to be the foreplay, or an anticipatory stage, to a final product, whereas 
there is such an aspect to the test drive, of course, and there are certain 
types of testing that want product at the end, or a telos, or a goal to be 
achieved. But I would be interested in thinking a development of theater 
and presentation in terms of non­presence, in terms of nondelivery, in 
terms of a non­product or in terms of a permanent rehearsal and a per­
manent insurrection of what one would had hoped to hold and stop and 
say, “This is the way we want to do it.” So there would be much more of a 
mutation involved, a dissatisfaction and destruction of the work if re­
hearsal became not only a lead­in, but a lead­in without termination for 
an apotheosis of a real deal in a true and final presentation. For the test 
drive implies a harassingly provisional logic that just breaks itself up at 
every moment.
MJS: And that would also go for and impact the many productions we have 
seen over the last decades that clearly present something that either docu-
ments the rehearsal process or gives emphasis to their extemporaneous 
character. 
AR: On the other hand, a few weeks ago I was dragged around in New 
York when all of the new theater hopefuls show up and perform for you. 
And they kept on saying that this was only a “work in progress” or a 
“master rehearsal.” And then, in most cases, it just wasn’t good enough. 
So, there is something that rehearsal would have to bring back in terms 
of extreme rigor and in terms of an encounter with its own impossibility—
a kind of becoming (to use Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche) that can only 
disturb itself but never can be satisfied with itself while still being very 
rigorous in every part of its process. The rehearsal would have to fail or 
fall short or let go of itself in a very rigorous way. 
MJS: Would there be a certain jouissance to eternalized foreplay, so to speak 
(and to bring in Giulia Palladini’s Lacanian reading of rehearsal)?8 
AR: There would certainly be a relation to what never takes place. It 
would involve a kind of deconstruction of theatrical site or space as well 
as of representation. What does come into presence? What does refuse 
to show up? This may sound very minimalist and post­Beckettian and de­
structive of itself. But I would like to imagine that kind of edge that is, of 
course, bound up with the jouissance of its own encounter with its dissi­
pation and death. 
MJS: This also relates to a flip side of The Test Drive you developed in your 
previous 2003 book Stupidity.9 Stupidity has a lot of faces too: the stupidity 
of a self-assured knowledge that is certain to have conquered the world, the 
stupidity ascribed to one by others, the Nietzschean stupidity that is  taken on 
as a mask, and so on. But the most important stupidity you depict at the 
very origin of thinking and existing alike: one can never quite seize the aston-
ishment of being struck by thinking or thrown (Geworfenheit) into living; 
rather one has to acknowledge one’s own stupidity in that respect and then 
build on that non-fundament (which is, of course, not a valid or construc-
tive way of “building” in the first place). From this perspective, life and politics 
are modes of testing and rehearsing in a non-result-oriented fashion; it is a 
tryout. But how to rehearse stupidity rather then rehearse “not to be stupid 
anymore,” that is, to have a performance or a result to show for? Or would 
you describe that as the very mode of impossibility one finds oneself in and 
has to deal with?
8 Cf. Giulia Palladini, “Towards an Idle 
Theatre the Politics and Poetics of 
Foreplay,” in “Precarity and Performance,” 
ed. Nicholas Ridout and Rebecca 
Schneider, special issue, TDR 56, no. 4 
(Winter 2012), 95–103.
9 Avital Ronell, Stupidity (Urbana:  
University of Illinois Press, 2003).
10 Cf. ibid., 278ff.
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AR: In preparation for meeting you, I looked at certain sections in Kafka 
and Kant. And one thing that struck me this time was the question of 
“what shows up”: the appearance or disappearance involved in displays 
and exhibits and exhibitionisms of stupidity. And there is one thing that 
they say independently from one another. In Kafka, at one point in the 
Nachlass, a stupid student says, “I appeared dumber than I was.” And in 
Kant, there is a moment where he rants about pretending to be intelli­
gent but not actually being intelligent.10 He says that until he met one 
particular person, he could not understand that one could pretend to be 
intelligent. What are the stakes of appearing smart or dumb? How can 
you appear to be more intelligent than you are? That must mean you really 
are more intelligent than you are. I do not think he talks about preten­
tious people, who put out something that was not there. But Kant is rather 
after the question of appearing or playing dumb or smart (like Bush did 
and Donald Trump does today). Here, we once more have the Nietzschean 
double track: stupid enthusiasm or the enthusiasm of an uninhibited in­
telligence that is not stupefied. So your question has also to do with a 
double­headed stupor, a phenomenology of mindlessness. This always 
has political implications for my work. The Third Reich was considered the 
most mindless violence without even pretending to have an ulterior ap­
pearance. Robert Musil was among those who found this takeover by 
strategic stupidity very weird, indeed. Today, in the United States and a 
lot of places in Europe, it is not as scandalous as it might have sounded 
fifty years ago: we have these really stupid parades of minimalist utter­
ances. American electoral politics in the age of Trump seem like theatri­
calizations and strange alienated rehearsals of power plays. Something 
is being dumbed down here that still requires consideration. You are 
right in saying that testing and stupidity are twin projects. Stupidity also 
has a double or triple appearance. In Nietzsche, there also is a sacred ig­
norance that is open to another kind of calling. If it had been bulked up 
more cognitively, it would not even be available. Take Joan of Arc who is 
ignorant but ready to take the call because she was not overtly versed in 
knowledge. There is a notion of divine stupidity, and God (at least the 
god of the New Testament) seems to prefer the sheep, the followers, the 
ignorant. The word “silly” comes from the German selig (blessed or soul­
ful). So in relation to the ignorance of dumbing down, there is a lot to 
consider in that area. But to bring it back to the rehearsing and the re­
hearsed subject, one might wonder what a condition of permanent re­
hearsal without some metaphysical grand and happy endings, which 
would culminate in a final product or finality, would imply for us and to 
what extent we are always rehearsing and—if we are rehearsing—we are 
rehearsing for the encounter with death. A notion and practice of re­
hearsal might be affirmed in a Nietzschean sense as that which lives by 
failure.
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I. Portrait for a Lack of Anything Better to Do 
René Pollesch made a film containing a reinterpretation of conventional re­
hearsal theories. It shows video recordings of rehearsals of the play Tal der 
fliegenden Messer (The Valley of the Flying Knives),1 which is edited and set to 
music, with a voice­over in which Pollesch speaks a text; this is framed and 
interrupted by brief private shots. We see actors rehearsing, but without hear­
ing the text they are reading and speaking, without knowing what the play is 
about. What Pollesch wants to show is obviously not the development of the 
play from the rehearsals. Instead, the film purports to show life. Theater is life 
and the rehearsal is presented as a mode of existence—specifically as one 
based on limitation: an ascetic way of living. The real use of the rehearsal (ac­
cording to Pollesch’s quasi anthropological interpretation of the theatrical 
way the actors, which he calls his “neighbors,” live) consists in an asceticism 
through repetition. By doing the same thing over and over, the actors limit 
the possibilities of life, according to his observation. Rehearsal is asceticism, 
as the film asserts, because in repeating always the same thing, it negates 
other possibilities. It kills potentiality. The sense of possibility is not multiplied; 
it is constrained. Rehearsal is conventionally considered an experimental pro­
cedure that brackets reality to elude limitations and suspends the usual oper­
ations of life to gain new possibilities. This notion of rehearsal as playing 
through and inventing possibilities is contradicted by the film. Pollesch thus 
rejects today’s aesthetics in which art primarily reveals what is possible, and 
places the as­yet­unrealized alongside the already realized. These art theories 
consider reality not as necessary but as mutable, and they insist that it could 
all be different as well. They maintain that art bears witness to the unrealized 
that is to be found in the factually given, and work needs to be done to enable 
this or to recall that it has not yet been exhausted. 
This is not the case with Pollesch. He interprets rehearsing as pure repetition 
and as that which exhausts what is possible. Portrait aus Desinteresse (Portrait 
for a lack of anything better to do), as the film is titled, considers the rehearsal 
as an interruption, which otherwise only takes place “when we die or run out 
of money.”2 Pollesch thus significantly shifts the purpose of all rehearsing. It 
is not training for improvement and enhancement of performance that are 
crucial for him, but rather the resistance to these kinds of appeals. Pollesch 
depicts rehearsal as a technique of limitation. As pure duplication, without 
added value or transcendence, it stops time. “The lived life that withdraws 
Kathrin Busch
1  The play was performed in 2008 in 
Mülheim an der Ruhr and at the 
Volksbühne Berlin. See René Pollesch,  
“Tal der fliegenden Messer,” in Liebe  
ist kälter als das Kapital, ed. Corinna 
Brocher and Aenne Quiñones (Reinbek: 
Rowohlt Verlag, 2009), 225–97. 
2  Unless otherwise stated, all quotations in 
the text are taken from the film Portrait 
aus Desinteresse.
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II. The Impossible
Pollesch thus situates himself in a previously little noticed aesthetics of de­
potentialization. A line of thinking impossibilities can be traced in art theory, 
ranging from Antonin Artaud through to Blanchot and all the way to Gilles 
 Deleuze and Giorgio Agamben. The beginning of this strictly modernist­critical 
theory of artistic production can be dated with the year 1924, when the 
 influential correspondence between Artaud and the publisher of the Nouvelle 
Revue Française, Jacques Rivière, was published.5 Artaud had sent the pub­
lisher poems, which the latter refused to publish. Artaud refused to accept 
this rejection and explained instead why the poems should be published de­
spite obvious deficiencies. He asserted that they bore witness to an impotence 
that is essential to the artistic act. According to Artaud, awkwardness and in­
ability are categories of artistic production, because they refer to what happens 
to the writer in the act of writing. Blanchot continued this idea and formulated 
that art for Artaud was obligated to an experience of “the impossible.”6 The 
reason why Artaud’s writing appears imperfect is that it is “in contact with 
something so grave,”7 that it should not be weakened by a skilled use of lan­
guage. Blanchot continued to develop this insight and based his theory of art 
on artistic experience as a reduction of possibilities, relating art to procedures 
of erasure, indeterminacy, and un­working.8
Finally, Deleuze also pursued similar ideas in a text on Samuel Beckett. Under 
the title “The Exhausted” (1995), he emphasizes the difference between 
 exhausting possibilities, which aims for potentialization, and exhausting pos­
sibilities that has a reduction as its object.9 His essay deals with Beckett’s  
television plays—in other words, this is also “theater” that is filmically fractured, 
from a scene destabilizes reality by entering into it again.” Since gestures are 
consciously repeated in the rehearsal, the involuntary repetition that deter­
mines everyday life is suspended. There seems to be no more interruptions in 
everyday life, just endless projects for which one is supposed to  exhaust 
one’s own capacity. Most of all, though, there are also no incisive experiences, 
but only “the oil slick of life,” only “dreadful infinity,” in which everything just 
slips away again in an involuntary repetition of the foreseeable, “as though 
there were no experiences to be gained in the labyrinth of fear and anxiety.” 
Pollesch counters this with the rehearsal as a suspension of actions and an 
arrest of what is happening. In rehearsals, processes are repeatedly stopped 
so as “to be able to linger in them.” Pollesch thus rejects the idea that rehearsals 
serve to perfect something, and formulates a denial of the false promises of 
self­transcendence: “We miss ourselves and our lives, if we aim for something 
that goes beyond us.” The rehearsal, conversely, provides an experience of in­
sistence, of the finite, and of embodiment, and it refers to what can specifi­
cally not be revised. 
For the text that he speaks over the film, Pollesch recorded and modified ideas 
from Boris Groys, raising questions of possible forms of resistance in light of 
today’s project­based forms of labor. In the last section of The Communist 
Postscript (Pocket Communism), which is about what philosophy calls “meta­
noia,” reversal, Groys writes: “The principle problem of a society that under­
stands itself as an open society is that of limiting its projects, of bringing them 
to an end. In such a society it is well­nigh impossible to consider a project as 
finite.”3 Pollesch suggests considering the rehearsal as a technique of this 
kind of metanoia, which creates the limitation lacking today. The rehearsal kills 
time through repetition. It limits life. Art creates no possibilities; it scraps 
them, thus, pointing out the instance of the impossible and the not­to­be­
made­possible in lived life. From a perspective of refusal like this, art serves to 
counter the phantasm of feasibility and self­empowerment. The deactivating 
procedure of strict repetition and limitation are thus to be understood as forms 
of resistance for Pollesch.
By duplicating scenes and showing them several times, Pollesch constructs 
what happens in the rehearsal as being a wholly unproductive act. He asserts 
it as training intermittence, as insisting on limitation that functions as a criti­
cal objection to the compulsion to prove oneself. The actors limit themselves 
and therefore resist the demand for productivity and self­improvement. It is 
as though stopping paradoxically has to be learned today in an enhanced as­
ceticism, as though what is really worth rehearsing is inactivity. The rehearsal 
does not serve “creation,” but rather “de­creation,” not the development of an 
oeuvre, but rather—to use a term from Maurice Blanchot—désoeuvrement.4
3  Boris Groys, The Communist Postscript 
(Pocket Communism), trans. Thomas Ford 
(London: Verso, 2010), 104.
4  This term, which is at the center of 
Blanchot’s production aesthetics ideas, 
means not only idleness—in other words, 
a withdrawal from the conventional 
performance of tasks—but also 
worklessness or “un-working.” Art, 
according to the implicit thesis, fuels 
nothing, creates, or affects nothing. Cf. 
Andreas Hiepko, “Möglichkeiten, das Wort 
désœuvrement zu übersetzen,” in 
Ökonomien der Zurückhaltung: Kulturelles 
Handeln zwischen Askese und Restriktion, 
ed. Barbara Gronau and Alice Lagaay 
(Bielefeld: transcript, 2010), 27–38.
5  Antonin Artaud, “Correspondence with 
Jacques Rivière,” in Antonin Artaud: 
Selected Writings, trans. Helen Weaver, 
ed. Susan Sontag (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1988), 29–49. 
6  Maurice Blanchot, “Artaud,” in The Book to 
Come, trans. Charlotte Mandell (Stanford: 
Meridian, 2002), 35.
7  Ibid. 
8  Cf. Maurice Blanchot, The Space of 
Literature, trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1989).
9  Gilles Deleuze, “The Exhausted,” trans. 
Anthony Uhlmann, SubStance 24, no. 3, 
issue 78 (1995): 3–28, http://pages.akbild 
.ac.at/kdm/_media/_pdf/Gilles%20
Deleuze%20-%20The%20Exhausted.pdf.
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In his early book on aesthetic theory, The Man without Content (1999),  Agamben 
laments that in philosophical aesthetics, by transforming from a production 
aesthetic to a reception aesthetic, this law of a certain incapacity in  capacity 
has become unrecognizable. A phantasm of ability predominates, which he 
describes elsewhere: “Separated from his impotentiality, deprived of the 
experience of what he can not do, today’s man believes himself capable of 
everything […] precisely when he should instead realize that he has been 
consigned in unheard of measure to forces and processes over which he has 
lost all control. He has become blind not to his capacities but to his incapacities, 
not to what he can do but to what he cannot, or can not, do.”12 Agamben says 
this estrangement from impotentiality makes us “impoverished and less free,” 
because with this we lose the possibility of resistance at the same time.13
III. Experience as Something Impossible
Pollesch frames the recorded rehearsal scenes with shots from “lived life” be­
yond the space of the theater. Although they are treated equally in the film, 
they do not serve to contrast theater with the immediacy of a genuine experi­
ence. The question of the real is posed differently. What is meant is “lived life, 
not the story you tell yourself.”14 In other words, what it is about lived life that 
cannot be dramatized or fictionalized—the chunk of fear or desire that remains. 
It is a matter of experience, not to the extent that it is possible, but rather to 
the extent that the impossible is insistent in it. Here it becomes clear what has 
been lost—for the subject—through the self­techniques of testing and cor­
recting: the pathos of experience, the experience that confronts and affects. 
In the place of experience, which can be described following Martin Heidegger 
as “striking up against something and indeed something that strikes us; having 
to take in something that comes upon us and does something to us, ‘affects’ 
us, encounters us without our complicity.”15 This form of experience is increasingly 
replaced with a testing and experimental way of dealing with the encountered, 
or better: concentrated. The film space shows the essence of theatrical 
art as the art of strict de­potentialization through repetition. The possible is 
 limited—without promise of anything else. What is performed is the absence of 
creation and inspiration. In his plays, Beckett also formulates a strict rejec­
tion of the creative, declaring art a place where imagination or inventiveness 
decompose. The work, according to Beckett, is confronted with the experi­
ence of the absence of inspiration, which shows that it has no agency. Art, 
therefore, holds the experience of the impossible and functions as a final in­
stance devoted to the remembrance of incapacity. 
Just like Pollesch’s inverted rehearsal theory, Artaud’s, Blanchot’s, and  Deleuze’s 
aesthetics aim for a critique of the appeal for enablement and empowerment. 
Conversely, what they make visible is that in a society oriented to compe­
tence, all forms of incapacity, de­potentialization, and passivity are condemned. 
This social condemnation illuminates the form of power in today’s society. 
As various authors following Michel Foucault have maintained, it consists less 
in domination and subjugation, is thus not based on repressive forms of power, 
but instead consists in activating and exercising capacity, in testing and in­
creasing ability. The object of this form of power is the competence of the 
individual, which is to be proven. Self­testing and self­improvement, accord­
ing to Foucault, are the normalization strategies of today. At the same time, 
everything becomes a question of possibility and ability. The authoritarian 
system of today’s society of control no longer follows the categories “permitted/
forbidden,” but has instead “switched to the fundamental distinction can/
cannot.”10 It is not so much moral qualities that are assessed, but rather apti­
tudes—for the purpose of enhancing them.11
This can be even more precisely formulated with Agamben, to the extent that 
he maintains that the alienation we are exposed to today is not an alienation 
from the products of our own labor, but rather an alienation from our own in­
capacity. Thus we are not cut off from our own ability, but rather from our 
own inability to the extent that we are called on to expand the scope of our own 
possibilities. In contrast to this, the aesthetics of incapacity indicate rejected 
inability. In artistic activity, one exposes oneself to incapacity in a special way. 
Artistic production includes the experience of non­mastery, which cannot be 
compensated with creative technique. It follows a different logic of activity in 
which the partial non­mastery of the realization of an idea, the possibility of 
deviation and being driven away from the original intention, makes up an es­
sential momentum of the activity itself. Incapacity inscribes itself in this dis­
tance between the intention and its realization. It is not genius or talent, not 
practice and improvement, but rather a rejection of the possibility of master­
ing artistic activity, as these theories suggest, which makes up the essence 
of art. This is what gives the aesthetics of incapacity their potential for 
resistance. 
10  Andreas Gelhard, Kritik der Kompetenz 
(Zürich: diaphanes, 2011), 147. Unless  
otherwise noted, all translations are my 
own.
11  These are also strategies of normalization 
that, in the course of the “psychologization 
of society,” serve to expand the scope  
of agency, to make it utilizable as a  
resource. Cf. Ulrich Bröckling, Das  
unternehmerische Selbst: Soziologie einer  
Subjektivierungsform (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 2007), 240. 
12  Giorgio Agamben, Nudities, trans. David 
Kishik and Stefan Pedatella (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2011), 44.
13  Ibid., 45.
14  René Pollesch, “Lob des alten litauischen 
Regieassistenten im grauen Kittel,” in 
Kreation und Depression: Freiheit im 
gegenwärtigen Kapitalismus, ed. 
Christoph Menke and Juliane Rebentisch 
(Berlin: Kulturverlag Kadmos, 2012), 245.
15  Martin Heidegger, Contributions to 
Philosophy (Of the Event), Studies in 
Continental Thought, trans. Richard 
Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu 
(Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 
2012), 124.
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as though everything experienced could be made the object of one’s own de­
sign. Yet experience in the actual sense, as lived experience, is not made, but 
succumbed to. It is not a project, but instead literally subjectifies—it subjects 
the subject to a change. There are basically two forms of experience: the 
form that one is subjugated to, and the form that one recounts or constructs, 
as an experiment, trial, and rehearsal in more or less prescribed or improvis­
ing procedures. 
For Pollesch, rehearsal is not about being­subject but about trying to over­
come the adversities of life by practicing a role, turning oneself into an object 
of a projective development, or giving in to the necessity of self­improvement. 
By representing art as a procedure of de­potentialization, he calls to mind what 
is given no scope for possibility in life: the experiences that are not made or 
tested as events or something we strike up against, but which can only be re­
peated. Theater in this sense means becoming “an actor of one’s own events.” 
Deleuze calls this a “counter­actualization”:16 realizing the impossible through 
repetition and “to become worthy of what happens to us, and thus to will and 
release the event.”17 This in turn means becoming the actor who plays his or 
her own life: “To know how to affirm chance is to know how to play.”18 For 
Pollesch, the rehearsal has exactly this affirmative form—instead of improving 
oneself, the event is incorporated. As Deleuze says: “Become the man of your 
misfortunes, learn to embody their perfection and brilliance.”19
Translated from the German by Aileen Derieg
16  Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense,  
trans. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale, ed. 
Constantin V. Boundas (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1990), 150. 
Deleuze develops these ideas with 
reference to the work by Joë Bousquet.
17  Ibid., 149.
18  Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 
trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1983), 26.
19  Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 149. 
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What would it mean to perpetuate the framework of the rehearsal and suspend 
the moment of the performance? Can the rehearsal break the pressure to pro­
duce by interrupting the economic cycle of supply and demand? By deferring 
the rehearsal from any purpose other than itself, can we interrupt a labor re­
gime in which only purposeful production and end results are valued and ev­
erything else is considered to be superfluous, wasteful, and even parasitical?
In this essay, we consider the possibility of emancipating the rehearsal from 
its function as a means toward an end. In so doing, we aim to explore whether 
its underlying characteristics can assert a different principle of human action 
and inaction. The question is not only how the human capacity for creativity, 
play, and engagement may be unharnessed from economic valorization, but 
what it might mean to put serious effort into something that has no finality.
Rehearsal usually refers to the act of refining and polishing actions in view of 
some future performance or public happening. By doing away with the per­
formance, the rehearsal may also function as a shielded space for testing ar­
tistic, social, and political processes. This form of rehearsal is close to the 
idea of “practice” in the sense of an activity that has a temporal and spatial 
framework that participates in the stream of process, learning, or procedure. 
In this regard, Julia Bryan­Wilson has noted that Herbert Marcuse’s concept of 
a “political practice” comes to mind as an attempt “to forge new forms of ex­
perience that move both the political and the aesthetic realm away from the 
automatic and the engineered.”1
Whereas performance can be thought of as a form of production that involves 
imposing a predetermined idea onto materials or actions, the rehearsal places 
the performer as a participant among a world of active elements, open to 
chance events and unplanned transformations. By suspending (and not nec­
essarily removing) the expectation of production, the rehearsal can also es­
tablish a resistance to a social order in which productivity, competition, and 
an unlimited desire to work (including work on the self) have become the 
norm.
To challenge the centrality of production and performance (in the sense of work 
done successfully) as orientations of life, we need to understand the forces 
that make them such potent spaces of identification and self­realization. As has 
been widely discussed, the technological, social, and political changes asso­
ciated with the transition from an industrial to a postindustrial economy have 
transformed working conditions and produced new forms of subjectification. 
1  Julia Bryan-Wilson, “Practicing Trio A,” 
October 140 (Spring 2012): 66.
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In doing so, the valuation of efficiency, maximization, and success has tran­
scended the work place and entered the private sphere, inciting us to make 
our lives—and not just our work—productive, and to adopt the model of the 
enterprise.2 
The old discipline of industrial labor, intended to train bodies and shape minds 
through compulsion, has been replaced by a self­governing of indivi duals 
whose own subjectivity is involved in the very activity they are required to per­
form.3 Political theorist Kathi Weeks writes that “post­Taylorist work process­
es therefore tend to require more from immaterial laborers than their sacrifice 
and submission, seeking to enlist their creativity and their relational and af­
fective capacities. It is not obedience that is prized, but commitment.”4 Margaret 
Thatcher puts it more succinctly: “Economics are the method; the object is 
to change the heart and soul.”5 
This commitment, which propels workers to work for the enterprise as if they 
were working for themselves, or to work on themselves as if they were an en­
terprise, is fuelled by the subject’s desire for self­realization, but also by the 
new conditions of labor: precarious and contingent work schemes along with 
the expansion of work in the service, information, and knowledge sectors of 
the economy. In the arts, the attitude toward high performance culture and 
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changing labor conditions takes on renewed significance as the distinctive 
forms of artistic production no longer appear as alternatives to alienated, 
productive work but instead seem to epitomize the very behavior promoted 
by the neo­managerial regimes of postindustrial labor. Artistic work today is 
subject to similar pressures of flexibility, mobility, and self­management as 
other forms of labor, while the desire for productivity and performance has 
expanded to include precisely those aspects of life—social relations, sex, lei­
sure, education, and so on—that had until recently escaped such 
considerations.
Even experience, which used to be thought of as the ultimate realm of one’s 
interiority, has developed into a new economic sector. In The Experience 
Economy: Work Is Theatre and Every Business Is a Stage (1999), B. Joseph Pine 
and James H. Gilmore were among the first to identify experience as a specific 
category of the economy that supplies products distinct from services and 
goods.6 This phenomenon is particularly relevant in light of the expansion of 
performance in the artistic sphere and its functioning within an economy of 
experience for both artists and viewers.7 These transformations pose important 
questions for artistic practices and their capacity to construct sites of tension, 
social debate, and liberation.
With respect to these changes, artists have adopted a variety of strategies of 
resistance to the neoliberal rationality, including an insubordination to the 
work ethic, a skepticism toward the virtues of self­discipline, an unwillingness 
to judge success and failure, a commitment to activities that are not meant to 
be profitable or resist turning into a product and the undertaking of actions 
that cannot be restricted to the finalities of any particular project—all of which 
2  Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval define 
the model of the enterprise: “The new 
government of subjects in fact presupposes 
that the enterprise is not in the first 
instance a site of human flourishing, but 
an instrument and space of competition. 
Above all, it is ideally depicted as the site 
of all innovation, constant change, and 
continual adaptation to variations in 
market demand, the search for excellence, 
and ‘zero defects.’ The subject is 
therewith enjoined to conform internally 
to this image by constant self-work or self-
improvement.” Pierre Dardot and Christian 
Laval, “The New Way of the World, Part I: 
Manufacturing the Neoliberal Subject,” 





4  Kathi Weeks, The Problem with Work: 
Feminism, Marxism, Antiwork Politics, and 
Postwork Imaginaries (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2011), 69–70.
5  Cited in Ronald Butt, “Mrs. Thatcher: The 
First Two Years,” Sunday Times, May 3, 
1981, http://www.margaretthatcher.org 
/document/104475.
6  B. Joseph Pine II and James H. Gilmore, 
The Experience Economy: Work Is Theatre 
and Every Business a Stage (Boston: 
Harvard Business Review Press, 1999).
7 This idea is developed in José Antonio 
Sánchez, “Act, Realize, Manifest,” in Per/
Form: How to Do Things with[out] Words, 
ed. Chantal Pontbriand (Berlin: Sternberg 
Press, 2014), 88–117.
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carry with them a new kind of subversive potential. Some artists have even 
questioned their status as artists by retreating from exhibiting art or literally 
dropping out of the art world. In past decades, such gestures of retreat or re­
fusal have taken multiple forms, but these different gestures have a common 
ancestor in Marcel Duchamp’s refusal of the role of artist and his more gener­
alized refusal of work—be it artistic, domestic, or wage­earning.8 
The proposition of the rehearsal without performance participates in this ex­
ploration of the options available to artists to confront the injunction to per­
form and be productive. Since the neoliberal rationality aims to conquer the 
interiority of subjects, the exploration of alternative motives for action and 
inaction is intimately connected to a work on the self as an activity of self­
transformation. According to Weeks, the pursuit of alternative practices and 
relationships may serve as “a path of separation that creates the conditions 
for the construction of subjects whose needs and desires are no longer as con­
sistent with the social mechanisms within which they are supposed to be 
mediated and contained.”9 Significantly, she goes on, this proposition marks 
the “passage from the negative moment of refusal to its constructive moment 
of exit and invention marks the shift from a reactive gesture of retreat to an 
active affirmation of social innovation.”10
As artists working at the intersection of visual and performative arts, many of 
our recent projects have involved resisting the notion of a performance—in 
both the sense of public presentation and of engaging in productive work—as 
a precondition for research and art making. Our projects focus instead on an 
engagement with action itself. Performed actions have become the means em­
ployed in the act of questioning and affirmation, and they are, in themselves, 
the locus and finality of the artistic practice. This is what  Giorgio Agamben 
defines as pure means: “A praxis that, while firmly maintaining its nature as a 
means, is emancipated from its relationship to an end: it has joyously forgotten 
its goal and can now show itself as such, as a means without an end.”11
Real Failure Needs No Excuse (2012)
During the spring of 2012, we rented a space in an unoccupied office building 
in Glasgow. We were the first occupants to move in and in each of the offices 
we could still find vestiges of the building’s former function: desks and office 
chairs, filing cabinets, dividers, fax machines and printers, whiteboard markers, 
flipcharts, fluorescent lighting fixtures, and so on.
Without a predefined script, we entered each of the spaces and began to 
film ourselves engaging in a continuous flow of improvised actions. In these 
actions, dividers were ordered, piled­up, and assembled in various configura­
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tions. Precariously balanced structures of wooden beams, venetian blinds, 
and free­standing fans, visible for only a short time, collapsed (because ev­
erything, eventually, collapses) to make way for new shapes and arrange­
ments. These operations combined equal doses of gravity­defying setups and 
sudden breakdowns.
As the “office workers” who appear in the video, we are obviously performers. 
Yet our performance is for no one. Our actions are filmed yet they are not 
made for the camera, nor are they in preparation for an eventual presentation. 
The actions have no objective. They simply exist in the moment during which 
they happen. They move forward, but they could easily be moving backward. 
They have no beginning, nor do they have an end. They simply go on, from 
one thing to the next, to the next, to the next. None of the actions ever amount 
to anything, yet there is a constant stream of them. 
As we explored the spatial and material possibilities of the different spaces, 
something began to happen to how we felt in our bodies and, by extension, 
our relationship to the materials with which we engaged. Thrust from the role 
of “critical thinkers” to “embodied souls,” it was like trying on an alternative 
research methodology, one that Donna Haraway has called “situated knowl­
edge.”12 We were discovering a new form of being, one that could not be learned 
through reading, thinking, or any other type of cognitive process. It was a 
practical form of knowledge that could only be gained through doing.
The state of being we were experiencing could best be described negatively 
as the opposite of that which typically governs the behavior of workers (and 
performers) with regard to futurity, development, and the anticipation of re­
sults. In the video, the rules of engagement have been radically changed 
from the work contract in which one is judged according to the efficacy and 
effectiveness in achieving one’s objectives to a performer whose behavior is 
8  See Helen Molesworth and Maurizio 
Lazzarato on Marcel Duchamp. Duchamp’s 
refusal of work (both domestic and 
artistic) has been examined by 
Molesworth. She writes: “This refusal to 
clean was memorialized in Dust Breeding 
(1920), a section of the Large Glass 
photographed by Man Ray after it had 
accumulated several months’ worth of 
dust. But nowhere is Duchamp’s laziness 
more evident than in the readymades, 
where he produced art with the least 
effort possible—buying it already made.” 
Helen Molesworth, “Work Avoidance: The 
Everyday Life of Marcel Duchamp’s 
Readymades,” Art Journal 57, no. 4 (Winter 
1998): 59. See also Maurizio Lazzarato, 
Marcel Duchamp and the Refusal of Work 
(Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2014).
9  Weeks, Problem with Work, 100.
10  Ibid.
11  Giorgio Agamben, Profanations (New York: 
Zone Books, 2007), 86.
12  Donna J. Haraway, “Situated Knowledge: 
The Science Question in Feminism and the 
Privilege of Partial Perspective,” Feminist 
Studies 14, no. 3 (Autumn 1988): 583.
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irreverent of the types of actions the space allows and prohibits. If the neo liberal 
rationality infiltrates minds, its deactivation originates through the body. 
Our actions can be characterized as “non­goal oriented” in that they have no 
definite objective. One of our interests in exploring such actions is in how 
they elude the designation of success or failure. Indeed, when the performer 
precariously leans planks of wood, poles, and chairs against the walls of a 
narrow corridor, the buildup may be suspenseful and nerve­racking to watch, 
but its eventual demise cannot be considered to be a failure. Rather, they of­
ten lead to second and third attempts to build something different—no better 
and no worse.13 In this context, the concept of success and failure becomes 
irrelevant as the “continuous action eliminates the moment of pause or con­
clusion wherein efforts can be judged as successful or not.”14 
Rather than sustaining capitalism’s rational and efficient productive logic, it is 
a form of improvisation that commits itself to intuition, chance, and, signifi­
cantly, the never­ending as a value in itself. In the words of Boris Groys, “Such 
an action is conceived from the beginning as having no specific ending—un­
like an action that ends when its goal is achieved. Thus artistic action becomes 
infinitely continuable.” In other words, we have left the realm of usable time 
and the pressed time of optimization and results. “Here the lack of time is trans­
formed into a surplus of time—in fact, an infinite surplus of time.”15
If we can think of this performer’s actions as a kind of labor, then it is one 
that postpones indefinitely an end result. In its constant stream of action, of 
moving things, stacking them, positioning them, balancing them, it remains 
for ever in the realm of making where nothing is ever made; in the realm of pro­
duction where nothing is ever produced. The performer responds to the call 
to action, yet disregards the objective to perform.
Until It Is Totally Destroyed, Unrecognizable (2012)
We enter a space in which planks of wood of different sizes and shapes, ropes, 
bricks, and tarps are leaning against the walls, spaced out in various structural 
configurations or simply laid out haphazardly all over the floor.  Facing one an­
other, we synchronize our audio players and then, as if turned on by a switch, 
we propel ourselves into action.
For approximately forty­five minutes, we move about at a frantic pace indis­
criminately stacking objects, leaning them onto each other in precarious 
assemblages, or displacing them from place to place. Our actions are com­
pletely improvised as we alternate between working independently, assisting 
one another, and undoing whatever the other one has done. At times, the 
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constructions are nothing less than spectacular, teetering on the verge of col­
lapse. At other times, they actually do collapse, crashing down into a pile of 
debris. Never fazed by such sudden breakdowns, we build new structures 
out from the very rubble in which they disintegrated.
At some point in the performance we begin to alternate reciting a libretto. The 
words are being piped into our ears, and we repeat what we hear in detached 
voices. The libretto speaks poetically about an upcoming economic and eco­
logical crisis in terms that are quasi apocalyptic, biblical. It links the political 
language of slogans and speeches with the mystical language of oracles and 
prophesies. The text predicts the down­spiraling movement of a civilization 
toward its immanent downfall. When the libretto ends, so does the performance. 
13  In “Worstward Ho,” Samuel Beckett 
famously wrote: “All of old. Nothing else 
ever. Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try 
again. Fail again. Fail better.” Samuel 
Beckett, Nohow On (Company, III Seen III 
Said, Worstward Ho) (London: John 
Calder, 1989) 101.
14  Shannon Garden-Smith, “Ways Out from 
Inside: Towards the Un-productive in the 
Work of Richard Ibghy and Marilou 
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We stop what we are doing and walk out of the space, leaving behind the 
planks of wood of different sizes and shapes, ropes, bricks, and tarps leaning 
against the walls, spaced out in various structural configurations or simply 
laid out haphazardly all over the floor. 
In the weeks prior to the public performance, we execute the entire sequence 
of actions several times a day. Each iteration begins with the materials in the 
exact state in which they were left at the end of the previous rehearsal. We never 
clean or order the materials at any point. In this manner, there is absolutely no 
difference between our rehearsals and the public performance. One takes up 
where the other has left off. The exercise becomes infinitely repeatable in a 
process that once begun, never returns to its starting point, yet it always 
starts over—a loop that does not begin or end at the same place. It is a contin­
uous process that gets nowhere. Different every time. Again and again.16 
In addition to doing away with the problem of beginnings and endings, this 
routine enables us to deal with the problem of the presence of spectators and 
their expectations; namely, for us to do something—to perform. The challenge 
we face is to develop a way of sharing the practice of the rehearsal in a way 
that does not reduce it to a process in the making of an event or a spectacle. 
The question is how to conceive of specific ways to perform actions that prob­
lematize the solicitation to be productive.
Is There Anything Left to Be Done at All? (2014)
In 2014 we were invited to undertake a residency at Trinity Square Video in 
Toronto, which was to culminate into an exhibition.17 Because the residency 
was dedicated to art production, we asked ourselves if it was possible to em­
brace the nonproductive without depriving ourselves of the potential to act. 
As artistic practices are increasingly complicit with high­performance culture 
in contemporary labor regimes, we were interested in discovering what would 
remain of the desire to act if the compulsion to produce for the sake of pro­
ductivity was suspended. After breaking the links that bind intention with re­
alization, effort with reward, we wanted to see what—if anything—there was 
left to do.
To explore these questions, we invited four artists—Justine Chambers (dancer, 
choreographer), Kevin Rodgers (visual artist), Rodrigo Martì (community­ 
engaged artist), and Ryan Tong (hardcore singer)—to workshop the genera­
tive potential of unproductive action and expenditure in creative labor. By 
suspending the expectation to produce something for someone or for some­
thing, we encouraged our collaborators to engage with the desires that drive 
their creative practice without being oriented toward any specific purpose.
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One by one, each artist arrived with some ideas about how to spend their 
time and some materials to use as starting points. Often, a gesture (such as 
marking our positions in a room), a series of improvisations (even in the most 
basic sense of displacing objects or our bodies in space), or an activity (such 
as recording and listening to sounds or watching an interview of a philosopher 
in a foreign language) would be followed by a conversation during which we 
would discuss how a “productive” orientation, expectation, or intention might 
have infiltrated into what had just transpired. These discussions would often 
influence the parameters for the following explorations. In this manner, the 
time we spent with our collaborators varied widely from experiment to experi­
ment, from day to day, and from artist to artist. 
By liberating a space and a time dedicated to the unproductive, the situation 
we set up enabled us to workshop techniques to establish other relations to 
the self. The kind of relations we were interested in discovering can be called 
heteronormative in the sense that they explore desires and norms other than 
those that orient the dominant rationality. They require an effort of self­obser­
vation and self­transformation that takes into account our very ways of moving, 
of feeling, and of having a body.
As an example, on one occasion one of the artists, Chambers, was engaged 
in repeating a mundane series of movements very slowly with great intention­
ality. She reiterated her movements over and over again until at one point she 
stopped. When we asked her why she had stopped, she answered, quite simply, 
that she had stopped caring about what she was doing.
Working with improvised actions in this manner was a way of engaging with 
thinking as a process. We were not interested in dealing with fully resolved 
problems or developed theses. We wanted to be able to experience the move­
ment of thought in uncertain circumstances. We were interested in exploring 
how thinking is inseparable from the material world and from our bodies, how 
freedom can emerge from such a process, and how it can be chaotic and 
never final. 
By using improvisation to test the possibilities and limits of specific principles 
of action (such as nonproductive production or non­goal­oriented action) 
through practical experiments, the project functions as a critical tool to alter 
the perceptions of its participants as well as a way to build political awareness 
16  This is a distinction made by Diedrich 
Diederichsen in his essay “Living in the 
Loop,” Fillip 14 (Summer 2011). This essay 
is a shortened version of the first chapter 
of Eigenblutdoping (Cologne: KiWi 
Publishing, 2008).
17  The residency and the exhibition were 
organized by Trinity Square Video in 
collaboration with the 27th Images 
Festival in Toronto.
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among its audience. Maurizio Lazzarato argues that although engaging 
subjectivity within production processes represents a moment of economic 
capture, as subjectivity is used to create value, there also remains what he 
calls “a space of radical autonomy” left open to potential intervention.18 If 
cognitive labor participates in the production of a particular kind of subjec­
tive normalization, it still allows for the possibility of independence. 
Afterward, in the exhibition we presented traces of our activities in the form 
of an installation that included several video sequences as well as sculptural 
elements, which took their cues from the forms that emerged during the 
process. From the start, we were aware of the contradiction that existed be­
tween our original proposition—to be nonproductive—and the fact that the 
whole project would result in an exhibition. In other words, our productivity 
consisted not only of what transpired in the studio but also what occurred 
when our actions were put on display. If our engagement with nonproductive 
action opened up a time outside of measured productive time, then it also 
self­reflectively revealed the impossibility of our actions of being completely 
independent of the normative structures of art.
However, the point for us in exploring the nonproductive was not to do 
nothing but to engage with, valorize, and, especially, share other principles 
of action. We wanted people viewing the installation to feel the richness 
of what is possible while remaining unproductive—even if the sharing it­
self contradicted the intentions of the whole project. Ironically, then, the 
success of our experiment led to our failure to fully release action from 
productivity.
Is there anything left to be done at all? demonstrates how non­goal­oriented 
action can bring the work of art and its conditions of production and pre­
sentation into focus. The nonwork done in the studio and the ensuing exhi­
bition offer examples of how actions radically different from work in their 
temporal, spatial, aesthetic, and operational logic may help artists generate 
a critique that highlights the contradictory labor situation in which they 
find themselves.
In all three works presented, we have defined rehearsal without performance 
as a form of “nonproductive production,” a mode of artistic engagement 
that deliberately detaches itself from actual performance. Such an approach 
enables artists to participate in the logic that governs the structures of art 
and culture, while at the same time confronting them to their rules. Rehearsal 
without performance is founded on the idea of interrupting the primacy of 
productivity to remove the creative process from a utilitarian and instru­
mental paradigm. By loosening the compulsion of high­performance cul­
ture, it enables artists to mobilize other desires, to replace the feeling that 
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“there is nothing left to be done” with a field of possibilities where “every­
thing remains to be done.”
Fig. 6
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At first glance, the art of the twentieth and twenty­first centuries seems to of­
fer no basis for an inquiry into the conjunction of drawing and rehearsal. In 
earlier centuries, the preparatory drawing, the oil sketch, the test print, and 
similar forms occupied a well­established preliminary position vis­à­vis the 
finished work of art, but regarding such genres as mere precursor stages went 
out of style around the mid­twentieth century. Explicit confirmation of their 
ascent came in 1966, when Mel Bochner’s exhibition “Working Drawings and 
Other Visible Things on Paper Not Necessarily Meant to Be Viewed as Art” 
featured preliminary drawings, sketches, and diagrams as fully valid works of 
art; by the same token, it dismantled a notion of art fixated on mastery and 
originality. In the twentieth century, preliminariness, retrospective alteration, 
intermediate stages, and incompleteness became constitutive features of ar­
tistic praxis. For example, underdrawings function as a visible part of the work 
in contemporary approaches to painting, as in Thomas  Eggerer’s work (fig. 7). 
Amy Sillman, who used to document various stages of the genesis of her paint­
ings in photographs, now creates painterly animated films on her mobile 
phone.
Moreover, the drawing is no longer evidence of the spiritual origin of form: in 
the twentieth century, it turned into a symptom of processes that are opaque 
to the artist herself or himself. Art historian Barbara Wittmann has noted that, 
starting around 1900, the cerebral tradition of disegno took on a new and dis­
tinctly physical cast. Since then, she writes, the drawing no longer represents 
the idea rendering the hand subservient to the mind. Instead, what matters is 
that which manifests itself by virtue of the hand. “In the blind spot of this ‘not­
knowing,’ however,” Wittmann adds, “the hand can now be conceived as an 
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instrument that is capable of surprising the mind and […] anticipates ideas.”1 
This turnaround is one major reason for the pedagogical and artistic interest 
in “illiterate” scribbles around 1900.2
The art historian Hans Cürlis pioneered the shift of attention from graphic 
form to the process of drawing in the academic study of art. Starting in 1923, 
he made a cycle of short films titled Schaffende Hände (Creative Hands) for 
which he recorded numerous artists as they worked on drawings.3 Where  Cürlis 
turned the spotlight on the hand, more recent artistic tendencies, especially 
since the 1950s, found their originating impulse in the tensions between body, 
ground, and material.4 Abandoning the ideal of the masterstroke, they attrib­
uted creative significance to accident, to lapses or bodily unknowing.5 So 
process­based drawing evinces features that Buchmann, Lafer, and Ruhm, 
taking their cue from Hans­Thies Lehmann, have identified as the characteristic 
traits of the post­dramatic: a performative aesthetic in which “the text is put 
in a particular relation to the material situation of the performance and the 
stage,” a relation they specify as “variation, repetition, augmentation, nonfi­
nality.”6 This kind of focus on process is the opposite of what, for centuries, 
the drawing stood for: “Graphic contour, modeling, chiaroscuro—all varia of 
drawing’s techniques—work against this model of process in consolidating 
form.”7 In this context, preliminary solutions and intermediate stages as dis­
solutions of form represent distinctive temporal registers of the aesthetic or 
an analysis of mastership motivated by feminist and other critiques.
II. Un/Working
The expansive ensembles created by the Tel Aviv–based artist Tamar Getter 
(b. 1953) stand as a paradigmatic illustration of what it means to conceive of 
drawing as “rehearsal”—the term she has used to describe the specific paint­
erly and graphic practice she has pursued since the 1970s.8 A central element 
in Getter’s work is what is often called “body knowledge” (remembered and 
stored conventions and information) in its relation to unknowing, as when the 
body responds differently to certain materials depending on variations in its 
own condition as well as contingent circumstances. She trains herself to pro­
duce ideal compositional solutions she then performs, rather than executes, 
in the acts of painting and drawing—in works made in the studio as well as 
others she produces directly on the walls of exhibition spaces. As part of 
 Bernardo Montet’s play Ma’Lov at the Théâtre de la Bastille, in 1998, she and a 
troupe of dancers executed a live drawing performance on stage. Yet unlike 
practices that aim for a perfect reproduction of what the artist has trained him 
or herself to do—and here lies the difference between Getter’s approach and 
similar memorization­based techniques9—hers is designed to engender devia­
tions for which there exists no standard of rightness. Rehearsal, in her view, 
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serves not to improve or correct but to make room for the act of making, 
which must be initiated afresh from instant to instant. Getter’s work is about 
the power of subjectivation inherent in ideal bodies, be they physical, artistic, 
geometric, or social, and of a resistance, remainder, or retraction that mani­
fests itself in variance. What it thus brings into view are moments of “defiance” 
or disobedience to rules: in art as in other endeavors, the body refuses to be 
disciplined, down to the last fiber, in the pursuit of mastery.
Not coincidentally, bodies of all kinds are pivotal to Getter’s work. In Chalices 
and Corpses (2010; fig. 8), for example, different views of bodies are arranged 
around a perfectly straight central line. It anchors the floating bodies in the 
pictorial space, without assigning them to a concrete location. The large­
format cycle—executed on panels of cotton polyester, the drawings together 
measure twelve by eighty­five feet—iterates and varies two motifs: a male 
nude inspired by Andrea Mantegna’s Lamentation of Christ (ca. 1480) as the 
embodiment of the art of perspective drawing, and a complex geometric body. 
The latter, too, is modeled on a masterpiece of perspective: a design drawing 
for a chalice by Paolo Uccello, from 1450. As Getter sees it, Uccello’s study 
represents the “eternal dream of an intelligible, measurable, lucid,  applicable 
and total order”10—an ideal she contrasts with her own “song of an  idiot.”11 
1  Barbara Wittmann, “Zeichnen, im Dunkeln: 
Psychophysiologie einer Kulturtechnik  
um 1900,” in Randgänge der Zeichnung, 
ed. Werner Busch, Olivia Jehle, and 
Carolin Meister (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 
2007), 186. Unless otherwise noted, all 
translations by Gerrit Jackson.
2  See Christian Driesen et al., eds., Über 
Kritzeln: Graphismen zwischen Schrift, 
Bild, Text und Zeichen (Zurich: diaphanes, 
2012).
3  See Toni Hildebrandt, “Die Zeichnung als 
Öffnung der Form,” in Suchen, Entwerfen, 
Stiften: Randgänge zum Entwurfsdenken 
Martin Heideggers, ed. David Espinet  
and Toni Hildebrandt (Paderborn: Wilhelm 
Fink, 2014), 55–69. For a catalogue of 
extant films by Cürlis, see http://www.
filmblatt.de/index.php?filmdokument-20.
4  See Wolfram Pichler and Ralph Ubl, 
“Vor dem ersten Strich: Dispositive der 
Zeichnung in der modernen und 
vormodernen Kunst,” in Busch, Jehle,  
and Meister, Randgänge der Zeichnung, 
231–55.
5  On the historiography of graphic practice 
since the 1950s, see the forthcoming book 
by Toni Hildebrandt, Entwurf und 
Entgrenzung: Kontradispositive der 
Zeichnung 1955–1975 (Munich: Wilhelm 
Fink, 2016).
6  See the introduction to the present 
volume, 10–20.
7  Pamela Lee, “Some Kind of Duration: The 
Temporality of Drawing as Process Art,”  
in Afterimage: Drawing through Process, 
ed. Cornelia Butler (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1999), 27.
8  Two major exhibition catalogues raisonnés 
contain extensive documentation of 
Getter’s cycles: Tamar Getter: Can You 
Draw a Circle Freehand? (Tel Aviv: 
Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 2009) and Tamar 
Getter Go2 / Works 1974–2010 (Tel Aviv: 
Tel Aviv Museum of Art, 2010).
9  Consider, for example, the painter Karl 
Otto Götz, who studied very defined 
physical movements in order tolend them 
permanent form in a painterly act. Unlike 
Getter, Götz aimed for the accomplished 
work: he wanted to hit the mark of 
perfection.
10  Tamar Getter in “Sarah Breitberg-Semel 
Interviews Tamar Getter about Boulevard 
Central and the Asiatic Company Building 
03,” in Can You Draw a Circle Freehand?, 59.
11  Tamar Getter, e-mail message to author, 
March 12, 2016.
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She studied the original for weeks, drawing without aids and correcting her 
mistakes countless times over. She also worked with the architect Hagai 
Nagar to create a digital reconstruction of the chalice, transforming the draw­
ing into a virtual object capable of being rotated and depicted from many 
different views. Besides Uccello’s version, she selected one perspective—an 
almost dead­on top view—to use in her drawing installation. Now Getter em­
barked on the absurd quest—hence the quip “song of an idiot”—to reproduce 
two views of a geometric body not by means of perspective, using vanishing 
lines, but by memorizing the relative placement of hundreds of quadrilaterals. 
She then drew each of the views—Uccello’s and her own—magnified several 
times over on the fabric panels in two different techniques. In one instance, the 
object is generated in purely mechanical fashion, using a projector and chalk 
line, while the other is an unaided freehand drawing.12 Yet despite the precision 
of the chalk line, the weeks she spent studying Uccello’s drawing, and the 
painstaking learning process in which she trained herself to recreate its struc­
ture, Getter ultimately failed to produce a flawless depiction of the chalice at 
this size. Each lapse entrained several more, as well as numerous efforts to rem­
edy them, which have left smudged traces on the fabric. Her work of art, 
then, consists not in her command of the mathematical formula but in probing 
the limitations that her own body imposes on the mechanical emulation of 
an ideal and the variations it spawns. The iteration and variation of bodies in 
her work are not the marks of a serial approach; on the contrary, embracing 
the deviations that her own body authors gives rise to a singular outcome. 
“Each error,” she notes, “provides another ‘picture’ of singularity.”13 Such 
“overachievement,”14 the variation of the views, and more generally, the pro­
posed appropriation of an ideal or masterwork and the errors left uncorrected 
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deflate the metaphysics of the ideal solid, linked by metonymy to the artist’s 
own body.
The “corpses” after Mantegna, meanwhile—captured in brisk freehand lines, 
in several stages of rotation around their own axis, they might serve to dem­
onstrate the idiom of the virtuoso sketch artist—evince a different difficulty. 
Though there are no errors, the contours of the figures are far from clear. This 
peculiarity is due, for one, to the fact that Getter set herself the challenge of 
drawing the body without lifting the pencil, which, given the fact that the pic­
tures are larger than life by a factor of three, turned out to be beyond her 
physical ability, whence the frequent interruptions of the line. Moreover, as a 
consequence of this self­inflicted defeat, the ideal of the perfect continuous 
contour unmarred by graphic detours, by twists, circles, and loops, proved un­
attainable. Mantegna’s divine figure forfeits its “beautiful” and spiritual contour.
Other works by Getter rely less on variation or rotation than on iterations of 
one and the same view. Her selection of motifs suggests that her interest is 
invariably in the moments of maximum tension; see, for instance, the rendi­
tion of Auguste Rodin’s sculpture Iris in her Blindfold Iris (figs. 9, 10). Another 
striking example is Horse’s Tail (2012; figs. 11, 12), a work on four walls that 
features the graphic depiction of a key moment in an acrobatic performance, 
among other elements. Two facing walls show an acrobat upside down in a 
shoulder stand on one side of a galloping horse. The third wall is taken up by 
an oversized depiction of the titular horse’s tail, which, far from being an art­
fully undulating embellishment, is an outrageously extravagant creation of 
pure excess—at one point, the artist had to work with a broom to master its 
enormous size. The image of a thistle on the fourth wall is a construction com­
posed of hundreds of straight lines for which the artist once more resorted to 
the chalk line. As in Chalices and Corpses, these disparate elements—the het­
erogeneity of their sensual appeal is matched by the diversity of techniques: 
chalk drawing, chalk line, sponges, broom—are connected by a single straight 
line to engender an “imaginary space where all ‘happens’ no matter the 
12  The chalk line is a printing technique  
used in construction. A string coated with 
pigment is strung between two points, 
pulled tight, stretched, and released, 
leaving a perfectly straight line marked on 
the surface beneath it.
13  Getter, “Sarah Breitberg-Semel Interviews 
Tamar Getter,” 58.
14  On “overachievement” and exaggeration 
in Getter, see Jonathan Soen, “Towards a 
Second Creation: Footnotes to Tamar 
Getter,” in Tamar Getter Go2, 476–89.
Fig. 8
Tamar Getter, Chalices and Corpses, 2010
Fig. 9
Tamar Getter, Blindfold Iris, 2000
Fig. 10
Tamar Getter, Blindfold Iris, 2000
Fig. 11
Tamar Getter,  
Horse’s Tail, 2012
Fig. 12
Tamar Getter,  
Horse’s Tail (detail), 2012
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different scale of things.“15 The line defines the space of the pictorial act, the 
artist’s scope of action, and the arena of drawing and painting. As in other 
works, the preparatory drawings related to this drawing and painting install­
ation witness to the artist’s efforts to internalize a discipline. Numerous sketches 
show her trying to memorize the union of rider and horse evoked, in this 
instance, by the horseback­riding acrobat’s artistry. To gather material for the 
action in the drawings, Getter studied YouTube videos of young male riders 
trying to show off their physical skills. In her work, however, this demonstration 
of virtuoso horsemanship takes on a confusing and grotesque aspect. In what 
the beholder can no longer make sense of as individualized form, Getter brings 
down the chalk for countless tentative dashes, repeating the figural ensemble 
in an interminable rehearsal until the wall is covered with marks. The method­
ical principle of excessive richness of detail reappears in a painting installation 
she is currently working on, Heliotrop’. (2016). Here, one of the three pictorial 
elements is an oversized horse rolling over. The drawing captures the precise 
15  Getter, e-mail to author, February 29, 
2016.
Fig. 13
Tamar Getter,  
Heliotrop’., 2016
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moment at which the animal’s vulnerability and ponderous mass are most ap­
parent, contrasting with the power, beauty, and agility the horse has conven­
tionally epitomized in old master paintings. Getter heightens the difficulty of 
depicting this precarious instant by magnifying the depiction to a size at 
which the contour of the otherwise noble animal disintegrates (fig. 13).
Getter’s works stage the fascinating yet self­defeating pursuit of the ideal of 
perfection as a source of necessary frustration; they are creative acts that 
both appropriate and reject the idea of artistic genius embodied in the hand. 
Highly trained skill remains operative but is demystified. Virtuosity—be it 
 Uccello’s, be it that of the village lad performing stunts on horseback—is both 
put on display, highlighting the ambition to impress bound up with it, and 
 dislodged. To see how this approach breaks with tropes of artistry, a brief 
comparison to drawings by Willem de Kooning is instructive. In their facture, 
 Getter’s works evince similarities to de Kooning’s so­called Twist drawings 
(1966),16 a set of—mostly female—figures he drew with his eyes closed, pro­
ducing irregular and errant contours. Getter, too, often has an assistant blind­
fold her before drawing models she has memorized in long periods of study; 
the lack of visual control inevitably yields the deviations, mistakes, and slips 
described above.17 De Kooning believed that this unusual technique would allow 
him to surprise his own eye;18 Getter, by contrast, dramatizes the reproduction 
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of content committed to memory as an artistic trope. In the nineteenth century, 
Baudelaire argued that the ability to draw from memory was the hallmark of the 
“true artist”: “In fact all true draughtsmen draw from the image imprinted in 
their brain and not from nature. […] When a true artist has reached the stage 
of the final execution of his work, the model would be more of an embar­
rassment to him than a help.”19 Instead, aiming for “true art” in the  
Baudelairean sense, Getter positively exorcises finality from her works.
In addition, the artist bids farewell not only to the perennial female model, 
but also to the conventional register of expression: her compositional formu­
lations are demonstratively rehearsed. All that finds expression here are the 
body and the recalcitrance of the material, which refuse to be brought into line 
and bear responsibility for the inaccuracies and lapses. She also dismantles 
the myth of the artist’s hand, which was essential to the art of drawing in par­
ticular, and invoked by graphic artists down to de Kooning. To this effect, Getter 
employs a wide­ranging arsenal of means of production, from spirographs, 
sponges, brooms, and strings dusted with pigment to the physical impedi­
ments she imposes on herself. The resulting aspects of incompletion and 
fragmentation on the level of formal execution correspond to the grotesque 
creatures and poses on the level of motif.
Contradicting the twentieth­century discourses of liberation associated with 
the free or self­guided hand, Getter’s lines are trammeled by the tension be­
tween freedom and discipline. Such discourses of liberation were proffered, 
for instance, by the theorists of “pure gesturality” (Giorgio Agamben),20 “danc­
ing typography” (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari),21 or the choreographic ideal 
of freely swaying bodies and lines (Loïe Fuller). Getter’s works, by contrast, 
uncover the rules, conventions, and models that are inscribed in the nexus of 
bodies and artistic ideals, as is also suggested by her account of how she as­
similated Rodin’s Iris: “I studied the sculpture. I went to this  museum and did 
round tour drawings (classical copies in different media; sanguine, pencils, 
16  See Richard Shiff, “‘Mit geschlossenen 
Augen’: De Koonings ‘Twist,’” in Spuren 
erzeugen: Zeichnen und Schreiben als 
Verfahren der Selbstaufzeichnung, ed. 
Barbara Wittmann (Zurich: diaphanes, 
2009), 145–68.
17  “To work blindfolded, use scrapers, 
squeegees, chalk-line plumb, spirograph— 
all these tools enable the suspension that  
I seek. I create situations in which the 
‘know-how’ aspect of traditional painting is 
made irrelevant, or rather—secondary.” 
Getter in “Sarah Breitberg-Semel Interviews 
Tamar Getter,” 39. For a more extensive 
discussion of the element of non-seeing in 
Getter’s work, see my essay, “Figuren der 
Blindheit in der Kunst von Javier Téllez, 
James Coleman und Tamar Getter,” in 
Anderes Wissen, ed. Kathrin Busch 
(Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink, 2016), 206–40.
18  See Shiff, “‘Mit geschlossenen Augen.’”
19  Charles Baudelaire, “The Painter of 
Modern Life,” in Baudelaire: Selected 
Writings on Art and Artists, trans.  
Patrick Edward Charvet (London: Penguin 
Books, 1972), 407.
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chalks, water­colors etc., just to understand Rodin better). After that, I contin­
ued with my regular schedules: only contours, only one­line, correcting only 
from former drawing, abandoning anatomy, abandoning all former drawings, 
closing my eyes to perform her blindfolded, once again, and then again and 
again, doing this or that aspect (angle) of the infinite angles, composing Iris 
in my hand, memory, and own body.”22 This time­consuming and painstaking 
process, which privileges conscientious emulation over originality, exempli­
fies how Getter arrives at her compositional formulations, or in other words, 
the genesis of her repertoire. It is only on the basis of this assimilation­through­
training that the subsequent “disappropriation” (Derrida) of the memorized 
form takes place.
III. The Physiology of Learning
Getter’s practice not only reacts against an overpowering tradition of mostly 
masculinist myths and stereotypical ideas about the artist since the Renais­
sance. She also intervenes into the abovementioned historic transformation 
of graphic art in conjunction with the rise, around 1900, of a physiological 
conception of the optimizable body, which is to say, into the nexus between 
body and knowledge. For Ma’Lov, for instance, she combined the motif of the 
perfect circle of the Giotto legend, here drawn on the stage by the dancers in 
a live act of art making, with the reception of that legend in reform pedagogy 
(figs. 14, 15). The crucial object is the freehand drawing of a perfect circle 
that, according to Giorgio Vasari, was taken to prove that Giotto’s genius was 
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manifest already in childhood. The freehand drawing—sometimes executed 
with both hands—was an important element in the reform pedagogy of the 
American educator James Liberty Tadd, who believed that “practical develop­
ment of the factors of the organism itself—the hand, the eye and the brain—
by the acquisition of their conscious control” would help the child acquire 
“facility, balance, proportion, accuracy, magnitudes, fitness and grace.”23 The 
skilled imitation of the world ceases to be the primary objective of drawing, 
as Tadd’s colleague Joseph Vaughan writes: “The end and aim is the training 
of hand and eye, and also of the brain, in conjunction with one another.”24 
These arguments reflect the insight that there is no knowledge without the 
body; mental ability must be trained into the body, which becomes the scene 
in which practices of subjectification are enacted. In this light, it makes obvious 
sense to read Getter’s critical engagement with ideal bodies in connection 
with (modern) techniques of subjectification.
Where reform pedagogy aimed to intertwine memory and the sensorimotor 
apparatus in order to achieve embodied knowledge, such knowledge, in 
 Getter, emerges as a source of error—the body becomes the blind spot that is 
made to appear in the process of drawing. Getter says: “Painting radically 
 attacks the status of our knowledge and memory as its foundation. In this 
sense, to draw blindfolded […] always means to re­stumble, because construc­
tion by memory initially fails.”25 It is not perfection but the body’s unknowing 
that here unlocks an artistic dimension.
Moreover, the pointed interest in drawing in reform pedagogy is embedded in 
two broader historic transformations. On the one hand, it is part of the “ex­
perimentalization of life,”26 in which drawing and graphic recording emerge as 
major techniques of the registration of movement and vitality, making them 
amenable to both scientific inquiry and to optimization conformable to the 
 increasing division of labor. Beginning in the mid­nineteenth century, organic 
motion came to be regarded as a crucial indication of life, which is to say, as 
20  See Giorgio Agamben, “Notes on 
Gesture,” in Means without End: Notes on 
Politics, trans. Vincenzo Binetti 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2000), 49–60.
21  “‘Graphie’ is the term Deleuze/Guattari 
coined, with critical reference to Leroi-
Gourhan and Worringer, to designate the 
quality of a writing that retains its intrinsic 
tactile, kinetic, and visual values, that still 
‘dances.’” Georg Witte, “Die Phänomenalität 
der Linie—graphisch und graphematisch,” 
in Busch, Jehle, and Meister, Randgänge 
der Zeichnung, 31n5.
22  Getter, e-mail to author, January 22, 2012.
23  James Liberty Tadd, New Methods in 
Education: Art, Real Manual Training, 
Nature Study (New York: Judd, 1899), 4–5.
24  Joseph Vaughan, Nelson’s New Drawing 
Course (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 
1903), 12.
25  Getter, “Sarah Breitberg-Semel Interviews 
Tamar Getter,” 41.
26  Michael Hagner and Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, 
eds., Die Experimentalisierung des Lebens: 
Experimentalsysteme in den biologischen 
Wissenschaften 1850/1950 (Berlin: 
Akademie, 1993).
Fig. 14
Tamar Getter, stage design and 
live drawing for Ma’Lov, 1998
Fig. 15
James Liberty Tadd, New Methods in 
Education, 1899
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an object of biological and physiological knowledge.27 “Whatever moves, 
whatever merely stirs, is registered, noted down, and recorded in writing with­
out recourse to the symbolic order of the alphabet.”28 By the same token, 
drawing was now understood in anthropological terms, as a universal human 
activity, and more particularly as a basal means man uses to apprehend his 
world. This physiological reconception of drawing and its discovery by an­
thropology promised to provide a diagnostic tool for the classification of psy­
chological stages and the detection of subjective deviance—for example, 
drawing practice was used in psychiatry,29 while (colonialist) scholars studied 
the graphic art of indigenous peoples to assess their “mental capacity.”30
Getter’s project thus interacts not only with art history, but also with traditions 
in social and cultural history, focusing on techniques of power and practices 
of the body associated with the disciplinary society and biopolitics. Her work 
highlights the extent to which art is itself pervaded by strategies and mecha­
nisms of subjectivation. In this respect, Getter’s interest in systemic forms of 
deviation also bears close relation to what Félix Guattari, in Chaosmosis, has 
called “refrain” (ritournelle).31 The term designates the “invention of novel 
catalytic foyers […] capable of letting existence ramify.”32 “The aesthetic­
processual model of art as producing or simulating worlds,” Stefan Hesper 
concludes, “becomes a model for all disciplines that envisage virtualities and 
chaos beyond the confines of finite and actual forms.”33 Getter’s approach 
 reflects similar considerations by localizing upheaval and chaos in bodies 
and materials that defy disciplinary submission. The act of performance, in 
this regard, represents the possibility of “escaping from the serialized and 
standardized production of subjectivity”34—a possibility that must forever be 
 established a new, as Maurizio Lazzarato has emphasized in an essay on 
Guattari’s and Deleuze’s theory of machines. That is exactly what Getter does, 
constructing one of those (political, economic, and aesthetic) apparatuses in 
which, to quote Lazzarato again, “this existential transformation can be tested—
a politics of experimentation, not representation.”35 It might be argued that 
such a conception of aesthetics hews uncomfortably close to the experimen­
talization of life in the natural sciences sketched above;36 yet the objective, in 
Getter as much as Guattari, is not purposive optimization but to chart a pos­
sible way to extract a segment of the real and deterritorialize it. That is why 
errors are articulated rather than effaced. Getter generates such procedures 
we may describe, with Guattari, as “agents of aesthetic partial enunciation” 
by demonstratively embracing bodily unknowing. In this manner, her art un­
folds a space of (chaotic) excess that is apt to stage not the drama of the  
artist’s hand but the comedy of variance.
Translated from the German by Gerrit Jackson
27  See the foundational study by Michel 
Foucault, The Order of Things: An 
Archaeology of the Human Sciences 
(London: Tavistock, 1970), especially 
chapter 10 titled “The Human Sciences.” 
Foucault writes: “It is upon the projected 
surface of biology that man appears as a 
being possessing functions—receiving 
stimuli (physiological ones, but also 
social, interhuman, and cultures ones), 
reacting to them” (p. 357).
28  Stephan Rieger, Schall und Rauch: Eine 
Mediengeschichte der Kurve (Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, 2009), 9.
29  On the uses of drawing in psychiatry, see 
several of the contributions in Wittmann, 
Spuren erzeugen.
30 On “indigenous drawing,” see the chapter 
“Indigenes Zeichnen” in Joachim Rees, 
Die verzeichnete Fremde: Formen und 
Funktionen des Zeichnens im Kontext 
europäischer Forschungsreisen 1770–1830 
(Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2015).
31  See Félix Guattari, Chaosmosis: An Ethico-
Aesthetic Paradigm, trans. Paul Baines and 
Julian Pefanis (Bloomington: University of 
Indiana Press, 1995).
32  Stefan Hesper, Schreiben ohne Text:  
Die prozessuale Ästhetik von Gilles 
Deleuze und Félix Guattari (Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1994), 102.
33  Ibid.
34  Maurizio Lazzarato, “The Machine,” trans. 
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 The Common 
Reader 
Limited edition of 
unique etchings, 
ink on paper, 





The print motif in the series of etchings titled “The Common Reader” refers 
to a photograph of Virginia Woolf sitting in an armchair. She is posing for a 
photograph: she rests her head on her hand and looks away from the camera. 
Woolf has been photographed many times in similar poses, often holding a 
book or a cigarette. The wide armchair is upholstered with a bold graphic 
pattern, designed by the Omega workshop—a design enterprise operating 
between 1913 and 1919 in London, which was founded by members of the 
Bloomsbury group, and included Woolf’s sister, the painter Vanessa Bell.
In the group of prints, this motif is adapted into a line drawing etched onto 
the plate that forms the constant element in a series that documents a pro­
cess that is evolving and changing. During the printing process, the plate is 
inked up, wiped, and reworked with brushmarks, pours, washes, and wipes 
that change the image from print to print. Each print reacts to the one that 
was made before. The line drawing provides the text, and the printing process 
is used to test, change, and interpret it. 
Instead of producing identical prints, the process of alteration and reaction—
of rehearsal—is documented. 
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To the crackling white noise of an old recording, Lives of Performers (1972) 
starts with rehearsal footage from Walk, She Said (1972). Then the voices set 
in: stage directions, though not synched to the images, introduce the kind of 
temporal dissonances that will define the film’s syncopated structure. Unfold­
ing through the minor form of the melodrama, the film shifts from the detem­
porized mythical framework of classical drama to the private, mundane purview 
of emotions and sensations in the not so recent past; it shifts to a narrative of 
the performer’s emotional entanglement during a rehearsal, and the inextrica­
ble relation between its reality and fictionalization. In the course of the film, 
the cliché plot of a heterosexual love triangle and its melodramatic form are 
progressively dissembled, thoroughly examined, and put to the test as it were.
If we assumed that “Rainer moved from dance to film in order to secure a 
space for reflection,” to keep “emotive engulfment” at bay, wouldn’t her return 
to choreography in 1999 appear as somewhat of a lapse?1 What if she actually 
never really left dance in the first place? If we depart from the proposition that 
the rehearsal does not only serve as the starting point of Lives of Performers’ 
melodramatic narrative,2 but functions as the work’s modus operandi, Rainer’s 
debut film could be seen in a different light: marking not so much her move 
from dance to film, but rather its displacement. In what follows, we want to 
suggest that the rehearsal operated as the medium of this displacement and 
that the film’s narrative and structure have to be understood through it.3 
Theodor W. Adorno’s perspective in “The Essay as Form” will serve as a spring­
board for testing this hypothesis. By mediating the levels of epistemology and 
representation, it allows, on the one hand, to conceive Rainer’s film­essay as a 
rehearsal form, an aesthetic and social mode of practice that has to be located 
within the transition between research and learning. On the other hand,  
reframing the rehearsal as an actualization of the essay will enable under­
standing it as a medium premised on the (re)production of art rather than the 
quasi­ontological formalism of Greenbergian descent, and thus as contem­
porary in a specific sense.
 meanings, ranging from probing, 
examining to working on, trying and 
testing something.
3  We are indebted to Sabeth Buchmann and 
Constanze Ruhm’s framing of Lives of 
Performers in relation to the rehearsal. 
See their “Subject Put to the Test,”  
Texte zur Kunst 90 (June 2013), 
 https://www.textezurkunst.de/90 
/buchmann-ruhm-subject-put-test/.
1  Noël Carroll, “Moving and Moving: From 
Minimalism to Lives of Performers,” in 
Engaging the Moving Image (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2003), 351.
2  In this text we are using “rehearsal” as 
corresponding to the German word Probe, 
which does not only designate a theatrical 
practice of rehearsal, but, in a broader 
sense, a probing attitude. The rehearsal, 
thus, encompasses a spectrum of
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reinforces her own victim status with her decision), in this scene the linear 
and probable plot is disassembled piece by piece into its component parts. 
Played through again and again with minimal differences, the scene is ren­
dered as varying sequence of possible plot progressions and gestures. It be­
comes an act of a rehearsal, as the decision is suspended and a delay, a 
wavering between different plot options, is thematized. Here, gestures become 
quotable, variable, refunctionable; in short, they become models of a prac­
tice of learning that cannot be exhausted through any degree of mastery (of 
having been learned).
In contrast to Bertolt Brecht, for Adorno the model for this type of essayistic 
testing is less so the Baconian empirical experiment, which he criticizes as 
the equivalent to a philosophical subjectivism. Instead, it is a non­doxological 
form of knowledge acquisition, an experience­based and context­sensitive 
type of learning. In Adorno’s words: 
The way in which the essay appropriates concepts is most easily compa­
rable to the behaviour of a man who is obliged, in a foreign country, to 
speak that country’s language instead of patching it together from its 
elements, as he did in school. He will read without a dictionary. If he has 
looked at the same word thirty times, in constantly changing contexts, 
he has a clearer grasp of it than he would if he looked up all the word’s 
meanings; meanings that are generally too narrow, considering they 
change depending on the context, and too vague in view of the nuances 
that the context establishes in every individual case.6 
What Adorno conceives of here as learning without a lesson, rehearsing with­
out instruction, is the work of orientation in changing environments. In this 
rehearsal scene (Probenszene), production and reception merge into each other. 
Reading without a dictionary necessitates a labor capacity that abstains from 
any reference to regulatory systems and definitions: a nonadditive, but rather 
genuine social and aesthetic capacity for synthesis or context formation. In the 
tactile and “tacit” mode of comparative sight7—at the same time descriptive and 
conceptual—a term is approached in its complexity in order to allow for its im­
manent emergence out of varying contexts. Adorno’s comparison indicates that 
the rehearsal confronts us with an epistemological problem that crystallizes at 
The Rehearsal as Form
Rehearsing: Learning without a Lesson
In 1970 Rainer disbanded her dance company and established the collective 
Grand Union to confront a problem of authority. The problem may well have 
grown out of her increasing popularity,4 but in principle is inherent to the op­
erations of a dance company itself. A typical dance rehearsal is in fact based 
on a hierarchical relationship, on a disciplined recitation of gestures directed 
by instructions from the coach. With the newly formed collective, Rainer re­
hearsed the performance Grand Union Dreams the following year, which, as 
with all of her later performances, would no longer be produced independently 
from film. Indeed, the collective medium of film—based on the division of  
labor—becomes a tool for Rainer to examine, or probe, the theatrical format 
of rehearsal and its immanent power relations. 
Lives of Performers singles out the directive character of the voice at the very 
beginning. We are provided with several minutes of silent, training bodies, al­
lowing us to follow their movements before Rainer starts speaking and her 
direction takes over. Only then do we hear the instructions of the coach dic­
tating the movements of the dance group. And again, a few minutes later. 
Cut: photographic documents. Description of a picture. A cinematic investi­
gation is taking its course. The hierarchies at play in the events of the rehearsal 
are the first to be examined: the distribution of roles between director and 
performers—such as when one of the interviewed performers asks, “To whom 
is the director more sympathetic to?”—as well as the narrative codes of the 
melodrama that regulate the private sphere, this second­order backstage. 
Moreover, the investigation aims to make the methodological framing in dance 
and film become reflexive, disclosing the genre­specific regularities, the con­
ventions of their formation and reception. 
By selecting the essayistic form, Rainer counters the authoritarian stance with 
a questioning one. This recalls the essay as conceptualized by Adorno: as a 
tentative and fumbling, a searching and attempting, a questioning and explor­
ing rehearsal form; a form that “probe[s]” or “test[s]” the fragility of its object 
in that it exposes it to a “small variation.”5 Rainer’s film demonstrates this move­
ment in various ways: be it through the director’s somewhat maieutic ques­
tioning of the performers, in the course of which the directive voice of the 
coach increasingly begins to transform into a polyphonic concert of voices; 
be it the tentative movements of the camera following the outlines of its ob­
jects; or through the disintegration of the cinematic elements (sound, image, 
language) that enter into a relation of mutual commentary. Another scene to 
consider would be that which, with the meeting of all of the protagonists, 
should in principle portray the dramatic climax, the culmination of the drama 
of the decision between two women and a man. Instead of immediately pre­
cipitating the dramatic turn (in the standard melodramatic case, the woman 
Jenny Nachtigall and Dorothea Walzer
4  On this argument see B. Ruby Rich and 
Noll Brinckmann, “Yvonne Rainer,” Frauen 
und Film 37, Avantgarde and Experiment 
(October 1984): 7.
5  Theodor W. Adorno, “The Essay as Form,” 
New German Critique, no. 32 (Spring—
Summer 1984): 166.
6  Ibid., 161. 
7  On the notion of “tacit knowledge” see 
Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
1966).
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ument and fiction; the two are connected by an “as well as” or even more so: 
instead of leveling the difference between the two, the difference is dealt with 
repeatedly through the surprising shift from one into the other, and is hence 
brought to mind as the object of a decision­making problem.13 With this, Rainer’s 
film­essay demonstratively reveals what Harun Farocki asserts about the  
film­essay in general: “That narrating and discussing belong together, that 
discourses are a narrative form.”14 All content is thus bound to an aesthetic 
decision, dependent on the rules and conventions of the formation and  
reception of knowledge.15 
Ultimately, what is at stake is the attempt to frame rehearsal as an undertaking 
that is not reducible to an authoritative program. Instead of moving forward 
methodologically toward a goal in the sense of the etymological meaning of 
méthodos,16 the essay embarks on improbable turns to proceed in a “method­
ologically unmethodological” way17—postponing, suspending, and problema­
tizing the decision­making in science and art. In this way, disciplined observers 
can become learners: those who constantly translate between the genres, 
disciplines, and media in order to orient themselves in a space whose rules 
they do not master, but can only probe. 
the transition between learning and researching. Rather than merely descrip­
tively substantiating the features usually attributed to the essay—its openness, 
its playfulness, and suitability for situations of social juncture, and so on8—Adorno 
roots them in a concept of a nonspecialized, much more practical or experience­
based acquisition of knowledge; a learning that allows for the tracing of a purely 
gradual, in no way qualitative difference between practicing and attempting, 
testing and inventing.9
Aesthetics of the Improbable
If we further pursue the problem of specialization, we find that the question of 
the transmission of knowledge and ability is most intimately connected to a 
methodological problem. The essay interrogates the division of culture into 
different sectors and realms that Adorno describes as the equivalent to the 
differentiation of social organization through the division of labor. An integral 
part of this is the distinction between science and art—the effect of an in­
creasing demythologization. In this respect, the essay stands out against a 
characteristically Cartesian, scientific method that loses the particularity of 
articulation within the general law of procedure if it acquires its object—de­
ductive or inductive—through the derivation of elements from the whole or, 
rather, the whole out of the element. Instead of framing its object and using a 
specific grammar, “reframing the frame of reason,” for the essay means ques­
tioning the scientific and the artistic discourses alike.10 
The narrative process of Lives of Performers demonstrates how a firmly be­
lieved program can be transformed into an outstanding question. With a con­
stant change of perspective, Rainer’s film confronts us with the necessity of 
reevaluating the status of the narrative again and again. After the cinematic 
representation of a rehearsal devolves rapidly into a dialogically unfolding com­
mentary, we are subsequently forced to recognize that the performance of the 
rehearsal had in fact been an investigation of the rehearsal. Thus, the status of 
the film’s material must be reinterpreted as a document. In the course of the in­
vestigation, however, it becomes apparent that the conversation examining the 
rehearsal is in turn a dramatic dialogue: it is neither the rehearsal of a perfor­
mance, nor its examination, but rather “the performance of a rehearsal.”11 In this 
way, the essay establishes itself beyond a narrating subject as an unreliable nar­
rative function that processes in two ways. On the one hand, we are presented 
with an effect of belatedness (Nachträglichkeit), which we are familiar with from 
any research and learning process: the effect of a sudden insight, based on a 
new configuration that requires us to reformulate our firmly believed coordinate 
system. On the other hand, the decisive judgment is suspended until the end, 
in favor of something that may be referred to as the “aesthetics of the im­
probable.”12 There is no “either … or” that regulates the relation between doc­
8  Cf. Fritz Martini, “Essay,” in Reallexikon der 
deutschen Literaturgeschichte: Erster 
Band. A-K, ed. Werner Kohlschmidt and 
Wolfgang Mohr (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1958), 
409.
9  Referring to the history of science, 
Annemarie Matzke describes the rehearsal 
as a double mode of production, of testing 
and finding/inventing ([Er]Finden) in her 
essay “Versuchsballons und Testreihen:
Wie auf Theaterproben Wissen hervor-
gebracht und standardisiert wird,” in 
Chaos und Konzept: Proben und Probieren 
im Theater, ed. Melanie Hinz and Jens 
Roselt (Berlin: Alexander Verlag, 2011), 134. 
10  Cf. Ulricke Oudée Dünkelsbühler, 
Reframing the Frame of Reason: Translation 
in and beyond Kant and Derrida (Amherst, 
NY: Humanity Books, 2002).
11  Rich and Brinckmann, “Yvonne Rainer,” 9.
12  In contrast to Christoph Menke’s use of 
the expression “aesthetics of the 
improbable,” it is here not used in 
distinction from Adorno’s “aesthetics of 
negativity,” but rather as actualization  
of the (romantic) aesthetics of the 
improbable within the latter. Cf. Christoph 
Menke, The Souvereignity of Art: Aesthetic 
Negativity in Adorno and Derrida 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), 57, 70. 
13  On the indistinguishability of history and 
stories that is indicated in the German 
term Geschichte(n), see Rüdiger Campe, 
Spiel der Wahrscheinlichkeit: Literatur  
und Berechnung zwischen Pascal und 
Kleist (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2002).
14  Harun Farocki, “Obdachlose am Flughafen: 
Sprache und Film, Filmsprache; Der  
Filmemacher Harun Farocki im Gespräch 
mit Rembert Hüser,” Jungle World 46  
(November 8, 2000), http://jungle-world.
com/artikel/2000/45/26804.html. Unless  
otherwise stated, all translations are our 
own.
15  Joseph Vogl conceptualizes this state with 
term “poetology of knowledge.” See 
Joseph Vogl, “Poetologie des Wissens,” in 
Einführung in die Kulturwissenschaft, ed. 
Harun Maye and Leander Scholz (Munich: 
Wilhelm Fink and UTB, 2001), 54f.
16  “Gr. méthodos (actually ‘the way toward 
an aim’).” Cf. Friedrich Kluge, “Methode,” 
in Etymologisches Wörterbuch der 
deutschen Sprache, 25th ed. (Berlin:  
De Gruyter, 2011), 618.
17  Adorno, “Essay as Form,” 161 (translation 
modified).
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Universality/Cliché, or Two Times “Pandora”
It is perhaps not a coincidence, then, that there is also a formal bracket that 
brings the diverging lines of Adorno’s essay and Rainer’s rehearsal into a con­
stellation. Tellingly, it is myth, more specifically that of Pandora with which 
Adorno opens and Rainer closes. 
A quote from Goethe’s adaptation of the Greek myth serves as the epigraph 
of “Essay as Form”: “Destined to see the illuminated, not the light.”18 It is an 
apt starting point for a mediation on the essay as a form of writing that does 
not want its object to “exemplify universal categories,” nor for them “to shine 
through—or at least render the particular transparent towards them.”19 The 
 essay does not start, nor does it seek to arrive at them. It does not strive for 
a closed totality. As Adorno specified: “Its concepts receive their light from 
a terminus ad quem hidden to the essay itself, and not from an obvious terminus 
a quo […]. It erects no scaffolding, no edifice. Through their own movement 
the elements crystallize into a configuration.”20 Movement, light, configuration: 
it is as if Adorno describes a choreography, or perhaps rather a rehearsal. 
The essay is a shifting, ephemeral configuration that, to freely paraphrase 
Goethe, is “destined to see the illuminated, not the light.”
Rainer’s Pandora, in turn, is not only concept but also body. Reenacting scenes 
based on production shots of G. W. Pabst’s silent movie Pandora’s Box (1929), 
in the last scene of Rainer’s film performers freeze photographically into ex­
pressive gestures until muscles start to twitch, eyes start to blink—and they 
move offstage. Rainer, like Adorno, addresses the problem of universality, but 
she approaches it from the mundane and minor perspective of mass culture 
(e.g., melodrama as a genre whose universality is called cliché). Instead of 
simply showcasing the artificiality of the setting à la Brecht, however, Lives of 
Performers points to something that Adorno has described as the essay’s 
proper theme. He called it the “blind natural interconnectedness, myth [that] 
perpetuates itself in culture,” and “the interrelation of nature and culture,” 
which can be also taken to mean immediacy and mediation, object and repre­
sentation.21 Adorno specified that under “the glance of the essay second na­
ture becomes conscious of itself as first nature.”22 In Rainer’s last scene, this 
epistemological motif is given a material body to be felt (rather than read). It 
is precisely because of the hyper­mediated nature of the tableaux vivants’ 
objectification of melodramatic sentiment that sensuousness is allowed to 
emerge. As Carrie Lambert­Beatty has noted poignantly, through the performers’ 
physical effort to hold their poses “calibrated to our attentive struggle [to see 
them endure], something remarkable happens. […] We feel for them.”23 Her 
book ends with the argument that this mode of inversion defines the para­
doxes and contradictions of Rainer’s investigation of spectatorship, of 
“the body as offered to the eye” (meaning not least the camera eye).24 If the 
momentum of Rainer’s dance was “the body being, and being watched,” Lives 
of Performers displaced it into film: 25 film being and film being watched then—
and the medium of this displacement was the rehearsal. 
Lives of Performers organizing principle might be indeed cliché (and its prob­
ing deconstruction), culminating in the film’s last scene. But couldn’t  Pandora’s 
box also be taken as an allegory for film itself, for the proverbial black box 
that here is put to the test too? Approaching Lives of Performers through the 
rehearsal implies a different model of what a medium is, what it does, and 
Adorno’s concept of the essay offers a tool to grasp it. 
Starting From the Bad New Things  
The Rehearsal as a Medium of Contingency
It is no secret that Adorno, like Clement Greenberg and Rosalind Krauss, was 
also an ardent advocate of art’s autonomy and medium specificity. Yet for him 
they did not serve as ends in themselves but were historically conditioned 
by the social division of labor in society that could not simply be abandoned 
by fiat.26 In contrast to the formalism of Greenberg and Krauss, Adorno’s was 
historically and philosophically coded and thus, potentially at least, open to 
change (Juliane Rebentisch speaks of a “second­order formalism”).27
Although this promise was not redeemed in his Aesthetic Theory, where art’s 
position is so fraught with historical­philosophical weight that it is left para­
lyzed vis­à­vis any mode of agency other than melancholic critique, his earlier 
conception of the essay allows for a different perspective. Not least, of course, 
because the essay does not figure as a form of art proper, but as one that is 
located in the tension between science and art, between intuition and ratio­
nality, autonomy and heteronomy—boundaries that, for Adorno, were ineluc­
table on historical grounds.28 With the development of contemporary art since 
the 1960s, however, these clear demarcations have foundered, for art too en­
tered into the general economy, shedding its modernist exceptionalism re­
garding rationality’s grinding wheels.29 Distinctions previously operative, that 
18  Goethe, quoted in ibid., 151.
19  Ibid., 151–52 (translation modified).
20 Ibid., 161 (emphasis ours).
21 Ibid., 167.
22 Ibid., 168.
23 Carrie Lambert-Beatty, Being Watched: 
Yvonne Rainer and the 1960s (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2008), 267.
24 Ibid., 4.
25 Ibid., 6.
26 See, for instance, Theodor W. Adorno,  
In Search for Wagner, trans. Rodney 
Livingstone (1952; repr. London, New 
York: Verso, 2005).
27 See Juliane Rebentisch, Aesthetics of 
Installation Art (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 
2012), 129.
28 Adorno, “Essay as Form,” 154, 157.
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is, the essay from art “through its conceptual character” was waning (and 
Rainer’s work might well serve as a case in point).30 In other words, the position 
of the essay changes at the moment in which art shifts too: when art’s (re)
production runs simultaneously to that of society, the essay’s open form can 
serve as a more adequate matrix for thinking contemporary art’s autonomy 
and the function of the medium therein than that of their modernist circum­
scription allows.
What is most productive about Adorno’s rendering of the essay is that in con­
trast to Krauss’s understanding of (modernist) art, its medium is not memory 
but contingency. Operating contingent on the subject matter that it addresses, 
it is a form that has to constitute itself each time anew in relation to the mul­
tiple registers of its “support”; its mode of signification is not geared toward 
any goal, nor does it follow any pre­given rules. Hence the essay’s method is to 
have none. There is no finality for the essay, as noted above, because it  
proceeds methodologically unmethodologically. Arguably Krauss’s medium 
proceeds in reverse, because for her the medium is the memory (i.e., of art’s 
modernist autonomy); it prescribes art’s method.31 To preserve autonomy, art­
ists have to reinvent new mediums that “signify in the way older mediums 
had done”—art’s modernist autonomy is both the sine qua non of art and its 
“goal.”32 Insofar as—other than in Greenberg’s frame—the procedure of realiz­
ing autonomy is not tied to the materiality of any given genre, but can encom­
pass all kinds of “supports” (mass­cultural artifacts, theories, etc.), it could 
be understood as unmethodological. Artists just need to “reclaim the specific 
from the deadening embrace of the general,”33 and to wrest art’s autonomy 
from mass culture—categories that tend to appear as historically immutable.
For Adorno, however, the “essay seeks truth contents as being historical in 
themselves,” hence the contingency of its procedure, its open form.34 Although 
Lives of Performers summons its epistemological thrust, it also retains the 
bodily, sensuous signature of the rehearsal. It is as if the probing, repetitive 
gestures of a body that learns a movement were displaced into film—into the 
searching movement of Babette Mangolte’s camera work, but also into the 
temporal complexity of the film’s structure. After all, the essay has to unfold 
its negotiation of concept and intuition, mediation and immediacy through 
the discursive medium of language, which also means consecutively. Lives of 
Performers, in turn, thanks to art’s mode of “sensuous evidence,” can make it 
palpable in a “flash of intuition” (and it certainly does as we have argued in the 
film’s last scene).35 
A crucial concern of Rainer’s dance is that sensuousness, or rather physi­
cality, is bound to specific temporalities. For instance, her signature work Trio 
A (1966), which consisted of ordinary movement, replaced the ordered 
time of choreography with “the real movement of time” of a body that goes 
through a motion.36 Rainer thus wanted to achieve a radical horizontality, a 
de­hierarchisation between dance and dancer, who as “neutral doer” was 
stripped of psychological depth and rendered a physical body. Rereading 
Trio A through an expanded notion of Krauss’s medium, Julia Bryan­Wilson has 
recently suggested that for Rainer the dance, too, functioned as a medium, 
one that thrives on the “muscle memory” of the body as a living archive, that 
is, the memory of movements previously learned.37 Bryan­Wilson convincingly 
highlights that the body, too, is a storage device, and that time also has and is 
a body. Yet in Lives of Performers this body is not only that of the dancer but 
also that of film. It operates less through learned gestures than through the 
open, contingent structure of the rehearsal, in which the movements of the 
body and those of the apparatus emerge through one another. Hence, if we 
reframe the medium of Lives of Performers not as dance, or film, but as the 
rehearsal, we can shift focus from the mnemonic registers of representation 
to those of (re)production; to the aesthetic as well as social conditions, forms 
and materials of art, and to the contingencies and possibilities of a practice 
that does not simply follow prescribed rules, but works on them, tests them, 
in order to develop different ones.
In contrast to Adorno’s insistence on grounding such openness in the essay’s 
anachronism (melancholically reaching for utopia), however, its actualiza­
tion as rehearsal acts from within the contradictions of the present. Sabeth 
 Buchmann and Constanze Ruhm have recently pointed out that what began 
in Lives of Performers as putting something to the test, now resonates with the 
neoliberal ideology of lifelong learning and continuous work on the self.38 
And it is precisely because of this economic identification, rather than despite 
it, that the rehearsal can serve as a point of departure for an art that is con­
temporary not in the broad sense (i.e., being of its time) but in a specific one: 
in the sense that it does not start “from the good old things,” from the premises 
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29 On this argument see Kerstin Stakemeier, 
“Verfransung und Digitalität. 
Medienspezifik in der Krise,” in Das 
Versprechen der Kunst: Aktuelle Zugänge 
zu Adornos ästhetischer Theorie, ed. 
Marcus Quent and Eckardt Lindner 
(Vienna: Verlag Turia + Kant, 2014), 141–55.
30 Adorno, ”Essay as Form,” 153.
31 Rosalind E. Krauss, Under Blue Cup 
(London: Phaidon Press, 2011), 3.
32 Ibid., 76. 
33 Rosalind E. Krauss, “Reinventing the 
Medium,” Critical Inquiry 25, no. 2 (1999): 
305.
34 Adorno, “Essay as Form,” 158–59.
35 Peter Gorsen, “Subjektlose Kunst,” in 
Transformierte Alltäglichkeit oder 
Transzendenz der Kunst. Reflexionen zur 
Entästhetisierung (Frankfurt am Main: 
Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1981), 57.
36 Yvonne Rainer, quoted in Annette 
Michelson, “Yvonne Rainer, Part 1: The 
Dancer and the Dance,” Artforum 12, no. 5 
(January 1974): 59.
37 Julia Bryan-Wilson, “Practicing Trio A,” 
October 140 (Spring 2012): 70.
38 Buchmann and Ruhm, “Subject Put to  
the Test.”
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and promises of modernism as “a classical as well as critical past,”39 but from 
“the bad new ones”40—rehearsing to move and to move differently within the 
tangled, crisis­ridden space of the present. 
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39 David Geers, “Neo-Modern,” October 139 
(Winter 2012): 11.
40 Walter Benjamin tellingly quotes the 
Brechtian maxim: “Don’t start from the 
good old things but the bad new ones”  
in his Versuche über Brecht, the title of 
which was translated not as “essays on 
Brecht” but as “understanding Brecht.” 
Walter Benjamin, Understanding Brecht, 
trans. Anna Bostock (London, New York: 
Verso, 1998), 121.
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In an essay entitled “The Poor Man’s Couch,” published in 1975, Félix Guattari 
suggests, somewhat ironically, that “cinematic performance” for the poor and 
“psychoanalytic performance” (“the analytical act”) for the rich, could be spo­
ken about in symmetry: 
For too long, belle époque psychoanalysis has persuaded us it was liber­
ating the instincts by giving them a language; in fact, it never intended 
loosening the vice of the dominant discourse, except insofar as it reck­
oned on achieving even greater success than ordinary repression had 
ever done: to control, to discipline, to adapt people to the norms of a cer­
tain type of society. In the end, the discourse that is proffered in the 
analytical session is no more “liberated” than served up in movies theaters. 
The so­called liberty of free­association is only an illusion that masks a 
certain program, a secret modelization of statements (énoncés). As on the 
film screen, it is understood in analysis that no semiotic production of 
desire should have any effect on reality. The little playhouse of analysis 
and the mass analysis of film both proscribe the passage to action, to 
“acting out.”1 
While Guattari mentions “Mr. Goldwyn’s proposition to Freud: $100,000 to put 
the famous loves on screen,”2 he seems to have left aside the representation 
of the act itself: the countless scenes in which a patient undergoes therapy, 
and in a shot­reverse­shot editing the viewer has to either share the point of 
view of the analyst or, alternatively, that of the analysand. These scenes are 
often used as narrative devices to interlace a plane of experiences that could 
not coexist otherwise in the linear diegesis because of their diachronic tem­
porality. The set then represents a bourgeois interior from where the libidinal 
story of the liberal individual can depart. Film is also formally free for a short 
moment, until it has to come back to the site it left after the free association, 
a parenthesis of sorts, ends. Beside the many shortcomings of Guattari’s 
coupling of conceptual frameworks, we could mention its neglect of the femi­
nist discourse about film and psychoanalysis that was articulated at the same 
time in the United Kingdom, within the pages of Screen magazine. Writing this 
essay, however, I was inspired by Guattari’s “unorthodox” method, and 
 attempted to compare the contingency of the analytical act, especially trans­
ference, to an ontology and politics of rehearsal. In French, the word répétition 
in its broadest meaning is an antonym of “rehearsal,” and although both terms 
have to be distinguished according to the context of their use, the  confusion 
1 Félix Guattari, “The Poor Man’s Couch,” in 
Chaosophy: Texts and Interviews 1972–
1977, ed. Sylvère Lotringer (Los Angeles: 
Semiotext(e), 2009), 258. The essay was 
originally published in the French under 
the title “Le divan du pauvre,” 
Communications 23 (May 1975): 96–103. 
This issue of Communications was 
devoted to psychoanalysis and cinema.
2 Ibid., 257.
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sometimes generates interesting frictions between, for instance, intentional 
gestures and automatic, unconscious bodily enactments of the performer. 
Related to the later occurrence of the term, the concept of repetition in psy­
choanalysis has a singular path from Sigmund Freud to various strains of 
trauma theory, which escapes the scope of this essay.3 I rather want to com­
pare rehearsal and the analytical act on an epistemological level. 
In order to transmit the knowledge gained through practice, analysts have to 
convert residues of their listening—notes more or less systematically taken—
into a readable “report,” but they are also asked to protect the identity of their 
patients. The recorded events thus have to be clouded by fiction, and traces 
of identity (naming names) redacted out. Given to other analysts as twice re­
moved discourse, that of the analyst and of the analysand, which were once 
together in the same room, this derivative material becomes, as André Green 
once stated, a “transcription of an unknown origin.”4 Rehearsal also needs to 
be “written” to a certain extent, and after the fact, so that the activity of 
generating seemingly un­recordable and un­repeatable manifestations of vir­
tuosity while repeating the score (or changing it), can become a form of 
transmittable knowledge for another performer. In both cases, it remains diffi­
cult to “contain” this representation of contingency by establishing its spatial 
and temporal limits; thus, the transcribed, fictionalized narratives of rehearsal 
and of transference are most often bordering on acts of transgression. The 
architectural enclosure of the rehearsal room also shares many characteristics 
with the designated safe space where this analytical act can take place, or, in 
what Donald W. Winnicott terms “the holding environment.”5 In one case, trial 
and error is allowed, and in the other a chain of signifiers unfolds beyond 
communication. In both, the repetition of contingency is a contradiction in 
terms. To situate the performer in a parenthesis of learning the score, with 
the possibility of failing, and to set the right conditions for the transfer to  
happen, a site of intersubjectivity must be protected. 
It would have been possible to isolate a sample of works in which the analytical 
act remains more abstract, or isn’t literally perceivable through “character­
ization.” However, by sticking to the dyad of the analyst and the analysand, I 
hoped to show how the appearance of this framework at particular moments 
within some artists’ trajectories corresponded precisely to a period of rehears­
al toward other types of “acting out” or “enactments.” The following case 
studies will unfold more or less chronologically. This order is meant to bring 
to the fore a discursive trajectory that starts with the assimilation and criticism 
of Lacanian psychoanalysis in feminist discourse, and seemingly ends with 
the so­called affective turn. Within this trajectory there are some blatant omis­
sions in which the staging of rehearsal plays a lesser role. These works and 
texts could be commented on in an expanded discussion about the relation­
ship between contemporary art and psychoanalysis, which rarely happens. 
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Among a larger sample, I thus choose to focus on some of the more exemplary 
cases that fit into the present discussion laid out by the editors of this book.
In 1979 the Jay Street Film Project collective (Anthony McCall, Claire 
 Pajaczkowska, Andrew Tyndall, Ivan Ward, and Jane Weinstock) directed  
Sigmund Freud’s Dora: A Case of Mistaken Identity, which reappraised the first 
case study published by Freud in 1905, “Fragments of an Analysis of a Case 
of Hysteria.”6 The film was one of the outcomes of a reading group in which 
this text, and its subsequent commentaries, were analyzed. Besides the fact 
that the case study was chosen because it was an initial rough attempt by 
Freud to migrate his clinical experience toward a narrative form, the growup 
invested it as a “discursive site” that was at the intersection of several other 
debates.7 As stated in a document handed to the audience before the screen­
ing of the film: “The psychoanalytical method itself is a process of reading 
the language and symptoms of the patient; Freud’s case history is a reading 
of that reading, which we, in turn, read.”8
Freud recounts that Dora’s parents consulted him after they found a suicide 
note in her room, and also because she intermittently stopped speaking. Later 
on during the session, Dora confided to Freud that a friend of her father, K., 
kissed her at the age of fourteen, while the father had a secret affair with K.’s 
wife. By interlocking these concomitant facts and because of Dora’s own re­
sistance to say more, Freud concluded that her hysterical symptoms—one of 
which was speechlessness—were a consequence of her repressed desires to­
ward K. Freud then tried to explain the break of transference and, consequently, 
to elucidate why Dora left therapy by her own will. In a text read by members 
of the Jay Street Film Project, theorist Jacqueline Rose confers agency to 
3 Within this vast theoretical body see, for 
instance, Sigmund Freud, “Remembering, 
Repeating, and Working-Through (Further 
Recommendations on the Technique of 
Psychoanalysis),” in The Standard Edition 
of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud, ed. and trans. J. Strachey 
(London: Hogarth Press, 1954–74),  
147–57; Jacques Lacan, “Tuché and 
Automaton,” in The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, ed. Jacques 
Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: 
Penguin Books, 1979), 53–56; and later  
on, Judith Butler, “The Pleasure of 
Repetition,” in Pleasure beyond the 
Pleasure Principle, ed. Robert A Glick and 
Stanley Bone (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1990), 259–76. 
4 André Green, “Transcription d’origine 
inconnue: L’écriture du psychanalyste: 
Critique du témoignage,” Nouvelle revue 
de psychanalyse 16 (Autumn 1977): 27–64.
5 See Donald W. Winnicott, Holding and 
Interpretation: Fragment of an Analysis 
(London: Hogarth Press, 1986). 
6 Sigmund Freud, “Fragments of an Analysis 
of a Case of Hysteria” (1905), in The 
Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 
vol. 7, ed. and trans. J. Strachey (London: 
Hogarth Press, 1954–74), 1–122.
7 To consult the script of the film, and for a 
statement summarizing the intentions of 
the group, written by member Claire 
Pajaczkowska, see Jay Street Collective, 
“Dora Script,” Framework (Summer 1981): 
75–80.
8 Jay Street Collective, quoted in Felicity 
Oppé, “Exhibiting Dora,” Screen 22, no. 2 
(July 1981): 82.
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the pages of Screen and m/f magazines, in which the filmic apparatus was 
deconstructed according to gendered positions of subjects within the domi­
nant ideology of Hollywood industry, rather than described on an abstract 
semiological level. Thus, following these various trajectories, the members of 
the group and their peers did not want to confine psychoanalysis to the sole 
establishment and enforcement of norms (as Gilles Deleuze and Guattari did in 
Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia [1972], and later Michel Foucault 
in The History of Sexuality [1976]), but they rather hoped to produce another 
critical text alongside the process of reappraising Freud’s foundational case 
study. 
In an essay entitled “Exhibiting ‘Dora,’” Felicity Oppé recounts her experience 
of projecting the film to various audiences beyond the constituency of theo­
rists, artists, and experimental filmmakers that triggered its making. This over­
consciousness of context—that of the time preceding and succeeding the 
screening—was built on the hope that potential viewers would somewhat oc­
cupy the place of the filmmakers, and that the psychoanalytical institution 
itself would be revealed through this circulation of subject positions. In this 
treatment of a case whose currency reappeared because of a particular way 
of reading it at the end of the seventies, the film thus became a collective 
 analytical act, like a rehearsal, to set forward another possibility of political 
intervention. As Claire Pajaczkowska explicitly states, speaking on behalf of 
the group: “We all maintain that the function of this project, like any other 
political project, is to make itself redundant, to change the relations of power 
that necessitated its presence.”10
Yvonne Rainer’s shift from dance to film should also be understood within the 
framework of a reappraisal of psychoanalytic theory informed by feminism 
led by various factions of theorists, filmmakers, and artists in the seventies. 
During the research period that led to their exhibition, Sabeth Buchmann 
and Constanze Ruhm isolated emblematic works that exacerbated the tension 
 between what could be defined as the contingency of the rehearsal proper, 
and an attempt to shift its temporality to the plane of representation (an im­
possible project that failure, however, produces complex results). Among these 
works they discussed the opening scene from Rainer’s Lives of Performers, 
made in 1972, just after the choreographer abandoned dance to devote herself 
to filmmaking. During this scene, Babette Mangolte’s sinuous camera move­
ments follow the bodies of dancers rehearsing, while they themselves are driven 
by the choreographer’s instructions heard offscreen. In fact, rather than  
imposing a subjective point of view, Mangolte’s body and her camera are 
lodged into the vacancies of the choreography as it is enacted, and therefore 
Dora “escaping” the clinic, but she also recognizes the political  valence of 
psychoanalysis for feminism. Rose poses that in this particular case study, 
Freud did not address the effect of his own countertransference during the 
analysis.9 He rather entrenched Dora’s symptoms into a strict  Oedipean grid. 
His attempt to impose Dora’s repressed desires toward K. as an  explanation 
was one way to bring about narrative closure. At the same time, he also oblit­
erated any possibility of female sexuality outside of a circuit of symbolic ex­
change and bourgeois ideology—in effect, sealing Dora’s case. 
Following Rose’s text, the members of the Jay Street Film Collective decided 
to reopen, once more, this case. They redistributed its content and its sub­
sequent reinterpretations in a script that comprises three sections. The first 
section shows one take of a close up of an anonymous woman’s lips (Suzanne 
Fletcher), reporting a conversation in which she bears in the first person. This 
scene is overlaid by frames displaying entries of a chronology of Dora’s case, 
and of events related to the constitution of the psychoanalytic institution itself. 
The timeline is supplemented by fragmentary factual information excerpted 
from other “grand revolutionary narratives” of the end of nineteenth century 
and early twentieth century (the emergence of the feminist and suffragettes 
movements, the birth of linguistics, the biographies of communist theorists, 
etc.). The second section unfolds as a fictitious dialogue between Freud and 
Dora, distillated from the content of the case study and its afferent literature. 
It alternates between shots and countershots of the two protagonists inter­
rupting each other. Rather than conveying affect in their reading, the nonac­
tors, artist Silvia Kolbowski (Dora) and author Joel Kovel (Freud), repeat the 
text as if it was simply read; thus, they make it clear to the viewer that it is im­
possible to “reenact” the original dialogue whose context is lost. Interpolated 
in the editing of the shots and countershots are advertisements for throat 
medicine (echoing Dora’s alleged symptom of aphasia), re­filmed from a tele­
vision screen, showed in full, and then interspersed with excerpts of porno­
graphic films. At the end of the section, Dora has already left the scene, and 
the camera captures only the bookcases behind her, showing the particular 
theoretical literature (Screen magazines, Freud’s Standard Edition, Marx’s 
Capital, etc.) that might have been consulted by the Jay Street Film Collective 
as research material. Finally, in the third sequence, which could be de­
scribed as an epilogue, Anne Hegira plays Dora’s mother who reads missives 
on postcards sent by her daughter. The recto of these postcards displays 
stills of scenes that were seen in the previous part. As the elided subject in 
Freud’s recounting of the case, the mother now becomes one of the filmic 
text’s main protagonist and addressee. 
One question articulated by the members of the group was how psychoanaly­
sis became a state apparatus by entrenching female sexuality to lack and so­
cial reproduction. The film also emerged from a larger debate unfolding in 
9 Jacqueline Rose, “Dora: Fragment of an 
Analysis,” m/f 2 (1978): 5–21.
10 Pajaczkowska, “Dora Script,” 75.
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as temporarily dispossessed of authority, now an ally of Rainer in the chaos of 
self­analysis.
Just like Jean­Marie Straub, Danièle Huillet, and Jean­Luc Godard, Rainer often 
asks performers in her films to utter lines of a script made up of quotes from 
various chosen texts in a disaffected tone verging on the neutral. This strategy 
became the epitome of a post­dramatic approach, which was meant to cir­
cumvent the viewer’s identifications to characters and the fetishism of the im­
age in Hollywood hegemonic narrative structures. Although Rainer’s work 
has been identified with the counter­cinematic genre of the “new talkies,” or 
neo­Brechtian documentary informed by psychoanalytically inclined femi­
nism, her films could not fit under either of these rubrics. While she partook in 
discussions with many of her peers in the seventies and eighties interested 
in the reappraisal of Lacan, Rainer always expressed ambivalence toward the 
way a set of shared theoretical references most often coalesced in a rigid 
ideological project.14 Rainer’s next film, The Man Who Envied Women (1985), 
embodies her complex relationship with a certain intellectual milieu using 
psychoanalysis jargon among other vocabularies as a way once more to split 
off affective life from “proper” academic parlance. This time the viewer follows 
the conflicted path of Jack Deller as he manages to balance the contradiction 
of the handling of his love affairs (one of which is the end of a romance with 
Trisha, the invisible narrator), with the way he endorses feminist discourse in 
the lecture hall. Being caught in­between shifting from his male “hysteric 
discourse,” and the university discourse, he constantly monitors occurrences 
of slips within a rhetorical performance, and Rainer shows several comedic 
moments when he fails at the task. In the prologue of the film, Deller appears 
on a proscenium of a cinema theater. However, rather than giving a lecture, 
he is seemingly at the wrong place, “pants down,” and engages in a flow of 
free associations addressed to his hypothetical analyst. On the screen nearby 
we see corresponding snippets of classic Hollywood melodramas, horror films, 
and an excerpt of the infamous eye­cutting scene of Luis Buñuel’s Un Chien 
Andalou (1929). In her detailed analysis of The Men Who Envied Women, theo­
rist Bérénice Reynaud has stated eloquently how, in this opening segment, 
Rainer changes the parameters of the setup she has devised for representing 
the scene of transference in Journey from Berlin/1971: “The analyst disappears, 
swallowed by the off­screen space (which means that he/she ends up literally 
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she doesn’t disturb the fragile exchange between the performers moving 
“together.” Then, as if we are witnessing the announcement of Rainer’s 
shift from one medium to the other within this scene, a break occurs between 
the opening segment and the rest of the film. After, a series of theatrical 
 vignettes unfold, these dancers pose nearly still and silent, while a voice­over 
recounts the details of their flirtatious or amorous relationships offstage. At 
first it seems that Rainer, the other dancers, and the larger community of art­
ists forming the audience are meant to be the recipients of these melodra­
matic confessions, but later their polyamorous discourse sounds like it had 
been spoken out loud for another subject, absent from the scene/diegesis. Or 
rather, the viewer is installed at a place where this invisible subject, the ana­
lyst, could sit as well. Rainer did not construct such a position narratively as 
she would do later in other films. But, since the script was opening the gap 
between the “lives” of the dancers and the actual performances they were 
asked to enact, Rainer seemed to have transitioned here from the experimental 
arena of rehearsal as choreography (deferring the spectacle of dance in task­
like activity) to the particular setup of an analytic act, which would occupy 
center stage in her upcoming work. 
In her film Journeys from Berlin/1971 (1980), produced a few years after Lives 
of Performers, Rainer found a setting that would enable her to put to the test 
the way the analytical act and transference are usually configured in cinematic 
forms by demonstrating the productive impossibility of adequately represent­
ing this act. The film is composed of several narratives that enmesh current 
and historical events with the biography of a subject borrowing from Rainer’s 
life (as she mentions herself in her autobiographical book Feelings Are Facts, 
written in 1971, in the title was an obscure reference to the year of her suicide 
attempt).11 Parts of these threads find their origins from Rainer’s sojourn in 
Berlin, between 1976 and 1977, which coincided with the trials of the Baader­
Meinhof clan members.12 Edited alternating scenes show the bedroom/living 
room of filmmakers Laura Mulvey and Peter Wollen, the street in a square, a 
kitchen, and, finally, a dislocated space, which stands for the office of a psy­
choanalyst. Film theorist and historian Annette Michelson appears in the film 
playing the patient, and Ilona Halberstadt, another public intellectual, takes 
on the role of the analyst.13 Instead of alternating her editing between shots 
and countershots (as done in Dora), Rainer installs the camera behind the 
back of the analyst, and sits the patient at a desk on which there is also a tele­
phone ringing intermittently (emitting obscene speech when it is picked up). 
Moreover, during Michelson’s stream of association, a woman, a child, or a dog 
are sometimes used as a substitute for Halberstadt. This recirculation of sub­
ject positions suggests that rather than being entrenched to transference in 
the spoken chain of signifiers, one image event replaces the other. Cutting 
the synchronic content of the voice­over presented in other parts of the film, 
these diachronic segments present Michelson, a “subject supposed to know,” 
11 Yvonne Rainer, Feelings Are Facts: A Life 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), 453.
12 For a commentary on Journey from 
Berlin/1971, see B. Ruby Rich, “Yvonne 
Rainer: An Introduction,” in The Films  
of Yvonne Rainer (Bloomington: 
Indianapolis University Press, 1989), 1–23.
13 Rainer, Feelings Are Facts, 453.
14 On Rainer’s vexed relationship to 
psychoanalytically inflected film theory, 
see Yvonne Rainer, “Some Ruminations 
Around Cinematic Antitodes to the 
Oedipal Net(tles) while Playing With De 
Lauraedipus Mulvey or, He May Be Off-




on the spectator’s lap, unless it is the spectator who has become the analyst—
i.e., the idiot who does not know anything but whose ignorance assumes all 
possible knowledges).”15
Like Rainer’s use of quotes in Journey from Berlin/1971 or The Men Who Envied 
Women, Andrea Fraser’s first performed works are based on the montage of 
textual fragments pulled from various incommensurate sources that are ut­
tered by one “performer” through a continuous flow of speech. Through most 
often site­specific “enactments,” Fraser attempts to show how the art field 
consolidates its discursive boundaries by the inclusion and the exclusion of 
certain statements. Her use of reflexive sociology influenced by Pierre  Bourdieu, 
however, always integrated the working of the unconscious and the facts of 
her own psychic life. At the beginning of a 1992 text aptly entitled “An Artist’s 
Statement,” she describes this particular investment into psychoanalysis as 
method and praxis in and around her work: 
Freud ended a paper called “The Dynamics of the Transference” with this 
statement: “In the last resort no one can be slain in absentia or in effigie.” 
My investment in site specificity is motivated by this idea. My engage­
ment in institutional critique follows from the fact that, as an artist and 
a writer, to the extend that I write, art and academic institutions are the 
sites where my activity is located. Psychoanalysis largely determines my 
conception of those sites as sets of relations, although I think of those 
relations as social and economic as well as subjective. And psychoanaly­
sis also defines, largely, what is for me both a practical and an ethical 
imperative to work site specifically.16 
Although Fraser’s video installation Projection (2008) does not represent the 
latest stage of her ongoing relationship with psychoanalysis both as a dis­
course and as a practice, this work brings it to the fore in the material limits 
of the exhibition space.17 Fraser went through “proper” analysis herself for 
several years. In this piece she decided to put to the test another therapeutic 
model: that of “intensive short­term dynamic psychotherapy,” employing 
video feedback as a projection tool. Instead of the slow path of analysis in 
which speech (or “acting out”) cannot be forced, the interpolated video image 
is used here to produce a semblance of transference. In principle, during 
these sessions the patient has to confront a represented situation through 
which he or she can see his or her gestures, and way of speaking, as shameful 
symptoms. The impotence of not being able to act out, to cope with frustra­
tions or to change accordingly, becomes a trigger for him or her to adopt 
available behaviors or a particular habitus instead of exploring more thor­
oughly his or her object relations. After parsing through fifteen hours of these 
video sessions, Fraser  isolated moments where she acknowledged the limits 
of her taking an ambivalent position toward institutions, and the guilt that this 
bad consciousness, overall, generates. She enacted transcribed fragments 
of her own speech during these intensive meetings, while the recordings, 
which could be described as rehearsals for these scenes, remained out of sight. 
In the twelve sections of her final script, Fraser shifts from the polar extremes 
of discourse, alternately taking the positions of analyst and that of the analy­
sand. In the installation, the viewer is located in­between her two life­sized 
projections. Being always within the interval, the viewer cannot rally him­ or 
herself with either of these characters as they appear and disappear. In  
moments of silence, he or she sits still, waiting to turn around, as Fraser will 
show up again on either side. When Fraser reenacts short­term dynamic 
psychotherapy, playing all of the roles, she seems to ask the viewer to be at 
the place of the “other” silent and invisible analyst, the one that, at last, 
has to bear the transmission of affects, and the deferred task of critique (of 
the self and of the institution). The work finds its particular strength in the 
way it repeats a normative scenario through the transgression of the boundaries 
of disclosure, and the words of Fraser herself, without offering any resolution, 
thus not ending or distorting the “proper” analysis.
In a 2014 text, Fraser stated that the term “performative” became misused by 
actors in the art field to describe the wish to act in a context or do certain 
things, rather than to describe a specific category of linguistic statements that 
have an effect in a real situation. She advocated the replacement of the word 
performative, emptied out of its content, by the concept of enactment: 
In psychoanalytic theory, the concept of enactment emerged through a 
reconciliation of the notions of transference and acting out. One of the 
premises of psychoanalytic practice is that you can’t change something 
over there—by talking about it, interpreting it, representing it, reflecting 
on it. You can only work on what is made “immediate and manifest” (as 
Freud put it) in the “here and now” of the analytic situation. This principle 
has been central to my thinking about performance, critical practice, 
and site­specificity since the mid­1980s.18 
Recently, British psychoanalyst Wilfred Bion’s 1960s work on group dynamics 
has influenced Fraser’s methods of teaching, in which she uses a technique 
called “enactment analysis.” This approach takes into account the constituency 
Vincent Bonin
15 Bérénice Reynaud, “Impossible 
Projections,” Screen, 28, no. 4 (1987): 40.
16 Andrea Fraser, “An Artist’s Statement,”  
in Museum Highlights: The Writings of 
Andrea Fraser, ed. Alexander Alberro 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 3. This 
text was originally presented at the 
symposium “Place Position Presentation 
Public,” at the Jan van Eyck Academie, 
Maastricht, in April 1992. 
17 Andrea Fraser, “Projection, 2008,” in 
Andrea Fraser: Texte, Skripte, Transkripte / 
Texts, Scripts, Transcripts, ed. Carla  




even access to an unconscious, or is her brain only the prey of the algorithms 
of a global economy? The predicted failure of the cure—early on the psychia­
trist mentions to the therapist she has little hope of recovery—is almost the 
prefiguration of capitalism’s success at integrating one more crisis.
Unlike the extended self­exploration of psychoanalysis, which end is predicated 
on the will of the analysand to close the cure, the techniques used in Self-
Capital are aimed at providing quick results, and to end with the patient  
being restored to her increased productivity. It could thus be said that in the 
framework of a culture of risk management and reinsurance, therapy has be­
come a form of retraining or rehearsal. Gilligan defines her character as a 
middle­class white woman who could work at the ICA in an administrative or 
curatorial position, and alternatively, who might be a viewer of the exhibition. 
However, accidents (and other contingencies like ecological disaster) can now 
break the boundaries of class division, which, in the past, made provisionally 
immune subjects of this middle and upper class. Self-Capital and other work 
by Gilligan thus provide narratives where crisis strikes anytime, anywhere, 
and through this contingency necessitates the redefinition of the concept of 
victimhood. If, as Lauren Berlant and others are suggesting, we now collec­
tively share a bundle of affects rather than a world, and that the former total­
izing paradigms (i.e., the concept of social class) cannot describe adequately 
the phenomena of contingency irrupting within our existences, is the model 
of psychoanalytical intersubjectivity definitely obsolete?
The way the analytic act is doubted within Fraser’s and Gilligan’s work, as well 
as a number of other artists’ practices, seems to indicate the latter—that the 
Lacanian model of subject positions reread through feminist methodologies 
has been relinquished for a more pliable affective turn and its incoming neuro­
plasticity. However, these artists still hold on to transference as the structure 
of an installation, sometimes site­specific, in the space and time of the exhibi­
tion, as well as the casting of the analyst and the analysand as characters. 
Now it seems that this persistent metaphor, or allegorical setup, mainly deploys 
itself in scenario of catastrophic flexibility that requires the atomized individ­
of her students as a collective entity, but then enables each of them to as­
sess their investments in the group.19 
Like Fraser, Melanie Gilligan wrote texts and produced works in which she 
has put to the test the limits of the performative as a linguistic category, and 
also challenges its misuse in art discourse. In a 2007 essay, she mentions, 
for instance, the compulsion to repeat (in the broadest sense, of “reenacting” 
past events) that precipitated the canonization of performance as a genre  
of visual arts, and even compared it to “objecthood” in the market.20 Although 
the end result of her working process is most of the time a well­produced  
video, Gilligan embraces contingency as an object of scrutiny of her practice 
on a formal and political level. To do so, she often collaborates closely with 
actors in long sessions, sometimes accessible to the public, in which the di­
vides  between rehearsal and acting, as well as scripted and improvised,  
become blurred. 
Her video series Self-Capital: ICA (2009) exemplifies her use of these post­
dramatic techniques to produce particular bodily movements of her actors that 
can be compared to acting out, in a therapeutic context. In 2009 Gilligan 
was invited to take part in the exhibition “Talk Show” at the Institute of  
Con temporary Arts (ICA), London. During a one­week residency at the ICA,  
Gilligan wrote the script, rehearsed the scenes with actress Penelope  McGhie, 
and shot the video in the upper galleries under the observational gaze of 
the audience. Self-Capital depicts a woman at the end of her forties who, after 
a severe meltdown, is referred by a psychiatrist to a therapist using methods 
of bodily acting out of affects. Just like Fraser in Projection, the same actress, 
McGhie, is playing all of the roles. The viewers witness the interaction of a 
client with a cashier at the ICA bookstore, the psychiatrist talking with the 
therapist on the phone while referring her patient, and finally the unfolding of 
the therapy sessions. From the beginning of her video, Gilligan establishes 
clearly that the enmeshed lives of all her characters are echoing the patholo­
gies and normativity of the global economy. The fact that this patient is 
capitalism itself plays off at another level of irony: the comparison between 
the tools to activate stock market speculation (rather than regulate them), 
and the techniques of emotional release provides a strange hybrid subject, 
both embodied and disembodied.21 The title extends this metaphor by super­
imposing three modes of subjectivity. The first mode refers to “ordinary” 
self­shaping and fashioning. The second mode points toward the actual sym­
bolic and real capital one has to accumulate to be able to survive in the  
social world. On a third level, this title poses the necessity of abstractions to 
have a self, to be embodied and anthropomorphized. In fact, the complexity of 
this going back and forth between various subject positions, each representing 
a specific “place” on an economical level, poses the more general question of 
“ownership” of emotions and affects. Does this patient have an “inner life” or 
Vincent Bonin
18 Andrea Fraser, “Performance or 
Enactment,” in Performing the Sentence: 
Research and Teaching in Performative 
Fine Arts, ed. Carola Dertnig and Felicitas 
Thun-Hohenstein (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 
2014), 125.
19 On this particular recent development in 
Fraser’s work, see Sven Lütticken, “Andrea 
Fraser: Institutional Analysis,” in Andrea 
Fraser, ed. Sabine Breitwieser (Salzburg: 
Museum der Moderne, 2015), 31–42. 
20 On this issue, see Melanie Gilligan, “The 
Beggar’s Pantomime,” Artforum 54, no. 10 
(Summer 2007): 426–33.
21 On the relationship between affect, 
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Melanie Gilligan and Marina Vishmidt, 
“Economic Subjectivities in Crisis,” in and 
Materials and Money and Crisis (Vienna: 




ual (in the words of Deleuze, the “dividual”) to artificially absorb the social 
responsibilities of crisis, which in the end exceeds and destroys him or her. 
Therefore, recognizing that adaptive therapy generally fails (for good or bad 
reasons), and that emancipation is put in abeyance, could it also mean that a 
particular form of rehearsal as social reproduction can be arrested in its 
course? To yield political results on that matter it is perhaps now time to 
leave, once more, the interiority of “places” designated by psychoanalysis in­




Berlant, Lauren. Cruel Optimism. Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2011.
Butler, Judith. “The Pleasure of 
Repetition.” In Pleasure beyond the 
Pleasure Principle, edited by Robert A. 
Glick and Stanley Bone, 259–76. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990.
Fraser, Andrea. “An Artist’s Statement.”  
In Museum Highlights: The Writings of 
Andrea Fraser, edited by Alexander 
Alberro, 3–15. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2005.
—. “Performance or Enactment.” In 
Performing the Sentence: Research and 
Teaching in Performative Fine Arts, edited 
by Carola Dertnig and Felicitas Thun-
Hohenstein, 122–27. Berlin: Sternberg 
Press, 2014.
—. “Projection, 2008.” In Andrea Fraser: 
Texte, Skripte, Transkripte / Texts, Scripts, 
Transcripts, edited by Carla Guini, 110–23. 
Cologne: Buchhandlung Walther König, 
2013.
Freud, Sigmund. “Fragments of an 
Analysis of a Case of Hysteria” (1905 
[1901]). In The Standard Edition of  
the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud, edited and translated  
by J. Strachey, 1–122. London: Hogarth 
Press, 1954–74.
—. “Remembering, Repeating and 
Working-Through (Further 
Recommendations on the Technique of 
Psychoanalysis).” In The Standard Edition 
of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud, edited and translated by 
J. Strachey, 147–57. London: Hogarth 
Press, 1954–74.
Gilligan, Melanie. “The Beggar’s  
Pantomime.” Artforum 45, no. 10 (Summer 
2007): 426–33.
Gilligan, Melanie, and Marina Vishmidt. 
“Economic Subjectivities in Crisis.” In and 
Materials and Money and Crisis, 95–105. 
Vienna: mumok/Buchhandlung Walther 
König, 2013. 
Green, André. “Transcription d’origine 
inconnue: L’écriture du psychanalyste; 
Critique du témoignage.” Nouvelle revue 
de psychanalyse 16 (1977): 27–64.
Guattari, Félix. “The Poor Man’s Couch.” In 
Chaosophy: Texts and Interviews 1972–
1977, edited by Sylvère Lotringer, 258. Los 
Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2009. 
Jay Street Collective. “Dora Script.” 
Framework (Summer 1981): 75–80.
Lacan, Jacques. “Tuché and Automaton.” 
In The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis, edited by Jacques Alain 
Miller, translated by Alan Sheridan,  
53–56. London: Penguin Books, 1979. 
Lehmann, Hans-Thies. Postdramatic 
Theatre. Translated and with an 
introduction by Karen Jürs-Munby, 
London, New York: Routledge, 2006.  
Lütticken, Sven. “Andrea Fraser: 
Institutional Analysis.” In Andrea Fraser, 
edited by Sabine Breitwieser, 31–42. 
Salzburg: Museum der Moderne, 2015.
Oppé, Felicity. “Exhibiting Dora.” Screen 
22, no. 2 (July 1981): 82.
Rainer, Yvonne. “Some Ruminations 
Around Cinematic Antitodes to the 
Oedipal Net(tles) while Playing with De 
Lauraedipus Mulvey, or, He May Be  
Off-Screen, but … ,” Independent 9, no. 3 
(April 1986): 22–25.
—. Feelings Are Facts: A Life. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2006.
Reynaud, Bérénice. “Impossible 
Projections.” Screen 28, no. 4 (Winter 
1987): 40.
Rich, B. Ruby. “Yvonne Rainer: An 
Introduction.” In The Films of Yvonne 
Rainer, 1–23. Bloomington, Indianapolis: 
Indianapolis University Press, 1989.
Rose, Jacqueline. “Dora: Fragment of an 
Analysis.” m/f 2 (1978): 5–21.
In Abeyance
210
Tomšič, Samo. The Capitalist 
Uncounscious: Marx and Lacan. London: 
Verso Books, 2015.
Winnicott, Donald W. Holding and 
Interpretation: Fragment of an Analysis. 
London: Hogarth Press, 1986.
In Abeyance
213
 Our Attempt / 
Notre Tentative 
 Achim Lengerer 
Achim Lengerer
Il écoute
           aucun animal n’écoute comme ça
                                                                    pour rien
                                       le bruit qui vient
                                       du plus profond de l’eau
He listens
               no animal listens this way
                                                for nothing
               to the sound coming
               from the depths of the water
— Fernand Deligny1
The listener here is Janmari, a boy of about fifteen, filmed by the French 
filmmaker Renaud Victor (1946–91) for the movie Ce gamin, là (This boy here), 
which was released in 1975. Shot over a period of several years, Ce gamin, là 
documents the attempt—la tentative—of the social worker and writer  Fernand 
Deligny (1913–96) to live, together with a rotating group of young adults, 
with autistic children in the south of France.
Deligny, who began working with “delinquent” and “difficult” children in the 
1940s, launched his first tentative en cure libre (attempt at liberated treatment) 
at the end of that decade, following it with a wide variety of projects in the 
1950s. In the mid­1960s, he briefly ran the drawing and painting studio at Jean 
Oury’s La Borde, one of the most famous clinics devoted to the practice of 
psychothérapie institutionnelle.2 There he met the mute, autistic Janmari, who 
would be at the heart of Deligny’s thinking throughout his last tentative,  
initiated in 1967.
That tentative, which took place in the Cévennes, in various small groups on 
farms scattered around the little village of Monoblet, was deliberately con­
ceived as an existence outside all institutional frameworks. Deligny’s young 
collaborators had no professional training; they were neither educators nor 
therapists. The most striking aspect of this tentative, however, was that these 
young adults never addressed Janmari and the other nonspeaking autistic 
1 Fernand Deligny (in voice-over) in Ce 
gamin, là. Translated by Caroline 
Hancock, Patrick Hubenthal, and the 
author.
2 A French movement of the 1960s and 
1970s calling for the fundamental reform 
(or, in the case of the antipsychiatry 
movement, the abolition) of psychiatric 
institutions.
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right or left ear, and on the other, the slight time difference in the reception of 
an auditory signal.7 A sensitivity to proximity and distance is thus inherent in 
the physical and physiological nature of the way we hear; the slight delay be­
tween the first pricked ear and the second, this span and spread, allows our 
brain to perceive the finest nuances of space. In contrast to the other senses, 
such as touch and taste, this ability to differentiate operates both in extreme 
proximity and at great distances. Nancy calls this, metaphorically, the “singular 
mobility, among the sensory apparatuses, of the pinna of the ear.”8
Questions of proximity and distance, of the mobility of the pinna of the ear, 
are of central importance to the tentative. The nuances of spatial perception 
allow for a balancing and a sounding of our shared living space. Deligny cap­
tures this in the word­image présence proche (close presence). The editor of 
Deligny’s collected writings, Sandra Álvarez de Toledo, notes that proche, in 
présence proche, should not be simply interpreted as another word for près, 
that is, “very near” or “not very far.”9 Rather, close presence must be a being­
present at a close distance or in distanced closeness. And hearing is one of our 
instruments for perceiving this.
2.
Audio
A young man is sitting on a rock playing a Jew’s harp. Children stand around; 
no one speaks. There is a bustle of wooden bowls, cutlery, pots, food. When-
ever the objects are in motion, sounds and tones are produced. Toward the 
end of the sequence, the young man claps twice with his arms extended, as 
though they were the two halves of the clapperboard used to synchronize a 
film’s audio and visual tracks.
3 Voix-off is the French term for voice-over 
(in German, Off-Stimme). I am currently 
working on a text in which I deal extensively 
with the unique characteristics of the 
voix-off in Ce gamin, là.
4 Jean-Luc Nancy, Listening, trans. 
Charlotte Mandell (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2007), 32.
5 Ibid., 6.
6 Ibid., 5.
7 For an overview (in German) of this 
process, see Nina van Ackern and Markus 
Lindenberg, “Räumliches Hören,” 




8 Nancy, Listening, 5.
9 “‘Close’ is not ‘near’ the child nor is it ‘for’ 
him.” Sandra Álvarez de Toledo, 
“Introduction et glossaire,” in Cartes et 
lignes d’erre / Maps and Wander Lines: 
Traces du réseau de Fernand Deligny 
1969–1979, ed. Sandra Álvarez de Toledo 
(Paris: L’Arachnéen, 2013), 12.
children with or through language. Janmari’s speechlessness thus became 
the basis for seeking other forms of communal life. The tentative was an at­
tempt outside language, outside the spoken word.
My involvement with Deligny began with translating the text of his voix-off in 
Ce gamin, là into German in collaboration with the visual artist Dominique 
Hurth.3 We approached the film as (amateur) translators; that is, by spending 
a great deal of time watching and, above all—this is inscribed in the process 
of translation—listening. So the circumstances and methods of listening to 
sounds and tones were my entry into thinking about the tentative. In this text, 
therefore, I would like to focus on the sonic space of the tentative: the sounds 
present in the Cévennes and their audio documentation on the soundtrack 
of the film Ce gamin, là.
What characterizes the soundtrack of Ce gamin, là? What sounds and tones 
are there in the tentative? What is the role of the production and perception 
of sounds in attempts to create a communal space? What is the function of 
recording in relation to the identity of a model community outside language?
1.
Audio
Dry grass is being burned in a field. Close by stands a boy, almost motionless. 
His body leans slightly forward, as if he were bracing himself against the waves 
of sound and smoke that blow directly into his face. From a bit farther away, 
we hear the tinkling bells of a flock of grazing sheep.
In his essay Listening (À l’écoute), Jean­Luc Nancy circles around two different 
French verbs for hearing: entendre and écouter. Entendre means hearing in 
the sense of understanding and can be literally translated as “to hear” or “to 
understand.” Écouter, on the other hand, stands for a kind of hearing, of lis­
tening, that “is listening to something other than sense in its signifying sense.”4 
In Nancy’s text, this pair of terms does not operate as an immovable, opposi­
tional either­or; rather, Nancy also thinks of écouter/listening as “straining 
toward a possible meaning, and consequently one that is not immediately 
accessible.”5 The ears are pricked: “To listen [écouter] is tendre l’oreille—liter­
ally, to stretch the ear.”6 The word tendre (to stretch, extend, hold out, strive) 
contains a specifically spatial extension. Unlike the eyes, the ears perceive in 
all directions; they perceive spatiality.
The basic condition of our binaural spatial hearing is, on one hand, the differ­
ences in volume produced by a sound’s proximity to or distance from the 
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imaging (in media such as maps and films) as part of an attempt at creating 
communality. In the dictionary one finds the French adjective commun(e) 
translated as “common” and the noun le commun as “community”—as some­
thing shared by many.
The communal space of the tentative, unlike those in many sociological mod­
els, is not one of linguistic negotiations and arrangements (since the non­
speaking children would not be able to participate in them), but rather “un lieu 
de vie en recherche”:12 a place of life in research, evolving through process 
and inventing itself through experimentation, with no family, party, or group 
affiliation (its exteriority to institutions is one of its constitutive features). In 
the tentative, there is no delineated and demarcated space for an isolate(d) in­
dividual because it is only through language, in turn, that an individual would 
be defined, determined, demarcated. Deligny’s conception of uniqueness, of 
“singularity,” is critical here. He writes that “most of the children here are not 
‘singular’ if we allow ourselves to hear that word in the sense of ‘alone,’ ‘indi­
vidual,’ ‘distinct from the others.’”13
4.
Audio
A young man is shaping a log with powerful blows of a hammer. A little girl 
stands beside him, beating out a second rhythm with another hammer. She 
pauses to give the blade of a knife a thorough going-over with her tongue 
(here the contemporary viewer is taken aback every time) and then returns to 
her polyrhythmic pounding on the log, now with two hammers. She hums  
softly to herself, imitating the rhythm of the blows.
Ce gamin, là consists of 16 mm sound and picture tracks synchronized after 
the fact on the cutting table. Untypically for a film belonging to the documen­
tary genre in its broadest sense, the film is silent for a third of its running 
time. The soundtrack is also unusual for another reason: a roughly twenty­five­
minute voix­off is distributed over the film’s ninety minutes. The film was 
originally intended to include no commentary, and the first rough cut was 
edited accordingly. The voix­off was recorded afterward in response to pres­
sure from the lead producer, François Truffaut.
Deligny evades the task of providing explanatory commentary: he says yes to 
speaking on the soundtrack (as the financing of the film hinges on this), but 
his way of speaking articulates a no. It is an act of resistance to the format of 
voice­over commentary, expressed not as a flat refusal, but by saying things 
differently, by “speaking in other images.” Deligny’s text arranges itself around 
the film’s images, comparable to the notion of the writer developed by Gilles 
Deleuze with reference to Marcel Proust, according to which the writer invents 
“a kind of foreign language within language” and causes language to be 
“seized by a delirium, which forces it out of its usual furrows.”10
In a sense, then, Ce gamin, là is a film that switches its soundtrack on and off. 
Sometimes we hear the original audio, synchronized with the picture; other 
times there are just projected images or Deligny’s voice in voix­off. In this way, 
the film unfolds its potential as a sound film—or, perhaps better, a “film with 
sound”—particularly when it is shown in the theater, for it is precisely the parts 
without sound that allow us, as watchers and listeners, to imagine a sound, 
in much the same way that the voix­off reechoes within us during the parts 
without speech. During the mute passages, we prick up our ears for the ab­
sent sound of the image on the screen.
3.
Audio
A little girl runs to the sound man and wraps herself, dancing, in the micro-
phone cable. The resulting feedback overloads and distorts the recording—
then the sound breaks off. In the silence of the soundtrack, the child goes on 
happily dancing.
Ten years after Deligny’s death, the French sociologist and political scientist 
Anne Querrien wrote the essay “Fernand Deligny, imager le commun” (Fernand 
Deligny, imaging the common) based on her detailed knowledge of the tenta­
tive and of Deligny’s word­images.11 Her text revolves around the verbs imager 
(to image, to visualize) and fabriquer (to fabricate); in it, she conceptualizes 
10 Gilles Deleuze, “Literature and Life,” trans. 
Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco, 
Critical Inquiry 23, no. 2 (Winter 1997): 229.
11 Anne Querrien, “Fernand Deligny, imager 
le commun,” Multitudes 24 (Spring 2006), 
http://www.multitudes.net/Fernand 
-Deligny-imager-le-commun. Querrien is 
coeditor of Multitudes and was secretary-
general of CERFI (Centre d’études,  
de recherches et de formation  
institutionnelles), an organization founded 
by Félix Guattari. A loose association  
of sociologists, urbanists, educators, and 
psychologists, this independent,  
decidedly left-wing research group was 
active from 1967 to 1987 and published 
many of Deligny’s writings in its journal, 
Recherche, including the voix-off from  
Ce gamin, là in 1975.
12 Ibid.
13 “La plupart des enfants là ne sont pas 
singuliers si nous laissons ce mot-là 
résonner du sens de seul, individuel, qui 
se distingue des autres.” Fernand Deligny, 
Singulière ethnie: Nature et pouvoir et 
nature du pouvoir (Paris: Hachette, 1980), 21 
(translated by Patrick Hubenthal).
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the children, the sounds of drums being beaten and bells being struck […] 
keep all outsiders away.”18 These immaterial boundaries are easily traced in 
some of the scenes from the film. About two­thirds of the way through, there 
is a slow pan across some of the buildings and outdoor spaces of the tenta­
tive: carried on the wind, a flute melody unfurls in and over this landscape. 
Through sounds like these, the tentative is enduringly embedded in a sonic 
space, forming a sphere of life that the children never leave. This sphere, it 
seems to me, corresponds to the range of their hearing.
Intermission: You don’t even look at each other, says Britta
What was the name of that piece from 2011? Spurious Emissions. For years 
now, I’ve been collaborating with my friend and fellow artist Dani Gal on a 
musical performance project called voiceoverhead, which builds on Dani’s 
extensive collection of documentary audio, sounds, and political speeches 
on record. The core of the piece is approximately fifty minutes of playing re­
cords, drawn from a limited subset of the collection. Our process is dialogical: 
one of us puts on a record, the other responds with a second or third. There 
is no written composition. During our performances, we stand some distance 
apart so the audience can experience us as two separate sources of sound; 
as a result, it is impossible for us to communicate by speaking during the per­
formance. What always astounds me is our ability to “play” with each other, 
even in moments of personal differences. In sharing the audio material, in lis­
tening (with the tension between the sensory qualities of the sound and the 
signifying qualities of the speeches documented on the records), there is a 
wordless interchange. You don’t even look at each other, says Britta in amaze­
ment after a performance at the Hessischer Rundfunk studio in Frankfurt. 
Why would we, we can hear each other, I reply, glossing over my uncertainty.
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What do the sounds and tones in the tentative do? They form the communal 
space outside language: we hear the voices of children who do not speak but 
do express themselves vocally. Humming, throat clearing, swallowing, rhyth­
mic imitations, the sounds of the environment, seemingly endless repeated 
sequences of vowels and consonants: a complexity of vocal utterances that 
remains wordless. Silent is not quiet, writes Querrien: “To be silent like  Janmari 
is not to be quiet, it isn’t a reaction; it is a posture, an attitude, a way of liv­
ing, a set of gestures that withhold speech.”14 Among these gestures are the 
children’s vocal sounds. The children contribute gestures of vocal presence 
to the community, a multitude of tiny gestures in a wordless space.15 This 
not­speaking is accompanied by a not­looking, not­gazing. We hardly ever see 
the children making eye contact. “Never the shadow of another in his field of 
vision” is how Deligny puts it in his voix­off.16
5.
Audio
A young man strides to a semicircle of stacked stone objects. He claps twice 
with his arms extended and then drags a piece of firewood across the uneven 
surface of one of the stones. The wood bounces four times. He drags it across 
the surface again, ending the action with a double tap on the stone. A second 
young man repeats the exact same sequence. Then the two of them place 
baskets, washtubs, pots, saws, and other objects on the stones in the back-
ground. They underscore their walking and carrying by drumming their fingers 
and knocking the objects against each other. 
At last a boy appears among the stones, standing in the exact center of the 
semicircle. Barely moving (it is the same boy who was standing in the smoke 
in the field), he dips his head and torso slightly to the right, then to the left.
In the film we can see and hear that the young adults who live with the autistic 
children produce nonlinguistic sounds as well. What can they do while “in­
tentionally” denying themselves their most powerful instrument, language? 
To keep the power of language from jumping its track, they do not use their 
voices; instead, they produce sounds and tones in many other ways, such as 
clapping their hands, striking a metal ring, and rhythmically rolling a rock 
back and forth in a basin. They also use a wide variety of instruments, such as 
Jew’s harps, flutes, and tambourines. “To listen,” Nancy writes, “is to enter 
that spatiality by which, at the same time, I am penetrated, for it opens up in 
me as well as around me, and from me as well as toward me.”17 This sonic 
space is an intangible, ungraspable spatiality that nonetheless forms a virtual 
internal and external boundary around the tentative: “The strange cries of 
14 “Silencer comme Janmari n’est pas se 
taire, n’est pas une réaction; c’est une 
posture, une attitude, un style de vie, un 
ensemble de gestes qui tiennent la parole 
forclose.” Querrien, “Fernand Deligny” 
(translated by Caroline Hancock and the 
author).
15 Le moindre geste (The slightest gesture)  
is the title of the first film released under 
Deligny’s name, in 1971.
16 “Pas l’ombre de l’autre jamais dans le 
champ de son regard.” Ce gamin, là 
(translated by Caroline Hancock, Patrick 
Hubenthal, and the author).
17 Nancy, Listening, 14 (emphasis in the 
original).
18 ”Die seltsamen Schreie der Kinder, der 
Klang von geschlagenen Trommeln  
und von den angestoßenen Glocken […] 
das hält jeden Fremden […] fern.”  
Jacques Lin, Das Leben mit dem Floß, 
trans. Ronald Voullié (Ostheim, Rhön: 
Peter Engstler, 2004), 35 (translated  
by Patrick Hubenthal).




Stone circle, second shot: a long lens shrinks the field of view. The boy has 
moved since the last sequence and is now standing behind the rearmost stone, 
facing in exactly the same direction as before. Again we hear the wood 
bouncing across the stone and the two handclaps, then one of the young men 
picks up the objects from the rear stone and takes them out of the circle. 
Seemingly without prelude, the boy picks up a basket and follows. Arriving at 
the center of the circle (where he had been standing before), he turns in a 
complete circle before vanishing in the cut.
Virtually motionless, ramrod straight: this is how the boy stands in the circle 
at first. He doesn’t even turn his head to see what is going on behind him. 
Without watching. He stands still: posture, pose. Without listening? Does he 
hear? Or is he, rather, à l’écoute, all ears, in receive mode? The boy is in  
receive mode, without intentionality (which is why he doesn’t need to turn 
around to monitor what is going on behind him to corroborate his accurate 
understanding). He is not listening; he’s receiving the sounds and tones that 
surround him. Yet within receive mode lies the germ of a potential action, un 
agir.21 Without warning, the boy picks up the basket.
In the voix­off, Deligny comes up with a word­image for the children’s recep­
tive state. Janmari is listening to a sound, water flowing from a spring, “and 
here he vibrates through and through, like a dowsing rod.”22 His body is all res­
onance; he is fully and completely his own resonating body, but also com­
pletely the resonant space of his surroundings, of the spring. Janmari, it is 
important to emphasize, is not some language­based figure of thought (as in 
Nancy’s text), but a resonating body that listens, and that listens to itself, in 
real life. Janmari, the resonating body of the tentative’s communality.
No Intermission
In summer 2014 I am working on an exhibition project about Deligny, taking 
motifs from Ce gamin, là as my starting point. Since the French word tentative 
comes from the Latin tentatum, which means “attempt” or “temptation,” but 
also a “prologue” or “rehearsal” in the theater context, I call the exhibition 
“Entretien sonore avec Fernand Deligny / Proben für eine Tonspur” (A sonic 
conversation with Fernand Deligny / Rehearsals for a soundtrack). One of the 
two exhibition spaces contains archival materials from Deligny relating to 
Ce gamin, là. The other is supposed to be a public workshop and rehearsal 
space for praxis­based encounters between the public and Deligny’s archive. 
Speaking is not allowed in this room. During the rehearsals, the sounds and 
movements are recorded with a ball­head microphone, which is particularly 
suited to recording sound in greater spatial depth. More often than not, the 
workshops fail; they almost never become “our” shared rehearsals. Why can’t 
we try out an attempt of our own? Today, the most important difference be­
tween a rehearsal and the tentative is clear to me: rehearsals have a beginning 
and an end, but the tentative does not; it knows no stopping, no interruptions. 
The attempt of the tentative has no intermission.
6.
Deligny and his collaborators are constantly documenting the tentative in 
various media in order to be able to perceive the communal space in extralin­
guistic (or, in the case of Deligny’s word­images, allolinguistic) ways: “imager 
le commun.”19 Image, imager, representation, illustration, visualization: along 
with the films, Deligny and his collaborators mainly use hand­drawn maps, 
with which they document the children’s daily movements and their own. Here 
Deligny distinguishes between dessiner, meaning “to draw” a picture, and 
tracer, meaning “to draw” a line, “to record” in a sketch, “to trace” a path. Thus 
a map does not have the status of a drawing (dessin); it is a trace, the visual 
track of the space in which the communal is negotiated, and the soundtrack 
of Ce gamin, là is its sonic equivalent.
Querrien calls the maps and the film artifices moteurs, propulsive tricks or ruses 
that expand the communal space of the tentative through media. They become 
cognitive tools and references for daily living in close presence. Only by means 
of these media can communality establish itself; without them it cannot be imag­
ined (imager) or produced (fabriquer). Communality arises from the interchange 
between documentation and world (the actual tentative). The connections are 
created by communally drawing, studying, and discussing the maps, by working 
on films (and, later, videos as well). Thus fabrication and imaging/imagining 
shape one another: “The common space is the trace of one within the other.”20
19 All the projects in the tentative involved a 
large number of participants, but two who 
deserve special mention are Jacques Lin 
and Gisèle Durand, who still live in 
Monoblet today.
20 “L’espace commun est la trace de l’un 
dans l’autre.” Querrien, “Fernand Deligny” 
(translated by Caroline Hancock and the 
author).
21 A key concept in Delignian thought is the 
distinction between agir (behavior, action 
without intention) and faire (intentional 
doing or making): “Nous, nous faisons 
quelque chose, c’est l’intention ça, c’est le 
langage: on fait la soupe, on fait la 
vaisselle, on fait je ne sais pas quoi. Un 
gamin autiste ne fait rien: c’est de l’agir.” 
(Us, we do something; that’s intention, 
that’s language: we make [faire] soup, we 
do [faire] the dishes, we do whatever. An 
autistic kid doesn’t do anything: it’s all 
behavior [agir].) Fernand Deligny, “Ce qui 
ne se voit pas,” Cahiers du Cinéma, no. 
428 (1990): 50–51 (translated by Patrick 
Hubenthal).
22 “Et là il vibre jusqu’à la moelle comme une 
baguette de sourcier.” Ce gamin, là 
(translated by Patrick Hubenthal).
Our Attempt / Notre Tentative Achim Lengerer
222 223
Audio
Janmari is lying stretched out beside a spring. He brings his face so close to 
the water that his nose almost touches its surface. He is covering his ears with 
his hands and his whole body is trembling. Then he turns his head, laughs—
facing directly toward the camera.
Translated from the German by Patrick Hubenthal
I would like to thank Elske Rosenfeld for her feedback and our helpful conver­
sations during the writing process.
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Rehearsal: Plan and Contingency / Art and Labor
The format of “rehearsal” as a possibility to integrate potentially dysfunctional 
methodologies into the filmic narrative appears as an apt technique to chal­
lenge the conventions of the respective genre. Rendering visible the “rehears­
ing” of new rules is challenging the all too virtuosic, and artistic production 
appears as the performance of a structurally open­ended learning process in 
front of a recording camera. It is, among other things, this blending of pri­
vate and public production spheres where precisely such moments that are 
usually eliminated from the final product become visible: moments of reluc­
tance and observation, of indecisiveness and awkwardness, of doubt and 
search, of making mistakes and failure, of hesitation and repetition. Procedures 
and mechanisms become visible that depend on deviating repetitions to con­
stitute rules, while at the same time also putting these to the test. This also 
involves a fundamental notion of the work on art, where shifting power relations 
manifest themselves, not least regarding the aim to render visible processes 
of artistic decision­making as a procedure oscillating between plan and 
contingency.1 
Casting: Subject Put to the Test
The specific constellation of the casting appears as a precondition of rehears­
al: not unlike the genre of the making of in other respects, “casting” as nar­
rative motive as well as a technique of staging presents itself as a subgenre, 
while at the same time becoming a more radical version of rehearsal, where 
the relation of direction and acting, of the sovereignty of interpretation and 
representation comes to a head on the basis of the question of power rela­
tions and self­enfranchisement, dominance, and submission, not least at times 
also touching upon sexualized aspects. The constellation of casting exacer­
bates this question by the fact that the transition between life and art, person 
and character takes place via a performance under the conditions of a sub­
jective evaluation of the skills, the “type,” and the flexibility of the performers 
who are tested on whether they will meet the requirements of the role.2 
Within the constellations of rehearsal and casting, the question is posed as to 
what kind of work it is precisely that is being invested into and represented 
1  In the framework of a screening and 
lecture series titled “Rehearsals Put to the 
Test,” realized in collaboration with the art 
historian and author Sabeth Buchmann 
(2013 Cinema of the Museum of Modern 
Art Vienna; series of courses at the 
Academy of Fine Arts Vienna), various 
manifestations of the format of rehearsal 
were investigated in the context of  
(neo-narrative) art film, as well as within 
other artistic practices. 
2 This is aptly exemplified, for example, in 
the film Salaam Cinema (Iran, 1995) by 
Mohsen Makhmalbaf.
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by artistic production.3 But what is more, within the casting it is exactly the 
relation of art and life, of performance and staging that is at stake. In the 
casting, the oscillation between reality and fiction emerges from the single 
body (and being) of a performer, thus something liminal adheres to it. It appears 
(if it is possible to phrase it that way) as an even “more existential” mode of 
self­representation and self­exploitation as self-performance regarding the 
procedures taking place within the conventions of rehearsal. 
Finally, it is nothing less but the weight of one’s own self that, within the casting, 
has to be thrown into the balance. Thus, the casting appears as a radical 
form of “rehearsal before the rehearsal” that—if at all—will provide the possi­
bility of participation in the forthcoming rehearsal. At this point it is not yet 
about rehearsing a character, a text, a position or an attitude; it is life itself 
that is put to the test. 
The subject finds itself on the test stand of a yet unknown (directorial) power 
(in the Foucauldian sense), transforming itself into an allegory of the term 
“subject put to the test” in a life that has only been rented. And even more than 
in the methodology of rehearsal, it is within the casting as a means of repre­
sentation, where an image of the production of fiction crystallizes—and there­
fore not least of the fiction of a precarious identity. While the ontological 
status of the actor­subjects within the classical film or theater rehearsal can 
be considered to be more or less “safe” (at least temporarily in the frame­
work of their roles that they have been assigned), the casting is primarily about 
casting the most suitable actor or actress, meaning to literally “cast” them 
into their role, as if they were material that will take on a form only later, in the 
casting mold. Jean­Luc Godard, who is not interested in stories but in ideas 
(and following this logic also does not cast actors for roles within narratives, 
but is rather interested in the question of the representation of history/ies that, 
within his oeuvre, are permanently questioned regarding their contingency), 
turns the conditions upside down in a typical Godardian gesture: in one of the 
first scenes of his film Éloge d’amour (titled De l’amour),4 it is not the actress 
who is cast in a role but it is the story itself that finds its form, if at all, only in 
the character itself: “Did you understand that it is not about the history of  
Eglantine, but that it is a moment of history […] of the profound history that 
passes through Eglantine? The moment of youth.”5 This document of a casting 
that appears within a fiction is being short­circuited with its own performance 
in a similar vein as the actress with the character that appears only by way of 
(hi)story, a (hi)story that can be activated only by passing through the body of 
the character/the actress. Thus, the fault line between reality and fiction finally 
becomes evident as symbolic marker. Here, Godard designs a blueprint of a 
casting constellation from the traces of a staging that by becoming visible 
represents a surplus for the viewer: an excess, a spillover of production, 
where character and person appear as incongruent, but—filtered through the 
instance of direction—are still searching for one another; the story that passes 
through the bodies of the actors spills through the gaps and over the borders 
of these instable corpor(e)alities.
In her short film Sternheim (2011), Austrian artist and filmmaker Marlies Pöschl 
deals with the question of identity and growing up from another perspective: 
here, the coming­of­age genre is paraphrased and abstracted in the framework 
of a casting situation. Sternheim is a juxtaposition of historic and contempo­
rary narratives on (self­)formation. On the one hand, the film relates to the 
bildungsroman Die Geschichte des Fräuleins von Sternheim,6 and, on the other 
hand, to the format of the TV casting show, which nowadays seems to be a 
contemporary substitute of the bildungsroman. Pöschl stages the story of 
twelve teenagers who team up in a secluded space to develop a play in the 
framework of a workshop, together with theater pedagogues Frauke and Eva. 
At the same time, scriptwriter Sophie and director Christoph hold a casting 
for their next film. This constellation represents two conflicting ideals of edu­
cation that exist in parallel and contradict each other: there is the functionalist 
ideal of the casting, and on the other hand the ideal of a workshop aiming at 
a free, liberated process. Through their joint work, the teenagers explore an 
interstitial space, having to invent their own roles within this setting as well as 
in real life. Sternheim engages with the narrative logics of both formats of bil­
dungsroman and casting show to query and radicalize them. Therefore the 
film drafts a Bildungsgeschichte (history of education) of the contemporary 
moment where identity becomes an unstable and contested factor. Pöschl 
employs conventions and clichés of documentary formats, while increasingly 
blending these with staged sequences, thereby creating a complex interlac­
ing of various levels of reality and identity: acting rehearsal and documentary 
plot, history and present, the fiction of narration and reality, characters and 
actors begin to overlap. Thus the film becomes a maze, which at any given 
moment seems to be almost impossible to exit, even for the director herself. 
3  Annemarie Matzke, Arbeit am Theater: 
Eine Diskursgeschichte der Probe 
(Bielefeld: transcript, 2012).
4  Jean-Luc Godard, Éloge d’amour (France, 
2001). Unless otherwise noted, all 
translations are my own.
5  “Alors bon, est-ce que vous faites une 
difference. [...] Est-ce que vous avez 
comprise que ce n’est pas l’histoire de 
Eglantine mais un moment de l’histoire  
[...] la grand histoire qui passe à travers 
d’Eglantine? Le moment de la jeunesse.” 
Ibid.
6  Sophie von La Roche, Geschichte des 
Fräuleins von Sternheim (Leipzig: Reclam, 
1986). Originally published in 1771.
Constanze Ruhm
228 229
Casting as Agency 
Over the course of the past two decades, the notion of agency—borrowed 
from social sciences and social anthropology (Pierre Bourdieu, Alfred Gell, 
Anthony Giddens, Piotr Sztompka)—made a career in the framework of theo­
retical debates. Here, this notion will serve as conceptual optics, through 
which the gaze on the methodology of casting will be focused more sharply, 
as it allows to precisely address the question of the power of agency (Hand-
lungsmacht) and self­enfranchisement of the actors (“actor” here as well in 
the sociological sense) or subjects. Even though in the framework of this es­
say it is impossible to fathom the complexity of this notion, I would still like to 
trace some of its prominent features.
In the text “Von Akteuren und agency: Eine sozialtheoretische Einordnung der 
structure/agency—Debatte,” social scientist Eberhard Raithelhuber writes: “If 
we consider humans as actors, we thereby often mean that individuals more 
or less consciously and reflexively are able to influence themselves and their 
environment. We assume that they possess a faculty, a capability or a power 
(Mächtigkeit) to act. […] When [the notion of agency] is translated into Ger­
man, it is usually and according to the context, rendered as Handlungsmächtig­
keit, Handlungsbefähigung or ­fähigkeit, described as transformative agency 
or it is simply equated with ‘acting.’”7 Against the background of this notion of 
agency, the methodology of casting could be understood to provide a model 
situation, within which precisely such tensions between structure (conven­
tions and rules of casting) and individual actions (of actors as well as of direc­
tors) can be made accessible and acted out at the same time, this always with 
regard to the contingency of the situation that an individual could have always 
acted differently.
This consideration will be illustrated with a scene from Mohsen  Makhmalbaf’s 
film Salaam Cinema (Hello Cinema) from the year 1995, its plot being exclu­
sively structured around a casting situation. The intra­diegetic director—played 
by Makhmalbaf himself—forces two girls who absolutely want to become 
actresses to make a choice between “being humane” (agency) and “being an 
actress” (structure), by not least re­delegating the power of agency away 
from his position as the “casting director” and toward the two candidates, and 
by also offering the (supposed) choice between being an artist and being 
human: “If you had to choose, would you rather be an artist or a humane per­
son? […] The one who wants to be an artist can stay. The one who wants to 
be more humane should go and not turn round.” 
In Rashid Masharawi’s short film Waiting from 2002 it is precisely this question 
of the subject’s agency that is being taken into account, while at the same 
time being reversed into its opposite—powerlessness: staged as a moment of 
deadlock that symbolically represents the status quo of the Palestinian con­
dition. The Palestinian actors and actresses who take part in a casting for an 
unnamed film are being instructed by their director (played by Masharawi 
himself) not to “perform” the condition of waiting, but simply to “wait”—an 
instruction aimed at the doomed attempt to stage a moment of inactivity in 
front of a recording camera. Like the play by Beckett, no one explains to the 
actors for what, with which attitude, or how long they should wait. The cast­
ing studio turns into an image of life in the refugee camps, and Waiting itself 
becomes an example of the de­differentiation of art and life. In such a way, 
the film is a metaphorical reflection on the condition of political deadlock as 
well as a form of transition that has become a permanent condition, which is 
the very living condition of the Palestinians. 
Insofar as the filmic fiction is canceled out by the reality of Palestinian living 
conditions, Masharawi’s Waiting appears as a metonymy of a political­artistic 
project, where it is worthwhile to rehearse for its realization. A commissioned 
work for Fareed Armaly’s documenta 11 (2002) contribution From/To,8 Waiting 
was shot as apparent documentation of a casting for Masharawi’s then planned 
feature film of the same title (which was realized later on), where various ac­
tors and actresses from Ramallah should have taken part. Owing to the usual 
political tensions in the region, the director was unable to return in time for 
the scheduled casting in Ramallah; therefore, the casting took place in Jordan, 
where Masharawi was staying at that time. The question being raised by this 
filmic study of the interrelation of (self­)perception and being perceived as a 
condition for the possibility of (inter­)action and participation, here, becomes 
an allegory of institutional and societal power structures. With the division of 
actor and role, the split in the subject becomes manifest. This split subject 
would need the fiction of a community to put itself to the test, while Palestine 
as a nation is caught in the condition of an ongoing casting. 
7 Eberhard Raithelhuber, “Von Akteuren  
und Agency: Eine sozialtheoretische 
Einordnung der structure/Agency—
Debatte,” in Vom Adressaten zum Akteur: 
Soziale Arbeit und Agency, ed. Hans 
Günther Homfeldt, Wolfgang Schröer,  
and Cornelia Schweppe (Opladen: Verlag 
Barbara Budrich, 2008), 19.
8 From/To was exhibited for the first time  
in Witte de With in Rotterdam in 1999. The 
project is a research-based, collaborative 
installation that charts Palestine not as 
topography but as contemporary 
topology. For documenta 11, which was 
curated by Okwui Enwezor, From/To was 
actualized by tracing notions of identity 
along connecting lines between idealistic 
and essentialistic positions, within which 




Primal Scene, Casting Couch, and Screen Test
As the primal scene of the filmic mise­en­scène, the methodology of casting 
as a performative and narrative device becomes itself a means to narrate 
transition and ambivalence. It brings to light the passage from actor/actress 
to character and back again, and the production of representation, as well 
as the representation of production: moments of failure, of endings, of repeti­
tion, of resumption. If one therefore interprets the trope of the casting as an 
Urszene, a primal scene of cinema, Roland Tavel and Andy Warhol’s Screen 
Test #2 can be understood to be its most radical and relentless mise­en­scène. 
In the text “Mario Montez: For Shame,” author Douglas Crimp writes: 
Ostensibly just what its title says it is, Screen Test No. 2 is the second of 
Warhol’s screen­test films of early 1965 in which Tavel, novelist, founding 
playwright of ridiculous theater, and Warhol’s scenarist from 1964 to 
1966, interviews a superstar for a new part (Screen Test No. 1 stars Philip 
Fagan, Warhol’s lover of the moment, who shared the screen with Mario 
Montez in Harlot, Warhol’s first sound film and the first in which Tavel 
participated). In the case of Screen Test No. 2, Mario is ostensibly being 
tested for the role of Esmeralda in a remake of The Hunchback of Notre 
Dame. He is shown throughout in a slightly out­of­focus close­up on his 
face, wearing (and often nervously brushing) a cheap, ratty dark wig. He 
also wears dangling oversize earrings and long white evening gloves. For 
a long time at the film’s beginning, he ties a long silk scarf into his wig, 
using, it seems, the camera’s lens as his mirror. After speaking the credits 
from off­screen, where he remains throughout the film, Tavel begins to 
intone, insinuate, cajole, prod, demand: “Now, Miss Montez, just relax … 
you’re a lady of leisure, a grande dame. Please describe to me what you 
feel like right now.” “I feel,” Mario begins his reply—and there follows 
rather too long a pause as he figures out what to say—“I feel like I’m in 
another world now, a fantasy … like a kingdom meant to be ruled by me, 
like I could give orders and suggest ideas.” 
Poor Mario. This kingdom is ruled by Ronald Tavel.9
Not unlike George Kuchar’s short film I, an Actress (1977), the methodology 
of casting as artistic medium in Warhol’s experimental setup becomes a pre­
text for making movies without having to make “movies.” With regard to the 
filmic economy, this strategy becomes a ploy, a cheap trick, a cheat. Screen 
Test #2 stages moments of mutual seduction that gain momentum mainly 
from the variable distances between character and actor/actress, prismatically 
refracted and multiplied by the self­staging of Mario as Maria Montez. At the 
same time, scenarios of exploitation and humiliation that manifest them­
selves in this game of deception, disappointment, withdrawal/denial and 
seduction, submission and insult—in terms of their motives—thoroughly 
touch upon  sadomasochistic, sexually charged phantasmagorias. From here 
it’s not a far cry toward pornographic genres, also considering Warhol’s own 
predilection for prostitutes, drug addicts, hustlers, and porn stars as actors/ 
actresses for his movies: it comes as no surprise that the motive of the casting 
is favored by the porn film industry. 
When one, for example, googles “casting and porn,” the hits are countless 
(naturally including invitations for actual castings). A pivotal link between the 
subject of casting and the pornographic genre is the question of economy: 
the basic motto being to get the most out of the production conditions with 
the most basic means, using cheap equipment, without money, with non­ or 
semiprofessional actors or actresses, and without any concern for questions 
of filmic dramaturgy and aesthetics, of course, not least so as to produce 
those moments of alleged authenticity, or “real life,” that are so popular in the 
porn genre. 
Therefore, porn merely responds to the desire of the camera and to the sco­
pophilia of the audience—to the key paradigm of cinema, so to speak, that 
goes back not least to Dziga Vertov’s Kinoglaz (1924). The main issue is that 
the cast is right, and their suitability is being put to the test in the framework 
of the pornographic casting fantasy. The relations are less than subtle, and 
the role cannot be created because there is no such thing like a role. One 
does things only to show that things can be done; the goal is the money shot. 
It is here where bare actions, stripped of any further elaboration, are being 
performed, and perhaps it is this that is sometimes so moving, similar to 
 Mario Montez’s gruesomely touching performance of himself in Screen Test #2. 
In porn, theatrical performance turns into sexual performance.
If one considers the porn film industry as a kind of degraded cousin of  
Hollywood cinema, or—to put it a bit more elegantly—as Hollywood’s dark 
mirror, one could claim that these parallel worlds are certainly linked by a 
number of motives, a central subject here being the notorious casting couch. 
While in porn, the couch as functional furniture is mostly visible in the frame, 
in Hollywood cinema, it remains as a profilmic off­space. It was Warhol who  
illustrated this aptly in Couch (1964)—a film that was shot in the Factory with 
chance visitors over the course of some months. A big old couch is the center 
stage, where the actors and actresses indulge in various social, verbal, and 
sexual activities.
9  Douglas Crimp, “Our Kind of Movie”: The 
Films of Andy Warhol (Cambridge, MA: 





In porn, one could say, the tropes of cinematic desire are cannibalized: like 
the projector from the cinema auditorium, the foreplay (the repressed of the 
filmic logic) is excluded here to give way for hardcore, for the hard kernel of 
the real, namely, as porn. Pornographic representation disintegrates the con­
ventions of cinema—the production following the logic of capital closely, as 
it is directed toward and capitalizing on the moment of the so­called money 
shot. Thus, one could say that the casting is not just a pre­form, or the foreplay 
of rehearsal, but it is also a pre­pornographic form, which at times sketches 
an even more brutal representation of a symbolic interaction than porn film—
a symbolic interaction that in the film itself must never become evident. 
Casting Agency
The documentary film Exhibition by Jean­François Davy from the year 1975 is 
a portrait of a porn actress, a so­called hardeuse named Claudine Beccarie. 
It is shot in the style of cinema verité; like in some of Jean Rouch’s films, one 
can see the protagonist sitting at the editing table commenting on scenes 
from the film and on her performance. Later, we see her in front of the en­
trance of a Parisian cinema, where films titled Les joyeuses, La chatte sans 
pudeur, or Chaleurs danoises are screened that feature her as principal ac­
tress, and where she interviews mainly male passers­by on their relation to 
pornographic movies, on their self­perception as viewers, on questions of 
identification and seduction, and finally also with regard to the possibility of 
becoming an actor in one of her future productions. 
Claudine asks a visibly tantalized and at the same time flattered stranger if he 
could imagine shooting a movie together with her? “Peut­être, pourquoi pas? 
Ça pourrait être très agréable,” he replies, while his facial expression moves 
through conflicting emotions. If he could imagine being undressed in front of 
a camera, Claudine continues her enquiry—here, the porn actress becomes the 
casting director herself. In the end, her question remains unanswered, and it 
seems reasonable to presume that the potential casting candidate has flunked 
the casting.
A German version of this text was originally published in kolik film, special 
 issue 21 (March 2014).
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Rehearsal as film is a subdomain of a more general genre. It denotes the in­
clusion of circumstances of production into the product. This might make 
one file the phenomenon of rehearsal as film with other modes of critical  
reflection on power relations pertinent to a production, modes of (self­)en­
lightment, or with claims to unveil the technological, economical, or ideological 
conditions of media production. But, as I would suggest, the tendency to con­
flate the frame with the image, the offscreen with the on­screen, should 
rather be considered as a form of “bigger in life” (as opposed to “bigger than 
life”), or as a means to get hold of film’s immanent conditions of vivification 
and mortification: as an attempt to get a grip on the ontological implications 
of the fact of film; and this fact of film is a fact within the world after World 
War II: the global breakthrough of visual production and consumption as cor­
relate of a specific kind of survival. Or, as Avital Ronell puts it, in taking tele­
vision as the acme of visual production: “In a decisive way it depends on the 
enigma of survival [...] it attenuates survival’s shocking incomprehensibility” 
and “considers the being­live or survival as the critical riddles of our time.”1 
While, traditionally, media self­reflexivity is considered a remedy against any 
confusion of film and reality, rehearsal as film, in this context, locates the on­
tological aspects of the “world viewed” exactly here, inside media production, 
or, more precisely, the capturing of the captured between its taking place 
and the filmic confirmation that it actually did take place.
Rehearsal
Rehearsal in film is, first of all, people being filmed while doing their work—
which, in this case, happens to be the work of rehearsing. Darren Aronofsky’s 
film Black Swan (2010) is one such standardized example: dancers are filmed 
while rehearsing for a ballet. The film’s plot of a young woman under (mental) 
pressure in an elitist, competitive world of dance is clearly distinct from the 
ballet being rehearsed, Swan Lake. But in other films, in which the filmed re­
hearsal is less separate from the film, when it affects the film in a more ephem­
eral way, an additional thing occurs. In that case, the filmed rehearsal is some­
thing different from any other type of work being filmed, like, for example, the 
tasks of a police squad that make it into so many examples of visual enter­
tainment. The filmed work of rehearsal is capable in its quality of “testing” 
(Ronell), its rehearsability, of taking over the status of its respective film. A 
1  Avital Ronell, “Trauma TV: Twelve Steps 
beyond the Pleasure Principle,” in The 
ÜberReader: Selected Works of Avital 
Ronell, ed. Diane Davis (Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press, 1989), 63–88. Stanley 
Cavell historicizes television in a similar 
fashion, and specifically names “the 
discovery of the concentration camps  
and the atomic bomb.” Stanley Cavell, 
“The Fact of Television,” Daedalus 111, no. 4, 
Print Culture and Video Culture (Fall 
1982): 75–96.
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captured rehearsal can become the film itself. The profoundly diachronic rela­
tion implicit in any rehearsal—here the rehearsal, there, projected into some 
future, the rehearsed object (the final performance)—gets disrupted when re­
hearsal and rehearsed become one thing (or film). 
A film like Cathérine Breillat’s Sex Is Comedy (2002) belongs to the master­
pieces of that genre in which the rehearsal is more than just one activity 
among others, in which it is not only in the film but comes as film.2 In Sex Is 
Comedy, the film­project­under­construction (which is intra­diegetically an-
other film whose title we do not know) is intricately related to Sex Is Comedy’s 
“narration”: a film director trying to do a pornographic film, which seems to 
consist of an encounter between a young woman and a young man. She re­
hearses, tests costumes and props (e.g., a dildo for the male lead, which 
supplants his own genital). In the process of doing so, the film unfolds a story 
of the director’s difficulties to cope with the sulking male protagonist and to 
(over­)identify with the female lead. Here, as in so many other cases of that 
genre, the two (story­)lines are not completely identical, some last remains of 
what the film to be constructed could eventually look like, what it could be 
about. But this “remain” is rather a function of the primary film, a subterfuge 
for the deployment of the film’s (anti­)narration. 
While the existent and the nonexistent film may be closely interconnected, 
the respective share of the unaccomplished film (that we will not see, or will 
only catch a glimpse of) in the actually accomplished film (which we see in 
its entirety) can differ. The whole genre of “film­in­film” films could be differ­
entiated along the line of their specific shares.3 Off­takes, internal discussions, 
fights, interviews, and rehearsal sequences blur the distinction between pro­
duction and product. The irony that this often engenders is a romantic one,4 
to the extent that it translates Friedrich Schlegel’s postulations concerning 
literature into film.5 Though in most cases we are not dealing with the full 
scope of the uncanniness of a mise en abyme,6 some uncanniness remains if 
the film we are witnessing to be unfinished, to be rehearsed, ends up being 
exactly what we actually see. Which is, in a strict sense, impossible, because 
rehearsal and rehearsed have to remain separate if the notions of “rehearsal” 
and “performance” are to still make sense: no presence can be its own 
anteriority. 
This impossibility or antinomy is interesting insofar as it is, in a limited sense, 
characteristic of film in general, as film—in its sheer ability to capture chronic 
Lebenswelt, streets, horizons, landscapes, people—implies openness or 
chance encounters, and, immediately, by having once captured it, annuls all 
of it. The unfinishedness of any rehearsal, the deferral of a postponed ac­
complishment, that is the final representation, the rehearsal as makeshift, all 
that is enclosed and negated inside the film once the rehearsal is captured. 
Stephan Geene
The filming procedure is therefore doomed to do exactly what any rehearsal 
needs to avoid; namely, seclusion and finishedness. The doing­it­not­for­real 
(rehearsing), then, becomes the only kind of real that remains. Rehearsal as 
film is a film that juxtaposes the attestation of people doing things in a visible 
way (not linguistically), and the denial of its accomplishment. 
Rehearsal as film, therefore, as an inclusion of the off in the on, and vice versa, 
an inclusion of a not­taking­place in a taking­place, ends up being nothing 
else but a well­established if not commonplace element of the theory of film. 
But why is there the ambiguity in the oscillation of presence and absence, why 
is this cultural trope still of interest, and why does it “survive”? We could pose 
these questions to Lee Edelman who asks, in a similar way, why Shakespeare’s 
Hamlet with its famous phrase “to be or not to be” has survived as a “founda­
tional text of Western culture” and as “modernity’s ideology of cultural sur­
vival”? For Edelman, this ideology consists in the “promise of secular temporal 
closure intended to restore an imaginary past in a future endlessly deferred.”7 
Edelman draws his argument from Jacques Derrida’s seminal philosophical 
position of a presence­absence dichotomy. For Derrida, as he stressed in one 
of his last public conversations, survival is a state beyond this specific dichot­
omy between present and nonpresent, and furthermore, between alive and 
dead. Derrida considers survival to be a personal condition of “millions of liv­
ing—humans or not—who are deprived of the most elementary things, but 
also of ‘human rights,’” which means, first of all, “to be deprived of the right 
of a life worth being lived.”8 
For Derrida, the meaning of survival is due to a “structural dimension,” the 
meaning of which is not to be “added to live or to die. It is originary: life is 
2 We might add Rainer Werner Fassbinder’s 
Warnung vor einer heiligen Nutte (1971), 
Yvonne Rainer’s Lives of Performers 
(1972), Jean-Luc Godard’s Passion (1982), 
Olivier Assayas’s Irma Vep (1996), and 
Bertrand Bonello’s Le Pornographe (2002). 
3 Early examples are Buster Keaton’s 
Sherlock Jr. (1924), Billy Wilder’s Sunset 
Boulevard (1950), and Stanley Donen and 
Gene Kelly’s Singin’ in the Rain (1952). 
More recent examples include Jean-Luc 
Godard’s Le Mépris (1963), François 
Truffaut’s La nuit américaine (1973), or 
Tom DiCillo’s Living in Oblivion (1995).
4 DiCillo’s Living in Oblivion is a comedy, 
but, as a rather different example, 
Fassbinder’s Warnung vor einer Heiligen 
Nutte is not less funny.
5 ”Das Produzierende mit dem Produkt 
darstelle, […] und in jeder Darstellung  
sich selbst mit darstellen, und überall 
zugleich Poesie und Poesie der Poesie 
sein,” Friedrich von Schlegel, Athenäums-
Fragmente (Leipzig, 2005), 105. 
6 As in David Lynch’s Lost Highway (1997).
7 Lee Edelman, “Against Survival: 
Queerness in a Time That’s Out of Joint,” 
Shakespeare Quarterly 62, no. 2,  
(Summer 2011): 148.
8 Jacques Derrida, “Apprendre à vivre  
enfin: Entretien avec Jean Birnbaum,” Le 
Monde (supplement), October 12, 2004 
(my translation).
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survival. In common language, ‘to survive’ means ‘to go on living,’ but also, 
‘to live on after one’s death.’ Walter Benjamin, when he talks about translation, 
underlines the distinction between überleben on the one hand (to survive 
death, as a book might survive its author’s death or a child its parent’s) and 
fortleben on the other hand, which means to go on to live, living on, to con­
tinue to live.”9 
Derrida argues that the state beyond life and death translates as an “uncon­
ditional affirmation of life.” He considers it to be “not simply that which remains, 
but life’s most possible intense form,” like “happiness.” And, interestingly, he 
affirms the same “even to the unhappy moments in his life.”10 Derrida’s conver­
sation has been explicitly connected to one of his most important books, 
The Spectres of Marx (1993); by musing about its motto apprendre à vivre enfin 
(learning, finally, how to live) and addressing the book’s most central inten­
tion, to make a coming form of justice thinkable. Derrida is extremely close to 
Giorgio Agamben who states, in a related project, The Coming Community 
(1993), that the sheer taking place of things is what the coming politics has to 
face, where some messianic act is taking place. One of his arguments con­
sists in his observation that love is not love if it is not arbitrary, that is, if it is 
not for any reason.11 The most radical realization of this idea might be Marguerite 
Duras’s film Le camion (1977). Duras detaches the film’s narration—a woman 
leaving her hometown after hitchhiking on a truck—of a documentary­style 
filming of a truck that passes through an average French industrial zone in the 
countryside for the duration of the whole film. The narration of the woman 
and a truck driver, enclosed in the truck driver’s cabin is never visualized; the 
truck is only filmed from the outside. The narration is only represented by 
Duras herself, who is seen sitting next to Gérard Depardieu in a kind of studio, 
as they are both reading the scenario. But Duras’s most peculiar decision 
consists in her use of a strict linguistic past conditional tense for writing (and 
reading) the scenario: “It would have been a street close to the sea. She 
would have been crossing a big, empty plateau. A truck would have been  
arriving,” and so on.12 
It is the use of this conditional mode that makes it possible for Duras to love 
the film’s characters and, we could add, the whole scenario of a devastated 
postwar French landscape and its destroyed inhabitants. A love, anticipating 
Agamben’s “quodlibet” and its privileging of “libet” (as in ad libitum) over 
arbitrariness; a love that doesn’t mean to contradict this world’s gloominess, 
its unseemliness, its unloveability—it is part of it.
In the Cut // Existential Matter and Film
One of the films that focus on the rehearsal­as­film principle in the most con­
centrated way, where rehearsal and rehearsed are interlocked or even (if 
that is possible), where the rehearsal and the final state of the rehearsed co­
incide completely, is a film that is—by its subject—far removed from any kind 
of ad libitum it seems: H Story (2001) by Japanese filmmaker Nobuhiro Suwa, 
a film that tackles the events of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. 
H Story is, at first sight, a film composed of footage, sometimes of even rushes, 
taken from the making of a remake of Alain Resnais and Marguerite  Duras’s 
film Hiroshima mon amour (1959). In H Story we see the (real—intradiegetic 
equals extradiegetic) director, Suwa, directing his actress and actor. What 
could be considered as a making of, as it is common for DVD extras, is actually 
something completely different: the film, of which the making of would be 
the prequel, does not exist outside this making of. It is itself the film, and not 
by means of its failure, but just as the (only) way to achieve the film’s alleged 
intentions: to relate to what Hiroshima mon amour meant in the past and could 
do now. Suwa constructs his film in a threefold manner: he films people while 
rehearsing, he relates this rehearsal explicitly to a given film (Hiroshima mon 
amour), and he presupposes his reference to one of the most furious existen­
tially, politically loaded films in the history of the genre. It is maybe the historical 
film that tries to define the condition of surviving this man­made disaster—the 
atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
H Story follows Hiroshima mon amour in as far as it takes as its departing point 
a situation that is quite remote from the description of the catastrophe, a 
situation as extremely commonplace as it is emblematic: a heterosexual couple 
in bed. Any film may start like that. The situation implies, intradiegetically, 
that both of them are alone with each other, in an intimacy that could be con­
sidered as just the type of intimacy modern societies paradigmatically offer.13 
A banal situation, but also a pillar in the construction of the liberal (economi­
cally as much as in regard to sexual morals) Western societies of the post–  
World War II period: autonomous subjects free to make use of their sexuality. 
This sexual option, more generally, is widely considered as being the epitome 
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Giorgio Agamben, The Coming 
Community (Minnesota: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1993).
12 Marguerite Duras, Le camion (Paris: Les 
Editions de Minuit, 1977), 7.
13 Patrice Chéreau’s film Intimacy (2001) 
presents a kind of literal procedure for 
analyzing this situation. The Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung characterized the  
film as the “drama of an a-personal love 
affair.” Evelyn Schielke, “Drama einer 
unpersönlichen Liebe,” in FAZ, June 6, 2001 
(my translation).
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of fulfilled time, as an antidote or simply a counterpart to the threatening, 
empty, or homogenous time of the capitalist condition—the empty time. But it 
is, and was, not less connected to the ennui of postwar societies, their empti­
ness, their generalization of commodity culture into the private realm—as 
“the sickness of eros” (Antonioni). 
Suwa eliminates erotic passion. His opening scene, with two people in bed, 
is immediately linked to their acting work. By choosing well­known actors or 
actresses for his film, such as Béatrice Dalle for “she” (role name) and Hiroaki 
Umano, not less recognizable for connoisseurs of Japanese film, Suwa not only 
references the film amid claims of critical art­house culture, he adds another 
level to the film’s tension of actor versus role: here we have a close­up of people 
in a supposedly nonpublic moment (two people in bed; both actor and ac­
tress exhibiting their acting capabilities). This diremption or divisiveness, as it 
is given in any film, between role and actor, overstated here through imple­
mentation of the making of into the film, is fortified as an exemplary scene, 
realized through the bodies and personae of Dalle and Umano.
The actors, out of character, might be “really” themselves, now, in their failure 
to act but, of course, this might as well be a mise­en­scène twist—they might 
be acting as nonacting, and this remains in a purposefully constructed sphere 
of indecisiveness. What remains definitive: it is them, these actors, defined 
by the record of their appearance in the given moment in time and the given 
bodily and personal conditions; it is right now, and charged with a drama ex­
pressed in their faces, or present as a surrogate in them.
And it is exactly this point that Suwa translates from Duras’s original screen­
play into his film: the drama of an actress, as shown in her face. Dalle, the 
“she”—quite emblematic and characteristic of a male perspective it is the 
woman who is carrier of the existential drama—is unable to remember her 
lines. She reveals a profound problem to do her work here: to rehearse. The 
project in its total seems to make her suffer. This suffering might be due to 
the project’s subject (Hiroshima) or to the complicated structure of Suwa’s 
film, but it could also stem from Dalle’s own personal, or individual crisis.
Suwa tantalizes her. He “cuts” her—in the sense of editing her in a jumpy way, 
in maximizing the heterogeneity with which she is shown, but also by inter­
rupting her, capturing her in overlong takes, observing her while sleeping, 
forcing her to repeat herself, to do the same gestures over and over again. He 
“nails” her down with a sewing machine (the editing device) that attaches 
her breath in an ornament of stitches. He is cruel to her, maybe not the real 
her, but rather to her exteriority: her being as being exterior. So maybe he 
constitutes an ulterior exteriority. He adapts to her being exterior.
How does Suwa relate to the original movie, and what is Hiroshima mon amour? 
Resnais and Duras’s film is, in a sometimes documentary and material mode, 
a testimony to an eradicated city. The fact that this catastrophe took place and 
became a symbol of the structural atrocities of technological modernity is at 
the film’s core. The catastrophe is central to the film’s premise, as seen in the 
infinite circling of the figure of she—here: Emmanuelle Riva, who is an actress 
that “plays” an actress, since the intradiegetic figure, too, is an actress in 
search of an understanding of the events—her visits to the museum, her re­
peated questions addressed to her lover, whether he was in Hiroshima at the 
time or not, and so on. The actress plays—intradiegetically—only a minor role 
in a film on Hiroshima, which has figures representing nurses, injured people, 
and hibakusha, victims of the fallout. When she is not used on the set, she 
drifts through the destroyed city. She does this in the state of detachment that 
might be characteristic to her as a person, but also as it is the usual boredom 
of being part of a film shoot. Hiroshima mon amour juxtaposes this detachment 
or casual, temporary alienation to the historical concatenation of a most de­
structive world war, that she, the she­figure, too, cannot forget. Memories of 
what she experienced in Nevers, France, during the war flash back to her all 
the time. Maybe it is the very involuntariness of these memories that gives 
her the feeling of not being master of her memories: they enter when you do 
not want them; they fade when you try to keep hold of them.
 
The drama of the Hiroshima bomb is so extreme that remembering/surviving 
and forgetting/dying seem precariously alike, and also seem to be happening 
at the same time, or what remains of an adequate idea of time. The extent of 
the catastrophe is measured by this equilibrium. The question as to how sur­
vival can be possible after that and what memory means is being relegated to 
the question of what type of thin time she is experiencing now, the time of 
these disturbing forty­eight hours of erotic passion and intensity. It is a rem­
nant of time, since it is so evident that it is a time without future and without 
any past: the lovers will not meet again. And in this constellation of a foreclosed 
post-ness, what kind of time is there that rests? 
For Cathy Caruth, the film is dealing with an “unclaimed experience,” or an 
“unclaimable” one. Caruth locates the film in the interspace between “history 
and the body,” or the “exploration of their relation.”14 Memory, owing to trauma, 
disrupted narrative, and, as we can observe in particular for the female figure, 
involuntary flashbacks, is in danger of being “erased.” In Hiroshima mon amour 
the repetition drive is installed, as Caruth argues, in the parallel of a repeat­
edly uttered dialogue (He: “You saw nothing in Hiroshima. Nothing.” She: “I 
14 Cathy Caruth, Experience, Trauma, 
Narrative, and History (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1996), 26.
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Literaturesaw everything, everything.”) and a filmic montage of dead body parts (of vic­
tims) and not less fragmented body parts of the lovers. The “betrayal of 
sight,” Caruth says, is induced by the man’s denial of her, the character, being 
able to see anything that “the act of seeing, by the very establishing of a 
bodily referent, erases, like an empty grammar, the reality of an event.”15 The 
actress who is taking part in the film’s intradiegetical reenactment of historical 
events in Hiroshima is to reenact something she originally did not participate 
in. Under the pressure of the catastrophe, she cracks up, starts to distrust her 
(future) memorability. Will she be able to remember her actual form of happi­
ness? She anticipates her future forgetting by losing the memory of her actual 
lover already, while he is still present. At the same time she is haunted by in­
voluntary memories of an anterior lover, a German “enemy” soldier. Is he, 
who died some time ago, already dead when she has to live through his slow 
dying—in which she assisted with for about as long as she lives together with 
her actual lover—over and over again? It is as if she still sits beside the corpse 
that was once her lover. 
Ronell explicitly refers to Caruth’s reading of trauma and memory, and links 
the condition of contemporary modes of seeing to this historical juncture. 
This survival is, indeed, beyond life and death, but it does not entail an Aufhe-
bung in an “affirmation” of life, as Derrida was claiming. Edelman’s “against 
survival,” as the title of his essay announces, objects against the very ideolog­
ical fiction of a “future reproductivism,” which delegates the unfinished, we 
could say, everything that is not yet “something,” that is not yet “one” (which 
would to be nothing) as long it is not accomplished in some deferred future. 
The unfinished, the “zero,” is relegated to the position of death. 
The lovers in Hiroshima mon amour remain unfinished, in a complete way, in 
spite of all the intensity they were able to achieve. H Story incorporates this 
very unrest, somewhat diminished, as the basis of the mode the film has been 
manufactured in. Its condition of rehearsal as film is this unrest.
15 Ibid., 29.
 Agamben, Giorgio. The Coming 
Community. Minnesota: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1993.
 Caruth, Cathy. Experience, Trauma, 
Narrative, and History. Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1996. 
 Cavell, Stanley. “The Fact of Television.”  
In Video Culture: A Critical Investigation, 
edited by John G. Hanhardt, 192–219. 
Layton, Utah: G. M. Smith, Peregrine 
Smith Books, in association with Visual 
Studies Workshop Press, 1986.
 Derrida, Jacques, “Apprendre à vivre 
enfin: Entretien avec Jean Birnbaum.” 
Supplement, Le Monde, October 12,  
2004.
 Duras, Marguerite, Le Camion. Paris: Les 
Editions de Minuit, 1977. 
 Edelman, Lee. “Against Survival: 
Queerness in a Time That’s Out of Joint.” 
Shakespeare Quarterly 62, no. 2  
(Summer 2011): 148–69.
 Ronell, Avital, “Trauma TV: Twelve Steps 
beyond the Pleasure Principle.” In  
The ÜberReader: Selected Works of Avital 
Ronell, edited by Diane Davis, 63–88. 
Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989.
Alive Supreme Stephan Geene
Image Credits 245
 Image Credits Contingency and Plan: Working in Theater
Annemarie Matzke
Fig. 1
Conception rehearsal for Heiner Müller’s 
The Scab under the direction of the author, 
Deutsches Theater Berlin, 1987. “Konzep­
tionsprobe: Harry Pietzsch, Horst 
Weinheimer, Margit Bendokat, Jan Josef 
Liefers, Horst Hiemer, Petra Segtrop, 
Wolfgang Utzt, Heiner Müller, Erich 
Wonder” in Stephan Suschke, Müller Macht 
Theater (Berlin: Theater der Zeit, 2003), 95. 
Photo: Grischa Meyer. Courtesy of Grischa 
Meyer and Theater der Zeit.
The Rehearsal as Metaphor for Metamorphosis 
The Pictorial Dramaturgy in Velázquez’s The 
Spinners, or The Fable of Arachne
Christine Lang
Fig. 2
Diego Rodríguez de Silva Velázquez, Las 
hilanderas, o la fábula de Aracne (The 
Spinners, or the Fable of Arachne), 1655–
60. Oil on canvas, 167 x 252 cm. © Museo 
Nacional del Prado.
Fig. 3
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